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Summary
This thesis answers three research questions in the field of firm-level productivity, drawing on
recent empirical frameworks that allow me to use detailed production datasets to simultaneously
estimate firm heterogeneities in productivity, consumer demand and price-cost markups.
Trade Reform Redux: Prices, Markups and Product Quality revisits the widely-studied Indian tariff
liberalization that began in 1991 to show that rising product price-cost markups, documented
in the recent literature are linked to quality upgrading responses to lower tariffs on imported
intermediates.
In On The Productivity Advantage of Cities, a co-authored paper, we shed new light on the nature
of agglomeration externalities for which most theory focuses on differences in technical ability
of firms across space, but for which most evidence relies on productivity measures that may be
biased by differences in prices across space. We provide new evidence from France that shows
little heterogeneity in the technical efficiency -– the ability to turn a basket of inputs into physical
outputs, or what we call quantity TFP -– displayed by firms in dense and less-dense areas, but
some heterogeneity in the prices firms are able to charge, as well as a positive correlation between
efficient allocation of resources within regions and the density of regions.
And in The UK’s Great Demand Recession, a co-authored paper, we estimate changes in revenue
total factor productivity, i.e., TFP estimated using deflated sales data; quantity TFP; consumer
demand and other measures for UK firms before, during and after the Great Recession. Our
results show weakness in quantity TFP and demand pushed down productivity in manufacturing
and services.
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in its use of these datasets and methods to provide
new understanding of firms’ responses to a range of economic forces, with implications for both
theory and policy in all three settings.
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4.9 Regressions of TFP-R measures on ã, λ̃ and ˜̄q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.10 Regressions of log prices and log markups on a, λ and log capital . . . . . 112
4.11 Service industries: Production function coefficients from the WLD estim-
ation procedure using revenue as a measure of output. . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.12 Real, actual and official price index changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.13 Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.14 Manufacturing. Standard labour productivity decomposition (factor pro-
portions version) over the period 2003-2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.15 Manufacturing. More detailed labour productivity decomposition (factor
proportions version) over the period 2003-2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.16 Services. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the period
2003-2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.17 Services. Standard labour productivity decomposition (factor proportions
version) over the period 2003-2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.18 Services. More detailed labour productivity decomposition (factor pro-
portions version) over the period 2003-2013. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
A.1 Markups by sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
A.2 Passthrough of marginal costs to prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V
A.3 Prices and output tariffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI
A.4 Regressions of prices, marginal costs and markups on output and input
tariffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII
A.5 Pro-competitive effects of output tariffs on markups . . . . . . . . . . . . IX
xi
A.6 OLS regressions of firm-product characteristics on tariffs with market
share interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX
B.1 Revenue productivity, density and product composition effects (number of firms
weighted, SP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXI
B.2 Revenue productivity, density and product composition effects (revenue weighted,
SP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXI
B.3 OLS regressions of standard revenue productivity measures on ZE population
density (revenue weighted, 2-digit dummies, various samples) . . . . . . . . . . XXII
B.4 OLS regressions of standard revenue productivity measures on ZE population
density (revenue weighted, 6-digit dummies, various samples) . . . . . . . . . . XXII
B.5 OLS regression of log marginal costs on TFP and log quantity (SP firms) XXII
B.6 FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price,
log marginal cost and log markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP
sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIII
B.7 FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price,
log marginal cost and log markup on log density (number of firms weighted,
SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIII
B.8 FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on
log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIII
B.9 FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on
log density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIV
B.10 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost
and log markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP sample) . . . . . . . . . . XXIV
B.11 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost
and log markup on log density (number of firms weighted, SP sample) . . . . . . XXIV
B.12 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue
weighted, SP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV
B.13 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number
of firms weighted, SP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV
B.14 DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS re-
gressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log
markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . XXV
B.15 DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS re-
gressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log
markup on log density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . XXVI
B.16 DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS regres-
sions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue weighted,
SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVI
B.17 DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS re-
gressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number of firms
weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVI
B.18 DGKP procedure with wage bill weights: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity,
log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log density (revenue
weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVII
B.19 DGKP procedure with wage bill weights: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and
Mulama measures on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample) . . . . . . XXVII
B.20 DGKP procedure excluding firms located in Île de France: 2SLS regressions of
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three substantive chapters, each concerned with what might be
thought of as distinct, but long-standing, questions in economic research: the reasons why
denser regions appear to be more productive than less dense regions, what happens to firms
when tariffs on international trade are reduced, and what explains the productivity growth
slowdown following the financial crisis of 2008/9. What links these questions, and what is
novel about my research, are the tools and data I use to answer them. I use three different
firm-product level datasets that provide both price and quantity information on firms’ sales
and production and apply recent empirical frameworks that allow me to simultaneously
estimate firm-product level productivity, markups and product demand/quality. This
approach contributes to the existing literature in its use of these datasets and methods
by providing new understanding of firms’ responses to a range of economic forces, with
implications for both theory and policy.
My work draws heavily from two key papers: De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal, and
Pavcnik (2016) (henceforth DGKP) and Forlani, Martin, Mion and Muûls (2016) (hence-
forth FMMM). These papers are related to the literature on heterogeneous markups and
productivity, notably Hall (1986) and Olley and Pakes (1996) and developed in Ackerberg
et al. (2015). DGKP and FMMM are similar in their motivation to unravel heterogeneity
in revenue TFP (total factor productivity estimated using deflated sales, or what we call
TFP-R). TFP-R is a mixture of supply-side differences between firms, notably physical
productivity (what we call quantity total factor productivity, or TFP-Q), and demand-
side differences in prices which could be due to differences in input and/or output quality,
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demand and markups.
DGKP builds on the proxy variable approach to estimate a production function allowing
for heterogeneity in TFP-Q as well as heterogeneity in demand and markups by using
output prices in a control function for unobserved input prices. FMMM provides an
alternative estimation framework that also allows firm heterogeneity in TFP-Q, demand
and markups by exploiting a revenue equation that is explicit about the type of demand
faced by the firm, as well as a quantity equation. And because it is explicit about the nature
of demand, FMMM allows construction of demand measures which are consistent with
several underlying consumers’ preferences (representative consumer and discrete choice
models) and market structures (monopolistic competition, monopoly and standard forms
of oligopoly). Crucially, these demand measures do not depend on the choice of estimation
technique and so can also be recovered using the DGKP estimation approach.
Demand heterogeneity in FMMM has a direct interpretation from a representative
consumer’s utility function as its relative willingness-to-pay for one variety over another,
i.e., a measure of ‘perceived quality’. Therefore, demand heterogeneity in FMMM captures
both actual quality differences, i.e., differences in the physical attributes of products that
are reflected in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, and ‘appeal’ differences, i.e., the capacity
of certain firms, through marketing, distribution channels and branding, to sell more
than others despite their products being similar to those of their competitors. It thus
encompasses notions of both product quality (my focus in Chapters 2 and 3) and product
demand (my focus in Chapter 4).
I borrow these approaches and apply them in the three different settings. Trade Re-
form Redux: Prices, Markups and Product Quality (Chapter 2) revisits the early 1990s
Indian tariff liberalization episode studied in DGKP to show that rising product price-cost
markups are linked to manufacturing firms’ quality upgrading responses to lower tariffs
on imported intermediates. I find that conditional on product quality, there was no rise
in average firm markups over the 1989-1997 period, i.e., quality upgrading fully explains
the rise in markups without any need for market power explanations. Further, I find that
there was substantial heterogeneity in firm responses such that all of the unconditional
rise in markups came from ’laggard’ varieties, i.e., those that started the period with the
lowest sales, total factor productivity and markups.
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In On The Productivity Advantage of Cities (Chapter 3), we estimate TFP-R for French
manufacturing firms using both the DGKP and FMMM techniques and use the decomposi-
tion provided by FMMM to disentangle TFP-Q, quality/demand, markups and production
scale. Our analysis suggests that the TFP-R advantage of denser areas is mainly driven
by higher prices charged rather than differences in TFP-Q. At the same time, firms in
denser areas sell higher quantities, and generate higher revenues, despite higher prices.
These and other results we document suggest that firms in denser areas are able to charge
higher prices because they sell higher demand/quality products. Finally, while the cor-
relation between firm revenue TFP and firm size is positive in each location, it is also
systematically related to density: firms with higher (lower) TFP-R account for a larger
(smaller) share of total revenue in denser areas. These patterns thus amplify in aggregate
regional-level figures any firm-level differences in productivity across space.
And in The UK’s Great Demand Recession (Chapter 4) we turn the focus to UK firms’
poor productivity performance since the 2008/9 financial crisis, again using the methods
of DGKP and FMMM to both measure demand and its changes over time and distinguish
between TFP-Q and TFP-R. This in turn allows us to measure how changes in TFP-Q,
demand and markups ultimately affected revenue TFP, as well as labour productivity, over
the Great Recession. Our findings suggest that UK firms’ poor productivity performance
post-recession is due to both a weakening of demand and TFP-Q pushing down sales,
markups, revenue TFP and labour productivity.
The results suggest important implications for policy. In both Chapters 3 and 4, for
instance, we aggregate firm-level measures to regional and national levels and show that
policy based on revenue productivity alone, without an understanding of its underlying
price and quantity productivity components, can be ill-directed. In particular, for the
UK we highlight that a large part, though by no means all, of the UK productivity
‘puzzle’ can be explained by poor post-shock demand. For France we show that regional
disparities in productivity are caused to an extent by product composition effects and
product quality differences between firms from high-density areas compared to low-density
areas, as well as an inferior allocation of resources between firms within low-density areas
compared to high-density areas. The conventional approach that diagnosed low revenue
TFP would recommend policy be focused on measures to boost the technical efficiency
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of firms (whether nationally, or in lagging regions). Our results, however, stress the
importance of marketing, connectedness and other attributes which affect the prices that
firms can charge (in the French setting), and the overall level of demand in the economy
(in the UK setting). Likewise, the finding in Chapter 2 that markups on average rise
following a reduction in tariffs, might imply policy makers should be concerned with
ameliorating firms’ market power. But if the rising markups are associated with an increase
in product quality, such that when taking quality/product appeal into account cost changes
are passed through to prices, as I show, then consumers did indeed benefit from the tariff
liberalisation.
While all of the chapters in this thesis share a common approach to estimating a
quantity-based production function, there are operational differences in the implementa-
tion, and so, at the risk of repetition, I set out in detail – in either the main text or the
accompanying appendices – the full framework used in each. To give an overview here, in
Chapter 2 my goal is to extend the analysis of DGKP and so in order to first replicate the
key results from that paper I make use of the code made available online for that purpose.
This approach considers a Translog production function which has the benefit of ensuring
that variation in markups across and between firms is not only due to variation in the
share of intermediate inputs among firms. Our benchmark results in Chapters 3 and 4
on the other hand consider Cobb-Douglas production functions, simplifying estimation
and reducing the number of parameters to estimate (although we do provide results for
the Translog as robustness checks). For both these settings, we also use the alternative
estimation procedure set out in FMMM. Additionally, for the UK we estimate revenue
productivity using a restricted version of the FMMM framework on firms in the services
industries. In the France setting, as in that of India, because of the institutional frame-
works, we consider it appropriate to treat labour as a semi-flexible input, while in the UK
we treat it as a fully-flexible input.
DGKP and FMMM both provide a treatment of multi-product firms and I make use of
both. In Chapter 2 I follow DGKP which, after estimating production function parameters
from single-product firms, assigns firm-level inputs to product-level outputs by numerically
solving a set of equations with an assumption that productivity is constant across products
within a firm. The FMMM approach to this problem is to allow productivity to vary across
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products, but assumes that demand/quality is constant within firms.
Finally, there are some operational differences driven by data constraints. In Chapter
2, I reassemble the raw production data used by DGKP from a commercially-available
database of large and medium-sized manufacturing firms, and show that my dataset closely
replicates the key results of the original paper. In this, I am able to follow DGKP and
estimate production functions separately for each 2-digit National Industrial Classification
industry. Our French data is the most comprehensive as we have access to full balance
sheet information for the population of firms in metropolitan France, and this data matches
well to the production data, allowing us to perform production function estimations at the
2-digit SIC industry level. The UK, however, only carries out a limited survey of firms –
which also forces us to estimate firm-level capital stocks from investment data – and once
we match this data with our production data we are left with too few firms to run separate
production function estimations, so instead group the data in a single estimation.
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Chapter 2
Trade Reform Redux: Prices,
Markups and Product Quality
Abstract
This paper revisits the widely-studied Indian tariff liberalization that began in 1991
to show that the rising markups documented in recent work by De Loecker et al. (2016)
(DGKP) are linked to quality upgrading responses to lower tariffs on imported interme-
diates. To do this, I reassemble the detailed product-level dataset used by DGKP and
closely follow their approach to estimating marginal costs and markups, while drawing on
Forlani et al. (2016) to obtain measures of product quality/appeal consistent with several
underlying types of consumer preferences and market structures. In doing so, I find that
the markups rise documented in DGKP is entirely driven by an increase in product quality
rather than an increase in marker power, i.e., conditional on product quality, there was no
rise in average firm markups over the 1989-1997 period. Furthermore, there was substan-
tial heterogeneity in firm responses such that all of the unconditional rise in markups came
from ‘laggard’ firms, i.e., those that started the period with the lowest sales, total factor
productivity and markups. These results indicate that the tariff liberalization benefited
Indian consumers more than what a simple reading of the rising markups result would
suggest.
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2.1 Introduction
In 1991 India began a programme of substantially liberalising its economy in response
to a severe balance of payments crisis. It slashed external tariffs and relaxed its regimes
for foreign direct investment and industrial licencing requirements while also undertaking
macroeconomic reforms such as reducing the fiscal deficit, devaluing the rupee and liber-
alising capital markets (Sivadasan, 2009). The reforms have been associated with a sharp
rise in imports, particularly of intermediate goods (Goldberg et al., 2009), higher aggregate
and within-firm productivity (Harrison et al., 2013; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011), the
introduction of new product varieties (Goldberg et al., 2010a) and the exit of the least pro-
ductive informal firms (Nataraj, 2011), among other findings. India’s pre-reform tariff wall
was exceptionally high, with rates averaging 101%, and it varied in height substantially
such that the across-the-board cuts that brought average rates down to 32.7% by 1997
generated substantial variation in the impact of the reform across industries. Researchers
have typically treated this variation as exogenous to firm and industry characteristics and
used it to estimate causal impacts of lower tariffs on various aspects of firm performance.
Central to this paper are the results presented by De Loecker et al. (2016) (henceforth
DGKP) showing that the trade reform spurred increases in average product markups.
While much of the theory (Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) predicts
that by lowering barriers to trade, firms will be forced down their cost curves and will
lower prices and markups, DGKP shows empirically that these pro-competitive effects of
lower tariffs in output markets can be swamped by the marginal cost-reducing effects of
lower tariffs on intermediate inputs which are not passed through to prices. A rise in
markups is usually attributed to a less competitive market or institutional rigidities and
is therefore welfare-reducing. However, if the rise in markups comes about through a rise
in product quality/appeal and concomitant consumer willingness-to-pay then it would be
of less concern to policymakers.
In this paper I answer the question, did Indian manufacturing firms’ markups rise fol-
lowing the trade reform because firms raised product quality and/or because of an increase
in market power? Theoretically and empirically, a rise in product quality, has been shown
to be a consequence of more open trade in developing countries (Goldberg et al., 2009;
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Verhoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2011; Antoniades, 2015), at least for some firms,
but the link to the rising markups documented by DGKP is less well understood. To
answer my research question, I reassemble the raw production data on Indian manufac-
turing firms used by DGKP and run the same procedures to estimate marginal costs and
markups. I then use the insights of Forlani et al. (2016), henceforth FMMM, to construct
measures of product quality/appeal consistent with several underlying types of consumer
preferences and market structures.
The first contribution of my paper is to a literature that theoretically and empirically
documents the effects of increasing trade openness on product quality. I show that quality
upgrading was an important factor in the rise of markups during the Indian trade reform
documented by DGKP. Indeed, when controlling for product quality/appeal, the trade
reform did not have any impact on average firm-product markups. Key to explaining this
result is that the decline in marginal costs via lower input tariffs observed in DGKP is ac-
tually associated with a rise in output quality: higher-quality foreign inputs enabled firms
to produce higher-quality outputs at lower marginal costs while maintaining high prices.
This finding complements existing empirical studies. Goldberg et al. (2009) provides de-
scriptive evidence that product quality rose in India over 1987-2000, documenting fast
growing imports of intermediates which were both rising in unit values and variety, in-
dicating that technological restraints were being relaxed and higher quality inputs being
used. For Mexico in the early 1990s, Verhoogen (2008) shows that exporters upgraded
quality in response to a devaluation.
The importance of lower tariffs on imported inputs to firm productivity and product
quality upgrading has been stressed in many studies. Notably, Amiti and Konings (2007)
estimates that the productivity gain for importing firms in Indonesia from a reduction
of input tariffs is more than the double the gain from the equivalent reduction in tariffs
on output.1 Topalova (2010) provide similar evidence for the Indian trade reform and
Goldberg et al. (2010b) provides evidence that lower input tariffs increased the rate of
new product entry, as well as TFP and research and development investment.
Standard heterogeneous firms trade models à la Melitz predict a negative correlation
between prices and firm size, but empirically this is only true in some industries, a fact
1Input tariffs are usually defined as the weighted average tariff on imports of intermediate inputs, with
the weights derived from detailed industry level input-output tables, see Section 2.4.1.
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explained by differences in the scope for quality differentiation (Khandelwal, 2010; Ver-
hoogen, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2011). Models that allow firm heterogeneity in
both productivity and product quality, such as Antoniades (2015), feature the usual pro-
competitive effects of lower tariffs as more firms enter the market, the least productive
firms exit and surviving firms lower prices and markups. But by also modelling endogen-
ous product quality, they also predict that trade openness raises returns to innovation,
leading to higher quality, prices and markups.
The second contribution of this paper is to document the extent of this heterogeneity
in the impacts of the trade reform across firms. More specifically, I show that the impacts
for firm-products that begin the period as low-performing versus high-performing are
mediated through different channels. The initially most productive firm-products do not
adjust markups in response to greater competition from imports, but do make efficiency
improvements that are passed through to prices. Firm-products that are initially poor
performers, however, respond to lower input tariffs by increasing output quality, allowing
them to increase quantities sold and reduce marginal costs, without a concomitant lowering
of prices, so leading to sharply higher markups.
These findings are in line with some of the literature. For example, evidence from
a developing country that it is the least productive firms that respond most strongly to
tariff reduction comes from Fan et al. (2015, 2018). Studying the effects of China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization, Fan et al. (2015, 2018) find that lagging exporting
firms upgraded output and inputs quality and prices faster than pre-reform leaders. Key
to these results, as highlighted in their theoretical model, is the presence of scale effects
and non-Hicks neutral productivity. However, many other researchers reach the opposite
conclusion. For instance, in the Antoniades (2015) model it is the most productive firms
that will respond to competition by raising quality, and the least productive by reducing
it. At the same time, Verhoogen (2008) highlights the importance of scale effects, such
that larger, more productive exporters find it more profitable to cover the fixed costs
of quality upgrading in response to better access to foreign markets. On the empirical
side, Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) shows that greater competition in markets due to
lower tariffs have a quality-raising effect only for products close to the world technological
frontier, with the opposite effect for products far away from it. However, for countries
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that rank lowly for institutional quality in the World Bank Doing Business surveys, there
is no distance-from-frontier effect.
To tackle these questions, I build on the analysis of DGKP. First, I reassemble the
finely-granular production data, an unbalanced panel of medium and large-sized Indian
manufacturing firms that contains detailed information on product-level sales and produc-
tion quantity. I then follow, as precisely as possible, the estimation procedures used by
DGKP to obtain marginal costs and markups at the firm-product-year level for the period
1989-1997, and show that my dataset closely replicates the key results of the original
paper. The DGKP procedures, which I describe in detail in Section 2.2 allow for estim-
ating a quantity-based production function and recovering key product-level measures for
multi-product firms.
The reason why DGKP showed only that markups rose but not why, is because testing
demand-side features, such as increases in quality and/or product appeal, requires expli-
citly modelling demand which involves laying down a number of strong assumptions about
preferences and market structure, such as in Khandelwal (2010), Amiti and Khandelwal
(2013) and Feenstra (2018), or else relies on choosing a value for a (constant) elasticity
of substitution between products, sometimes using the values for the United States from
Broda and Weinstein (2006) as in Stiebale and Vencappa (2018).
I however, build upon FMMM to construct measures of the demand faced by firms for
their products which are consistent with several underlying types of consumer preferences
(representative consumer and discrete choice models) and market structures (monopol-
istic competition, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly) and analyze what happens
to these demand measures when Indian firms face lower tariffs in output and inputs mar-
kets.2 Demand heterogeneity in FMMM has a direct interpretation from a representative
consumer’s utility function as its relative willingness-to-pay for one variety over another,
i.e., a measure of ‘perceived quality’. Therefore, demand heterogeneity in FMMM captures
both actual quality differences, i.e., differences in the physical attributes of products that
are reflected in consumers’ willingness-to-pay, and ‘appeal’ differences, i.e., the capacity
2A paper with a similar approach and setting, but a different research question to mine (mergers and
acquisitions), is Stiebale and Vencappa (2018). Stiebale and Vencappa (2018) uses the multi-product
DGKP quantity production function estimation procedure to obtain firm-product level markups and the
FMMM approach to directly obtain estimates of product quality/appeal from the estimated markups and
data, as in this paper.
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of certain firms, through marketing, distribution channels and branding, to sell more than
others despite their products being similar to those of their competitors.
The identification strategy employed in DGKP and this paper relies on tariff changes
over the period being exogenous to firms’ pricing and production decisions. Topalova
and Khandelwal (2011) provided evidence that this is the case, for the period up to the
Indian election in 1997, but not thereafter, so I restrict analysis to this period. The tariff
liberalisation was accompanied by a number of other reforms to dismantle what was known
as the license Raj and it could be argued that the empirical strategy needs to explicitly
recognise the correlations between reforms. DGKP show convincingly that controlling
for industry-level de-licensing reforms does not qualitatively change their results and so I
maintain a focus on tariff changes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the DGKP
estimation procedure for marginal costs and markups and Section 2.3 the FMMM approach
for calculating measures of product quality. Section 2.4 describes the data I use and
provides a comparison to DGKP. Section 2.5 reports results and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 DGKP model and implementation
2.2.1 Production function estimation
DGKP explain the impact of trade reform on markups, using price and quantity data from
multi-product firms. To do this, they develop a framework that builds on the simple rule
– first highlighted in Hall (1986) and implemented in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
among others – that markups can be pinned down by taking the ratio of the output
elasticity of materials to the share of materials in revenue. Developing this framework is
the main contribution of DGKP, allowing a way to get at the output elasticity from a
quantity-based production function, and at the materials share in revenues from a multi-
product firm setting, in order to study the effects of trade policy on markups.
The approach extends the proxy variable (or control function) approach to estimating
the parameters of a production function due to Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003). These earlier approaches attempted to deal with the endogeneity
problem inherent in measuring TFP as the residual from a regression of the log of output
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on the log of an index of inputs that arises because firms observe their own TFP when
making input choices (the simultaneity bias). Olley and Pakes (1996) uses investment
expenditure and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) uses materials expenditure to control for
unobserved productivity by inverting the firm’s demand function (a monotonic function
of the unobserved productivity) for the input. However, researchers typically use firm
revenue, rather than quantity, data for estimation, biasing production function coefficients
while also conflating productivity and marginal costs estimates with price and demand
variation across firms. To deal with this issue, DGKP start by writing a (log) quantity
production function for firm f producing product j at time t:
qfjt = fj(xfjt;β) + ωft + εfjt, (2.1)
where xfjt is a vector of log physical inputs, consisting of labour, materials and capital
(lfjt, mfjt, kfjt), β is the vector of production function coefficients, ωft is TFP
3 and εfjt
is an error term.
Writing the production function in terms of physical output and inputs creates two
challenges not faced in the usual Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
approaches to estimation: input quantities are rarely observed, only input expenditures
(as in my data); and these expenditures are at the firm level and not attributed to products
within multi-product firms. Each firm-product-specific input (labour, materials, capital)
is defined as:
xfjt = ρfjt + x̃ft − wxfjt, (2.2)
where ρfjt = ln ˜ρfjt is the share of firm input expenditure allocated to product j and w
x
fjt is
the firm-product-specific input price. Writing wfjt for the vector of firm-product-specific
input prices, and substituting in Equation (2.1), DGKP obtain:
qfjt = fj(x̃ft;β) +A(ρfjt, x̃ft,β) +B(wfjt, ρfjt, x̃fjt,β) + ωft + εfjt, (2.3)
Equation (2.3) highlights the two challenges. The term A(.) represents an input alloc-
ation bias, and the term B(.) an input price bias since both are functions of the input
expenditures.
3Note that TFP in the DGKP model is firm-time specific, while in the multi-product extension of
FMMM it firm-product-time specific. I return to this in Section 2.3 below.
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2.2.2 Input price bias and single-product firm estimation
Making the assumption that the production technology is product-specific, it is clear that
when considering only single-product firms, the term A(.) = 0 since ρ̃fjt = 1 and so the
production function can be estimated using only single-product firms and then in a later
stage used to assign inputs within multi-product firms. Equation (2.3) considering only
single-product firms simplifies to:
qft = f(x̃ft;β) +B(wft, x̃ft,β) + ωft + εft, (2.4)
Key to DGKP’s approach to dealing with the B(.) term is to use a control function for
unobserved input prices. The insight here is to note that higher input prices imply higher
quality inputs creating higher quality outputs, as in Verhoogen (2008), allowing DGKP
to write firm-specific input prices as a function of output prices as well as market shares,
product dummies, exporter status and tariffs.
wxit = wt (pit,msit,Df , EXPit) . (2.5)
Substituting into Equation (2.4):
B(wit, x̃it,β) = B((pit,msit, EXPit)× (1, x̃it),β, δ), (2.6)
where δ is an additional coefficient vector representing the parameters of the w(.) function.
These coefficients will be retrieved, allowing an estimate of firm-specific input prices.
The usual Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) control function is used for unobserved pro-
ductivity by inverting the materials demand equation given by:
m̃ft = mt
(
ωft, k̃ft, l̃ft, pft,Df ,msft, EXP ft, τ
input
ft , τ
output
ft
)
(2.7)
so that,
ωft = ht(x̃ft,Zft), (2.8)
where Zft contains all the variables that determining input demand except input ex-
penditures and productivity, i.e. Zft = {pft,Df ,msft, EXP ft, τ inputft , τ
output
ft }
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A potential source of bias in using only single-product firms for the estimation comes
from productivity or inputs use affecting firms’ choices to add additional products. DGKP
control for this in much the same way as Olley and Pakes (1996) control for selection
into single-plant vs. multi-plant establishments, that is non-parametrically estimating the
probability of a firm being single-product in t + 1 using its information set in t, i.e. a
polynomial of inputs and interactions of inputs, tariffs, market share, a polynomial of
prices and year dummies. Using Equations (2.6), and (2.8), DGKP write (2.4) as,
qft = φt(x̃ft,Zft) + εft, (2.9)
in order to estimate φ̂ft, i.e. output quantity purged of measurement error and unanticip-
ated shocks. Equations (2.4), (2.6) and (2.9) then give,
ωft (β, δ) = φ̂ft − f (x̃ft;β)−B
(
(pft,msft,Df , EXP ft))× (1, x̃ft); δ
)
. (2.10)
Estimation of β and δ can then follow by assuming that productivity follows a law of
motion given by
ωft = g
(
ωft−1, τ
input
ft−1 , τ
output
ft−1 , EXP ft−1, SP ft
)
+ ξft, (2.11)
where SP ft is the estimated probability that a firm remains single-product in the next
period. The law of motion for productivity given the parameters, ξft (β, δ) allows con-
struction of moment conditions,
E (ξft(β, δ)Yft) = 0, (2.12)
where Yft contains labour and capital along with lagged materials and interaction
terms, as well as lagged market shares, tariffs and interactions with the inputs, and this
is estimated using the GMM method due to Wooldridge (2009).
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2.2.3 Input allocations and multi-product firms
After estimating the β and δ coefficients using the single-product firms, DGKP write the
production function as,
q̂fjt = f(x̃ft, β̂, ŵfjt, ρfjt) + ωft, (2.13)
and note that it can be split into terms that contain the input allocations ρfjt and those
that don’t
q̂fjt − f1(x̃ft, β̂, ŵfjt) = f2(x̃ft, β̂, ŵfjt, ρfjt) + ωft. (2.14)
Collecting all terms formed of estimates and data on the left hand side, there are now
Jft equations for each firm. Together with the restriction that the input allocation shares
have to add up to 1 across products within firms,
∑
j
exp(ρfjt) = 1, (2.15)
this implies that the Jft input allocations for each firm and ωft can be recovered from a
system of Jft + 1 equations which are solved numerically. At this stage it is worth noting
that recovering these input allocations in this way requires the assumption that TFP is
specific to firms across products, ωft while in parts of the analysis I use a firm-product
specific measure, afjt = q̂fjt − q̄ft.
2.2.4 Markups
Having estimated the parameters of the production function and input shares across
products within firms, it remains only to use data and estimates to recover markups
and marginal costs. This is straightforward following the markup rule due to Hall (1986)
and used in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) that markups can be pinned down by taking
the ratio of the output elasticity of materials to the share of materials in revenue. This
rule to pin-down markups is consistent with many hypotheses on product market structure
(monopolistic competition, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly). The proof is as
follows.
Firms minimise cost of a variable input free of adjustment costs and exhibit no market
power in input markets (the cost of materials WMit is allowed to be firm-time specific but
17
it is given to the firm). We can write marginal cost as:
∂Cfjt
∂Qfjt
=
∂Cfjt
∂Mfjt
∂Mfjt
∂Qfjt
= WMfjt
∂Mfjt
∂Qfjt
. (2.16)
Markups over marginal cost are defined as:
µfjt ≡
Pfjt
∂Cfjt
∂Qfjt
. (2.17)
Combining, we have:
Pfjt
µfjt
= WMfjt
∂Mfjt
∂Qfjt
.
Multiplying by Qfjt and dividing by Mfjt on both sides we get:
PfjtQfjt
Mfjtµfjt
=
Rfjt
Mfjtµfjt
= WMfjt
∂Mfjt
∂Qfjt
Qfjt
Mfjt
= WMfjt
∂mfjt
∂qfjt
.
Re-arranging we finally have:
µfjt =
∂qfjt
∂mfjt
WMfjtMfjt
Rfjt
=
∂qfjt
∂mfjt
sMfjt
. (2.18)
Having estimated the Translog production function:
qft = βllft + βlll
2
ft + βmmft + βmmm
2
ft + βkkft + βkkk
2
ft +
βlmlftmft + βlklftkft + βmkmftkft + βlmklftmftkft + aft, (2.19)
using the method outlined above, the materials share of revenues in product j (sMfjt)is
recovered from Equations (2.14) and (2.15) and then the output elasticity of materials
(
∂qfjt
∂mfjt
)can be calculated for all firm-products as βm + 2βmmmfjt + βmllfjt + βmkkfjt +
βlmklfjtkfjt because of the assumption that single-product and multi-product firms use
the same technology in production.
2.3 FMMM demand structure and assumptions
The DGKP framework described above allows estimation of heterogeneous and variable
markups but does not shed light on how firms are able to raise markups during the In-
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dian trade reform since it argues that imposing an Industrial Organisation-style demand
system, such as Khandelwal (2010) or Verhoogen (2008) is inappropriate. FMMM, how-
ever, provides an approach that is consistent with several underlying types of consumer
preferences (representative consumer and discrete choice models) and market structures
(monopolistic competition, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly). This Section
provides an outline of the FMMM approach.
2.3.1 Demand heterogeneity
Returning to standard profit maximization (marginal revenue equal to marginal costs),
FMMM write the elasticity of revenue Rft with respect to quantity Qft as one over the
profit maximizing markup:
∂rft
∂qft
=
∂Rft
∂Qft
Qft
Rft
=
∂Cft
∂Qft
Qft
PftQft
=
∂Cft
∂Qft
Pft
=
1
µft
, (2.20)
Again, this result holds under different assumptions about demand (representative con-
sumer and discrete choice models) and product market structure (monopolistic compet-
ition, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly). The log revenue function, i.e., the
function relating log revenue to log quantity, is both unknown and potentially different
across firms, but equation (2.20) provides the slope of the firm-specific log revenue function
for firm f while data on the actual log revenue rft and log quantity qft provide us with a
point where such firm-specific log revenue function cuts through the (q, r) space. If we now
linearize the log revenue function around the observed data point (qft, rft) with a slope
given by 1µft we can uniquely pin down an intercept for this linearized log revenue function
on the r axis. We use such intercept λ̃ft as our measure of demand heterogeneity:
4
λ̃ft ≡ rft −
∂rft
∂qft
qft = rft −
qft
µft
. (2.21)
Given our definition of λ̃ft observed firm log revenue is simply
rft = λ̃ft +
1
µft
qft, (2.22)
4To simplify notation we ignore components that are constant across firms in a given time period or
within a product category. Those constants will be captured in our empirical analysis by a suitable set of
dummies.
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and so λ̃ft is a firm-specific log revenue shifter
5 corresponding to the log price firm f would
face if selling one unit of its product.6
While being general and intuitive, this measure of demand heterogeneity also maps to
more formal and explicit differences in the underlying structure of preferences. In partic-
ular, FMMM show that λ̃ft =
λft
µft
where λft is a parameter characterizing differences in
utility derived from the consumption of products sold by different firms. More specifically,
consider a representative consumer who maximises at each point in time t a differentiable
utility function U(.) subject to budget Bt:
max
Q
{
U
(
Q̃
)}
s.t.
∫
f
PftQftdf −Bt = 0
where Q̃ is a vector of elements ΛftQft and λft = log(Λft). Therefore, while the repres-
entative consumer chooses quantities Q, these quantities enter into the utility function as
Q̃ and Λft can be interpreted as a measure of the perceived quality/appeal of a particular
variety. FMMM show that the log revenue function corresponding to the above preferences
r(qft, λft) can be approximated, around the observed profit-maximizing solution, by the
linear function:
rft '
1
µft
(qft + λft), (2.23)
and so λft is:
λft ' µftrft − qft. (2.24)
Two things are worth nothing at this stage. First, (2.24) is valid as a first-order linear
approximation and is the counterpart of (2.21) meaning that the log revenue shifter λ̃ft,
what FMMM label demand heterogeneity, maps via markups into differences in product
appeal across firms’ varieties λft = λ̃ftµft. Second, while the shape of the function
relating revenue to quantity and product appeal will depend upon the specific underlying
preferences, FMMM show that (2.23) applies to any preferences structure that can be used
to model monopolistic competition and for which a well-behaved differentiable utility
5Demand heterogeneity is the variation in revenue that is not explained by variation in quantities,
i.e., two firms selling the same quantity but generating a different revenue (because of a different price).
Therefore, demand heterogeneity is a firm-specific log revenue shifter given quantity (or equivalently a
firm-specific log price shifter given quantity).
6At the intercept point qft = 0 and so we have Qft = 1 from which Rft = Pft and rft = pft = λ̃ft.
Note this has no implications whatsoever about the presence/absence of a choke price.
20
function exists.7 This includes standard CES preferences as well as generalized CES
preferences (Spence, 1976)8, CARA preferences (Behrens et al., 2014), HARA preferences
(Haltiwanger et al., 2018), Translog preferences (Feenstra, 2003) as well as the class of
Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) preferences discussed in Zhelobodko et al. (2012)
and Dhingra and Morrow (2019).
In order to focus on demand, I rewrite equation (2.22) as pft + qft = λ̃ft +
1
µft
qft to
be clear about the log demand curve rather than the log revenue function:
pft = λ̃ft +
1
µft
qft − qft = λ̃ft +
1− µft
µft
qft (2.25)
For my purposes in this paper the key thing I take from the FMMM framework is that
it allows imposing minimal assumptions on preferences and market structure to deliver
consumer demand for a variety governed by the two heterogeneities: the price elasticity of
demand which delivers the slope of the log demand curve at the profit-maximising point,
(1− µft)/µft, and the demand shifter, λft/µft.
The FMMM framework is also useful in linking revenue-based TFP and quantity-based
TFP. The production function with Hicks-neutral TFP, such as the Translog used here
in Equation (2.19) can be written as qft = q̄ft + aft where q̄ft is the index of inputs use
that we label log scale.9 Finally, by defining revenue TFP as TFPRft ≡ rft− q̄ft and using
equation (2.22) while substituting we get:
TFPRft =
aft
µft
+ λ̃ft +
1− µft
µft
q̄ft (2.26)
meaning that TFPRft is a (non-linear) function of quantity-based TFP aft, the log revenue
shifter λ̃ft, the profit-maximizing markup µft and log production scale q̄ft.
7FMMM also show λft is a measure characterizing differences in utility in the oligopoly model developed
in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and further refined in Hottman et al. (2016)
8In the case of CES and generalized CES preferences (2.24) holds as an equality because the log revenue
function is linear in both qft and λft.
9For example, with the Translog production technology:
q̄ft = βllft + βlll
2
ft + βmmft + βmmm
2
ft + βkkft + βkkk
2
ft+
βlmlftmft + βlklftkft + βmkmftkft + βlmklftmftkft,
.
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2.4 Data
DGKP use the Prowess dataset10 produced by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy
(CMIE), for the period 1989-2003. This privately-managed subscription based service col-
lects data on 45,000 listed and unlisted Indian companies from 1988-2018. For the period
1989-2003 and narrowing the scope to manufacturers, it covers 5,000 firms, representing
around 60%-70% of industrial activity (De Loecker et al., 2016), in an unbalanced panel.
It is not a representative sample of firms but makes use of the detailed reporting required
by firms under the 1956 Companies Act that means CMIE can collate panel data for the
largest firms in the Indian economy. The reporting requirements are broad, and include,
for each manufactured product, the value, quantities and units of sales, data that is not
available in a representative cross-sectional sample such as the Annual Survey of Industry
(ASI) for the trade reform period. In total Prowess contains approximately 14,000 vari-
ables collected from annual and interim financial reports, stock exchanges and regulatory
sources.
DGKP provide replication files – Stata and Matlab syntax and an intermediate data file
containing firm-product level data required to generate the published figures and tables.
This subset of Prowess variables is not sufficient to perform my analysis since I require
measures of all the firm-product inputs in order to re-estimate the production function to
get at the FMMM measures of firm heterogeneity.
I therefore independently access the raw data from the Prowess database. While CMIE
continue to provide Prowess to researchers, the service has undergone changes since DGKP
downloaded their data in 2005 which make it both easier to work with and more difficult to
perfectly replicate the dataset. CMIE uses a proprietary product classification that can be
concorded to the Indian National Industry Classification (NIC) but when DGKP obtained
the data in 2005, it did not link the product names reported by firms to the classification.11
Recent vintages (snapshots produced semi-annually) of the data are linked to standardised
names and then to product codes but DGKP had to manually map names12. DGKP
10This dataset was also used by Stiebale and Vencappa (2018); Goldberg et al. (2010b); Chakraborty
and Raveh (2018) and others. See Goldberg et al. (2010b) for more details of the construction.
11It also used a 12 digit classification, while it now uses a 20 digit classification. In practice the manu-
facturing data uses a maximum of 16 of the available 20 digits, with 97.3% of the observations in my data
identified using 12 digits or fewer.
12In the 2018 vintage I use, there are 16,550 unique product names linked to 2987 standardised names.
For instance, firms use 49 unique names to report production of ’Steel castings’.
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Table 2.1: Variable names and descriptions
Variable Prowess 2005 description Prowess 2018 description
Labour Total wage bill which includes
bonuses and contributions to
employees’ provident funds
Compensation to employees
which includes bonuses, pen-
sions, social security and
other items
Intermediates Consumption of commodities
by an enterprise in the process
of manufacturing or trans-
formation into product
Raw materials, stores &
spares
Capital Gross fixed assets, which in-
cludes movable and immov-
able assets
Gross fixed assets
Source: DGKP for Prowess 2005 variable descriptions. Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE)
for Prowess 2018 names.
kindly supplied their original mapping of product codes to NIC 1998 but changes to the
Prowess and NIC classifications13 mean that it is not possible to replicate the exact product
mapping. I instead use the current (updated 2018) CMIE classification mapped to NIC
2004 using a file provided to me by CMIE and then manually concord the handful of
changes between NIC 1998 and NIC 2004.
The DGKP intermediate data file contains firms from a limited subset of manufac-
turing industries. It includes all NIC 2-digit industries except for division 16 (Tobacco
products), 18 (Wearing apparel), 19 (Leather), 20 (Wood and wood products), 22 (Pub-
lishing and printing), 23 (Coke and refined petroleum), 30 (Office, accounting and com-
puting machinery), 32 (Communication equipment and 33 (Medical, precision and optical
instruments). The omitted industry divisions contain few observations (less than 1,000
per industry over the 1989-2003 period) in my data, explaining the omission by DGKP. I
use the same industries as DGKP.
Prowess contains several measures of materials, labour costs and capital, and I use the
variable closest in description to those reported in DGKP. Table 2.1 reports changes in
names. I follow DGKP in obtaining two-digit NIC wholesale price indices.14 to deflate
sales and inputs15
13NIC is based on the Standard Industrial Classification and underwent a substantial revision in 2008.
14Downloaded from the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade at
http://eaindustry.nic.in/ .
15Multi-product firms in the data often produce in multiple two-digit industries. I deflate these firm-level
inputs by assigning the firm to the industry from which comes its largest proportion of output. For product
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The Prowess data is delivered in separate modules, of which I make use the companies’
(standardised) standalone annual financial statements, which contain information on sales,
employment costs, raw materials use and capital stock; and the products module which
contains information on values, quantities and units of product sales.
I do some initial cleaning of the raw data, dropping duplicate observations (firms some-
times report more than once in a 365-day period as they change accounting year-end).
Most Indian firms do not use calendar years for financial reporting purposes while the
tariff is calendar year based. Following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015) which uses similar
firm-level data, I assign observations to calendar year t− 1 if the firm’s accounting year-
end falls earlier than June 1.
From the products file, I drop lines that are reported to be clubbed together with
another (unreported) product, before summing sales quantities and values using the most
detailed (20-digit) CMIE product definition. I then combine the product and financial
data. This gives me two measures of the value of production – from total sales of produced
goods and from the sum of product sales. I drop all firm-year observations where these
separately reported figures are different by +\-10%. Finally, I drop firms with reported
raw materials use greater than the sum of product sales and those that report negative
raw materials use.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for full sample by industry sector
Sector Share All Single Num
output firms product products
15 Food products & beverages 0.11 317 126 198
17 Textiles & apparel 0.10 318 173 100
21 Paper & paper products 0.02 87 64 38
24 Chemicals 0.28 435 170 696
25 Rubber & plastic 0.07 129 78 99
26 Non-metallic mineral products 0.07 106 73 89
27 Basic metals 0.14 226 110 139
28 Fabricated metal products 0.01 63 41 63
29 Machinery & equipment 0.05 96 46 224
31 Electrical machinery & communications 0.03 63 39 123
34 Motor vehicles & trailers 0.11 77 44 102
Total 1.00 1,917 964 1,871
Notes: Indian National Industrial Classification 1998. All columns show annual averages. ‘All firms’ is
unique firms in full estimation sample, ‘Single product’ refers to firms producing one unique product and
‘Num products’ is the number of unique products within each sector.
sales values I use the product’s appropriate industry deflator.
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The DGKP replication file16 contains 53,807 firm-product-year observations, substan-
tially fewer than in my replicated dataset (61,448), and particularly so in the crucial years
for the analysis of trade reform, 1989-1997 which accounts for 44% of the original sample
(24,031 observations) but 55% of the new sample (33,587 observations). It is not clear
why the datasets differ by so much. Enquiries made to CMIE indicate that no new firms
are added to the older data, so the discrepancies are more likely due to either the product
matching procedures or some differences in the preliminary data-cleaning steps undertaken
in DGKP and my sample.
The distribution of firms across industrial sectors, and between single- and multi-
product firms, shown in Table 2.2 is however qualitatively similar in DGKP. Chemicals and
Basic metals account for the largest shares of average annual output in the new sample, as
they do in DGKP (28% and 14% vs 26% and 16% respectively). The average number of
unique firms per year is similar (1,971 in the new sample vs. 1,970 in DGKP). There are
somewhat fewer single-product firms in the new sample (964 average per year vs. 1,047)
as the product data is more granular in the new sample, containing 1,871 unique products
compared to 1,400 in DGKP.
2.4.1 Tariff data
I take the industry level tariffs for 1989-2001 directly from the DGKP intermediate data
file. These tariffs come from Topalova (2010). DGKP construct input tariffs using the In-
dian input-output tables for 1993-4 using the standard definition of τ inputit =
∑
k skiτ
output
kt ,
where ski is the share of industry k in industry i and τ
output
kt is the tariff on products in
industry k at time t. These tariffs were collected at the six-digit HS level and concorded
using Debroy and Santhanam (1993) to the Indian National Industrial Classification. The
tariffs are almost all at the four-digit NIC 1998 industry level with a handful at three-digit
and two-digit levels.
The identification strategy employed in DGKP and this paper relies on tariff changes
over the period being exogenous to firms’ pricing and production decisions. Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011) provide evidence that this was case up to the Indian election in 1997.
The period up to 1997 is therefore the focus of DGKP and my paper. Panel (a) of Figure
16Available as ’estimationfile.dta’ in the Supplemental Material at https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11042.
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2.1 shows how the mean output and input tariffs faced by producers in my sample changed
over the 1989-2001 period. Mean output tariffs began the period at 101% and declined to
32.7% by 1997, while mean input tariffs in the sample fell from 39.9% to 11.2%. Tariffs
fell in every industry, with those producers facing the highest tariffs in 1989 seeing the
largest reductions by 1997, as shown in panels (b) and (c). This pattern of liberalisation
is helpful for the empirical strategy, first because there is a large amount of variation in
tariff changes over time between industries, and second because these across-the-board
cuts indicate that there was little or no favouritism shown to particular industries based
on pre-reform characteristics, as shown more formally in Topalova and Khandelwal (2011).
Figure 2.1: Industry tariffs during the trade reform period
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(c) Industry-level input tariffs, 1989 vs
1997
Notes: Panel (a) plots mean (unweighted) tariffs per year in the estimation sample. See text for
calculation of input tariffs. Panels (b) and (c) plot the tariffs facing 80 4-digit industries in 1989 against
the tariffs faced in 1997. Panel (b) shows output tariffs and panel (c) shows input tariffs. Source of tariffs
is DGKP.
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2.5 Estimation and results
2.5.1 Production function estimation
I follow DGKP in estimating a Translog production function using 1989-2003 data on
single-product firms to recover the vector of input coefficients, β and the parameter vec-
tor δ, and then using the multi-product input assignment procedure to recover the input
shares, ρfjt. Appendix A-1 describes in detail the close quantitative and qualitative replic-
ation of the DGKP procedure with my dataset. I then calculate markups using equation
(2.18), and then estimates of TFP (a), product appeal/demand (λ), the demand shifter
(λ/µ) and the demand slope (1/µ) from equations (2.19), (2.21) and (2.24). Finally in
preparation of the estimation sample summarised in Table 2.3, I trim outliers of markups,
demand (λ) and the demand shifter (λ/µ)17 to provide a sample size of 27,504 firm-
product-year observations, substantially more than the 21,246 in the DGKP estimation
sample.
Panel A of Table 2.3 shows summary statistics at the firm-year level. On average,
firms produce 2.26 products in the average year, while more than 90% produce four or
fewer products. Panel B, showing the firm-product-year level, highlights the large amount
of variation in TFP between producers and the considerably larger variation in product
appeal, the demand shifter and the demand slope.
Of the 27,504 firm-product-year observations in the sample, 9,448 or 34% have markups
of less than 1, appearing to violate standard profit maximisation assumptions. However,
as DGKP point out, multi-product firms maximise profits across products. As in DGKP,
in my data, average firm markups (weighted by annual within-firm sales shares) are below
1 for only 10% of firms while the analysis also considers firm-product fixed effects so using
variation within firm-products over time rather then depending on levels.
2.5.2 Replication and discussion of main DGKP results
DGKP exploit variation within firm-product pairs to show (1) the pass-through of marginal
cost to prices is incomplete; (2) that the large fall in output tariffs over the 1989-1997
17DGKP trim the top and bottom three percentiles of the markup distribution when presenting their
main results. I trim on within-firm changes as this is the variation used in the analysis, although results
are not substantially different.
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Table 2.3: Firm and firm-product summary statistics
mean sd p10 p50 p90
Panel A: Firm-level variables
firm sales 322.35 1110.84 14.25 100.49 651.31
firm value added 158.86 577.21 4.30 38.45 319.93
firm products 2.26 2.01 1.00 2.00 4.00
Observations: 14,504
Panel B: Firm-product-level variables
sales 137.91 517.16 2.37 39.58 303.18
value added 64.73 451.87 -20.04 12.85 170.43
materials 73.19 240.84 2.32 24.90 155.73
labour 11.56 41.32 0.27 2.93 26.07
capital 109.07 499.91 2.50 26.20 198.62
ln price -1.68 3.03 -5.10 -2.51 2.56
ln quantity 5.15 3.40 0.54 5.47 9.26
lnmc -1.79 3.14 -5.38 -2.43 2.44
TFP-R 0.89 1.46 -0.96 0.96 2.51
TFP a 2.57 3.14 -1.88 3.32 6.10
product appeal λ 2.94 14.24 -5.20 -0.02 12.84
markup µ 2.01 2.96 0.20 1.34 4.25
production scale q̄ 2.58 1.82 0.26 2.73 4.71
demand shifter λ/µ -5.65 26.90 -16.09 -0.02 3.99
demand slope 1/µ 2.43 6.17 0.24 0.75 5.04
Observations: 27,504
Notes: Summary statistics refer to firm-year observations in Panel A and firm-product-year observations
in Panel B. Sales, value-added, materials, labour and capital measured in 1981-1982 Indian rupees.
period is associated with only a small fall in prices; (3) that the fall in input tariffs
reduced marginal costs – and hence via (1), generated higher markups; and (4) that when
controlling for marginal cost in a regression of markups on output tariffs so as to estimate
the pure pro-competitive effect of trade reform, that these effects helped to moderate the
rise in markups.
I replicate these results with the new Prowess data, leaving comparisons and full ana-
lysis to Appendix A-1 but here showing the main specification (2.27) as it provides the
starting point for my analysis.
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Table 2.4: OLS regressions of prices, marginal costs and markups on output and
input tariffs
(1) (2) (3)
ln price lnmarg.cost lnmarkup
τ output 0.1788 0.0664 0.1125
(0.0590)*** (0.0591) (0.0647)*
τ input -0.0385 0.7862 -0.8247
(0.5066) (0.4408)* (0.2952)***
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01
N 27,504 27,504 27,504
Firm-product FEs Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Overall impact -11.2 -23.9*** 12.7**
Standard error 10.6 9.0 6.2
Notes: Corresponds to DGKP, Table IX, p.491. Standard errors clustered by industry. All regressions
include a constant, firm-product fixed effects and sector-year fixed effects. The last two rows use the
average decline in output tariffs of 68 percentage points and the average decline of 24 percentage points
in input tariffs to compute the mean and standard error of the overall impact on prices. R2 is the within
R-squared. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
ln pricefjt = αfj + αst + β1τ
output
it + β2τ
input
it + εfjt (2.27)
Prices are regressed on output and input tariffs, along with firm-product fixed effects
and a full set of year-times-sector (two-digit) dummies. The tariffs are at the (four-digit)
industry level and so the β coefficients in equation (2.27) are interpreted as the difference
in the percentage change in prices for a firm in an industry that experiences a 1 percentage
point greater change in tariffs than another. Results are shown in column (1) of Table
2.4, while columns (2) and (3) replace prices with marginal costs and markups as the
dependent variable. Since log prices are the sum of log marginal costs and log markups,
the coefficients of interest also sum across the three regressions, i.e. the effect of output
tariffs on prices is equal to the sum of the effects of output tariffs on marginal costs and on
markups. Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit industry level, the “treatment”
level at which tariffs vary across firms.
The coefficient on output tariffs in column (1) is positive and significant, showing that
a fall in output tariffs of 10 percentage points acts to reduce output prices by 1.788%,
conditional on input tariffs. DGKP argue that this effect can be thought of as an increase
in competition, acting either to reduce markups or improve X-efficiencies.
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A fall in input tariffs, however, is not passed through to prices at any reasonable
significance level. The effects of changes in input tariffs, conditional on output tariffs,
would be associated with access to cheaper or more varieties of intermediates that act to
reduce marginal costs – indeed, DGKP argue that this is the only channel for input tariffs
– but, in this specification there is no effect on prices.
Column (2) shows results for marginal costs, where a change in output tariffs has no
significant affect, implying that competition does not lead firms to reduce costs. However,
a 10 percentage point fall in input tariffs is associated with a 7.86% fall in marginal costs,
implying that firms do benefit from lower prices of intermediates. Column (3) shows
changes in markups. The reduction in output tariffs, leading to lower prices but largely
unchanged marginal costs weakly acts to reduce markups. However, it is the reduction in
input tariffs that sharply reduces marginal costs without affecting prices and acts strongly
to raise markups.
Table 2.4 also shows the overall impact of the fall in tariffs on prices over the 1989-
1997 period, which can be computed by multiplying the average fall in tariffs – of 68
percentage points and 24 percentage points for output and input tariffs – by β1 and β2
respectively, and is shown together with the standard error in the final two rows. Average
firm prices, net of sector-year fluctuations, fell by only 11.2% due to the trade reform and
were not statistically different from zero. However, the reduction in tariffs reduced firms’
marginal costs by 23.9% – far more than 11.2% reduction in factory-gate prices, leaving
the combined impact of the tariff changes to raise markups by a statistically significant
12.7%.
DGKP’s main claim is that these results show that firms are the chief beneficiaries
of trade reform via higher markups, at least in the short run before any dynamic effects
are taken into account. They provide weaker evidence that firm-products that begin
the period with top decile markups reduce markups more than other firms. However, the
result is also consistent with firms upgrading the quality of existing products. DGKP argue
quality upgrading alone would not be a sufficient mechanism to produce these results. If
there was complete passthrough of marginal cost changes to prices, then quality upgrading
would not result in higher markups. And, since quality is costly, upgrading, conditional
on productivity and input prices, would imply higher marginal costs whereas DGKP find
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lower marginal costs in response to tariff reform.
By using the measures of demand following FMMM I show that quality upgrading is
an important part of the story, and that these demand changes are much stronger for
varieties that have weaker measures of performance when they are first observed in the
data. For better established varieties, efficiency improvements made in response to tariff
reform are more important.
2.5.3 Key features of FMMM measures
Prices, demand parameters and TFP
Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 provide OLS regressions that show correlations between key features
of the data and MULAMA model measures. In these regressions, I use product-unit dum-
mies and year dummies while reporting robust standard errors clustered at the firm level
in order to show the relationships across firms. Table 2.5 column (1) shows that the associ-
ation across firms between TFP and the demand shifter is positive, an important feature of
the Prowess data that stands in contrast to that found in other settings that consistently
find a negative correlation (Forlani et al. (2016) and see other chapters in this thesis).
This feature of the data in this paper is robust when also considering firm-unit-product
fixed effects, to the untrimmed data, to further trimming of outliers and to considering
changes over time in the variables. While the MULAMA model allows this correlation to
be unrestricted, the result is somewhat surprising considering the usual interpretation of
a negative correlation as a quality-quantity trade-off due to higher-quality/demand goods
necessitating higher-cost inputs. It is however consistent with models such as Antoniades
(2015) in which higher quality products are associated with high productivity (low mar-
ginal cost) producers. Briefly putting this result to one side, both TFP and the demand
shifter in relation to quantities and prices behave in ways consistent with economic intu-
ition. Higher TFP is associated with larger quantities (column 2) and lower prices (column
3), while higher demand is associated with larger quantities (column 4) and higher prices
(column 5). Finally, column (6) shows that conditional on TFP, the demand shifter is
associated with higher prices.
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Table 2.5: OLS regressions involving prices, demand parameters and TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln demand shifter λ/µ ln quantity ln price ln quantity ln price ln price
TFP a 6.778 0.840 -0.177 -0.251
(0.427)*** (0.021)*** (0.018)*** (0.021)***
ln demand shifter λ/µ 0.007 0.007 0.011
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Product FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504
R2 0.47 0.87 0.92 0.82 0.92 0.93
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm. All regressions include product-unit and year dummies. R2 is
the within R-squared.
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Demand parameters and costs
In order to better understand the relationship between TFP and demand shown in column
(1) of Table 2.5, Table 2.6 provides OLS regressions of various model measures on log mar-
ginal costs and log input prices. Column (1) shows a positive and significant marginal cost
to prices pass-through elasticity, very similar in size to the 0.413 (with 0.029 standard er-
ror) within-firm results reported in Appendix Table A.2. Higher marginal costs are also, as
expected, associated with lower TFP in column (2). Consistent with the positive relation-
ship between TFP and the demand shifter, lower marginal costs are associated with higher
demand, whether measured by the relative product appeal, λ (column (3)) or the demand
shifter, λ/µ (column(4)). This is despite one of the identifying assumptions required when
using output prices in the control function for input prices/quality in equation (2.5), being
that higher quality/demand outputs are made from more expensive inputs. Clearly, this
result needs further explanation. The key is that it is firm-product input prices and not
marginal costs that appear in the control function and columns (5)-(8) show the relation-
ship of these input prices with marginal costs, output prices and demand.
DGKP make use of an assumption, following typical O-ring theory (Kremer, 1993),
that high quality (and cost) labour, materials and capital are complementary and therefore
their prices can be captured using a single firm-product specific price index. Operationally,
these prices, wfjt, are retrieved from the single product production function estimation
which yields the β and δ vectors in the input price bias control function in equation (2.4),
B(wft, x̃ft,β), and then using equation (2.5) to calculate estimates of the input prices,
wxit = wt (pit,msit,Df , EXPit).
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Table 2.6: OLS regressions of cost measures on prices, demand parameters and
TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln price ln TFP ln product ln demand ln priceinputs ln price ln product ln demand
a appeal λ shifter λ/µ appeal λ shifter λ/µ
ln marg. cost 0.452 -0.633 -2.870 -4.130 0.345
(0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.217)*** (0.344)*** (0.015)***
ln priceinputs 0.953 0.807 1.558
(0.022)*** (0.189)*** (0.290)***
N 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504
R2 0.95 0.96 0.38 0.44 0.37 0.97 0.32 0.41
Product FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm. All regressions include product-unit and year dummies. R2 is
the within R-squared.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Column (5) confirms that firm-products with higher cost inputs have a higher marginal
cost of production. Higher cost inputs are also associated with higher prices (column (6))
with an elasticity very close to 1, a result that provides comfort that the input price control
function is correctly specified. Finally, columns (7) and (8) show that firms with higher
input prices do indeed produce higher relative-demand products and have a demand curve
with a higher intercept term. Together these results suggest that in the Indian setting
higher quality/demand products are produced with more expensive inputs, but at lower
marginal costs.
One explanation could be that the more technically efficient firms are those produ-
cing for higher-value markets, even within detailed product categories, as in for example,
Antoniades (2015), or that because our demand measures capture perceived quality, a
product sold widely in a national market will have a higher demand shift and product
appeal measure than a product sold only locally at the same price.
Prices, marginal costs and markups on MULAMA measures
Table 2.7 provides OLS regressions of prices, marginal costs and markups on TFP, de-
mand heterogeneity and production scale, showing the conditional correlations for these
MULAMA measures across firms within products (columns (1), (3) and (5)) and within
firm-products (columns (2),(4) and (6)). Here, I follow DGKP to make results consistent
with the analysis of trade reform by including sector-by-year fixed effects to control for
macroeconomic fluctuations at the 2-digit sector level, and once again, standard errors are
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Table 2.7: OLS regressions of prices, marginal costs and markups on MULAMA
model measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln price ln price ln marg. cost ln marg. cost ln markup ln markup
TFP a -0.283 -0.346 -1.013 -0.854 0.730 0.508
(0.017)*** (0.038)*** (0.016)*** (0.031)*** (0.014)*** (0.035)***
ln demand shifter λ/µ 0.009 0.012 -0.002 -0.005 0.010 0.017
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
scale q̄ -0.319 -0.339 -0.309 -0.362 -0.010 0.023
(0.018)*** (0.031)*** (0.022)*** (0.033)*** (0.009) (0.022)
Sector-year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product FEs yes yes yes
Firm-Product FEs yes yes yes
N 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504
R2 0.94 0.99 0.95 0.99 0.85 0.96
Notes: Standard errors clustered by firm. All regressions include sectorxyear dummies. Regressions in
columns (1), (3) and (5) include product dummies and columns (2), (4) and (6) firm-product dummies.
R2 is the within R-squared.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
clustered by firm.
Whether considering product or firm-product fixed effects, higher TFP (conditional on
demand and firm size) is associated with lower prices, sharply lower marginal costs, and
higher markups. Likewise, firms with higher demand, conditional on TFP and production
scale (note that since qfjt = a + qfjt this effectively controls for production quantity) is
associated with higher prices, and as discussed above, somewhat lower marginal costs, with
a combined effect of higher markups. Finally, bigger production scale is associated with
lower prices and lower marginal costs, but no significant effect on markups, conditional on
TFP and demand.
2.5.4 MULAMA demand measures and trade reform
Having established these key relationships, I turn to the relationship between demand and
tariffs, re-running equation (2.27) but with the demand shifter and demand slope as the
dependent variable. Table 2.8 report the results.
The positive and significant coefficient on output tariffs in column (1) shows how lower
tariffs reduce residual demand amid higher import competition, and this shift in the de-
mand curve results in a lower markup and consequently more elastic demand – a higher
(i.e. flatter) slope (1/µ), which is seen in column (4). But lower input tariffs act to oppose
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Table 2.8: OLS and IV regressions of MULAMA demand measures on output
and input tariffs
ln demand shifter ln demand slope
λ/µ 1/µ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τ output 4.567 4.786 4.599 -1.234 -1.343 -1.266
(1.883)** (1.923)** (2.118)** (0.602)** (0.647)** (0.640)**
τ input -32.907 -30.315 -22.768 11.364 10.071 7.361
(12.557)** (13.211)** (11.278)** (4.708)** (5.132)* (3.647)**
R2 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.14
N 27,504 27,504 14,922 27,504 27,504 14,922
Control for MC no yes IV no yes IV
Firm-product FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by 4-digit industry. All regressions include firm-product fixed effects
and sector×year dummies. Columns (2) and (4) control for log marginal cost (coefficients not shown),
columns (3) and (6) instrument for log marginal cost with lagged marginal cost and TFP a. R2 is
within-R-squared. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
these changes, shifting demand upwards and, via markups, making it less elastic. This
higher demand could be the result of 1) an increase in product quality, or 2) an indirect
effect of tariffs via lower marginal costs which allows a product to be sold more widely. To
show the role of quality, in columns 2-3 and 5-6 I control for marginal costs first using OLS
and then, to account for measurement error, using an instrumental variables approach.
DGKP in some specifications instrument for marginal costs using lagged marginal cost
and τ input to deal with measurement error in the estimated variable. They note that it
is only necessary for the instruments to be uncorrelated with the measurement error, i.e.
there is no serial correlation in the measurement error of marginal cost. In these regres-
sions I instrument marginal costs with lagged marginal costs and TFP, afjt, instead of
lagged marginal costs and τ input since the latter is already included in its own right.18
The coefficients and standard errors on output tariffs barely change and, although the
coefficients on input tariffs are somewhat smaller they remain significant, indicating that
the effect of input tariffs on demand does not come indirectly via marginal cost changes.
This is evidence that trade reform prompts firms to upgrade product quality.
Taken together, these results show that lower tariffs affect demand through both the
slope and position of the demand curve and indicate that that firms are using the availab-
18The IV requires a lagged variable, reducing the sample size and I check that the columns (1) and (2)
results are consistent when using the IV sample.
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ility of cheaper and/or higher quality inputs to increase output quality and are charging
correspondingly higher markups. This is a departure from the DGKP story that firms’
market power lets them retain the benefits of lower input prices from the tariff liberal-
isation. If product quality increases as a result of liberalisation then there are real gains
for consumers, and the apparent limited pass through of marginal costs to prices is not
the full story. The natural question to ask is, what happens to prices, marginal costs and
markups conditional on product demand and quality?
Revisting prices, markups and trade reform
To explore this question further I return to the analysis of the main DGKP results shown
in Table 2.4, and now control for the demand curve parameters, λ/µ and 1/µ in equation
(2.27). With this reduced form, it is important to note that the results have less of a causal
flavour than those above, since the demand parameters are themselves not exogenous.
Table 2.9 reports the results.
Columns (1), (3) and (5) reproduce results from Table 2.4 above, for comparison and
columns (2), (4) and (6) add the demand shifter and slope as controls. In column (2),
the addition of controls results in a lower coefficient on output tariffs, though it remains
significant, implying that if demand had not changed due to the pro-competitive effects of
liberalization in output markets, prices would still have fallen. Another way to think of this
is that since we are holding the log demand curve constant, the price changes must be due
to firms making efficiency improvements that shift the supply curve. Consistent with this,
the coefficient on output tariffs in the column (4) regression of marginal cost becomes much
larger and significant, indicating that lower output tariffs led to reductions in marginal
costs that were more than fully passed through to prices. This finding is a departure
from DGKP, which takes a different approach to estimating the pro-competitive effects of
the reform, and finds that most of the output tariff effect in column (5) is due increased
competition lowering price-marginal cost margins, see Appendix Table A.5. However, that
approach depends on the assumption that input tariffs only affect markups via reductions
in marginal costs, and not, as we have seen directly via higher quality inputs.
The coefficients on input tariffs change even more when controlling for demand. In
column (2), the larger and positive (though still not statistically significant) coefficient
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points towards firms raising quality and being able to sustain higher prices. In other words,
had output quality remained constant, lower input tariffs would have put downwards
pressure on prices.
The result in column (4) is perhaps surprising, showing that when input tariffs fall,
marginal costs do not change conditional on demand. It appears that marginal costs
only fell when input tariffs were reduced because of quality changes, implying that lower
marginal cost inputs were of a type that raised output quality. Again, this result stems
from the finding in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 that quality and efficiency are positively correlated,
while marginal costs and quality/demand are negatively correlated.
The overall impact of the price and marginal cost changes net of the effects of demand
and quality, are a greater reduction of prices, 15.5% (now significant at the 10% level)
instead of 11.2%, and a smaller, statistically insignificant effect on marginal costs of a
8.1% reduction instead of a strongly significant 23.9% reduction.
Column (6) shows that when controlling for product quality, the trade reform did not
have any impact on average firm markups. Firms reduce prices and costs through lower
input costs and increasing efficiencies when tariffs fall, at the same time producing higher
quality products in response to the availability of cheaper and higher quality inputs. The
higher markups documented in DGKP appear to be entirely driven by this process.
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Table 2.9: OLS regressions of prices, marginal costs and markups on tariffs with
controls for demand
ln price ln marg.cost ln markup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τ output 0.1788 0.1368 0.0664 0.1688 0.1125 -0.0320
(0.0590)*** (0.0419)*** (0.0591) (0.0787)** (0.0647)* (0.0548)
τ input -0.0385 0.2504 0.7862 -0.1397 -0.8247 0.3901
(0.5066) (0.3920) (0.4408)* (0.6274) (0.2952)*** (0.3330)
R2 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.31
N 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504
Controls for demand Yes Yes Yes
Firm-product FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall impact -11.2 -15.5* -23.9*** -8.1 12.7** -7.4
Standard error 10.6 9.1 9.0 12.1 6.2 6.2
Notes: Standard errors clustered by industry. All regressions include a constant, firm-product fixed effects
and sector×year fixed effects. Controls for demand in columns (2), (4) and (6) are the demand shifter λ/µ
and the demand slope 1/µ. R2 is the Within R-squared. The final two rows use the average decline in
output tariffs of 68pp and the averge decline of 24pp in input tariffs to compute the mean and standard
error of the overall impact, net of the controls, on the dependent variable. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
2.5.5 Firm-product heterogeneity and trade reform
There is abundant empirical evidence that the effects of trade liberalization on product
quality are heterogeneous (for example, see Fan et al. (2015, 2018); Khandelwal (2010);
Kugler and Verhoogen (2011); Verhoogen (2008); Manova and Zhang (2012)) and typically
the size and productivity of firms are the characteristics that determine the heterogeneous
effects, as supported by theoretical models such Kugler and Verhoogen (2011), Antoniades
(2015) and Fan et al. (2018). The results above that show that demand-side effects of trade
reform are key to understanding firm pricing and markup decisions, is also suggestive of
heterogeneous effects since these are factors that vary across firms and products. I invest-
igate the heterogeneous effects of the Indian trade reform by considering the differential
effects on varieties depending on their pre-treatment performance. Guided by the existing
empirical and theoretical evidence, I define a size dummy using the market share of each
variety within a four-digit industry in the year in which the variety first appears in the
data, assigning the dummy a value of 1 if it has an above-median market share and 0
otherwise.19
19DGKP use a similar method to categorise high markup firms (top quintile) and find some evidence
that the pro-competitive effects of trade reform are felt more strongly by firms that begin the period with
relatively higher markups.
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Table 2.10: Summary statistics for low- and high-share varieties
Variable Low share High share ∆
ln quantity -0.520 0.695 1.215***
ln price -0.035 0.047 0.082***
lnmarg.cost 0.175 -0.234 -0.409***
lnmarkup -0.220 0.537 0.758***
TFP a -0.204 0.273 0.477***
demand shifter λ/µ -1.843 2.461 4.304***
demand slope 1/µ 3.533 0.950 -2.583***
Notes: All variables except 1/µ de-meaned by product-unit fixed effects. Mean values shown. Low
share/High share refers to firm-products sales value in each half of the 4-digit industry distribution in the
first year in which the firm-product appears in the data. The difference in means, ∆, is shown in the final
column along with significance based on a t-test of the equality of means with unequal variance. * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 2.10 shows sample means across the high and low market share varieties, and
confirms some key findings in the literature. High market share varieties outperform
peers in all dimensions. They sell higher quantities at higher prices and with much higher
markups, while productivity (TFP-Q) is higher.20 Marginal costs lower are lower for these
varieties, while they face higher, less elastic demand.21
I then re-run the reduced form equation (2.27) using as the dependent variable in turn,
log prices, marginal costs, markups, quantities, TFP, the demand shifter and demand
slope, and interact the time-invariant size dummy variable with both output and input
tariffs, running the following specification,
lnZfjt =αfj + αst + β1τ
output
it + β2τ
input
it +
γ1(τ
output
it ∗ topfj) + γ2(τ
input
it ∗ topfj) + εfjt,
(2.28)
where lnZfjt is log quantity, log price, log marginal cost, log markup, log TFP-Q, the
demand shifter and demand slope, and topfj is the size dummy that takes the value 1
if a variety has an above-median market share within a four-digit industry when it first
appears in the data and 0 otherwise.
Table 2.11 reports and decomposes the results into the total effects over the 1989-1997
period, providing evidence that the changes in prices, marginal costs and markups were
20Positive correlations between either output or export prices and productivity, and output prices and
market shares are features noted by, among others, Verhoogen (2008), Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) and
Manova and Zhang (2012).
21The authors cited above argue that these correlations require heterogeneous product quality.
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mediated through very different channels for varieties with low initial market shares com-
pared to those with high shares. Column (1) shows the overall effect on each variable due
to the trade reform in the same way as the final two rows of Table 2.4 after estimating
equation (2.28) without the interaction terms and then multiplying the β1 and β2 coeffi-
cients by the 68 percentage point drop in output tariffs and the 24 point drop in input
tariffs over the period respectively. Columns (2) and (3) separate out the changes due
to output and input tariffs respectively. The effects on low share varieties are calculated
from the β coefficients estimated in equation (2.28) and the high share varieties from the
β and γ coefficients. For the log-levels regressions (i.e., all except the demand shifter and
slope) these numbers are percentage changes in each variable from 1989-1997, while for
the levels-levels they are absolute changes.
What is striking about these results is how similar tariff-induced price declines of
10.6% and 11.9% for low and high share varieties respectively are derived through different
channels. High share varieties respond to lower output tariffs with increases in technical
efficiency which are almost fully passed through to marginal costs and prices (and hence
unchanged markups), while demand parameters are unchanged.22 Lower input tariffs for
these varieties raise and steepen the demand curve, allowing firms to increase quantities
while leaving marginal costs, prices and markups largely unchanged. But for the low-share
varieties, markups change a lot. Indeed, almost all of the 12.69% increase in markups under
the DGKP methodology is due to a 18.5% increase in markups for these varieties. Lower
input tariffs raise quality much more strongly for the low-share firm-products than the
high-share, allowing them to increase quantities sold without adjusting prices. Efficiency
rises very strongly through the inputs channel as well.
The finding that it is the low-share varieties that benefit most from lower tariffs is
similar with the evidence from Fan et al. (2018), that laggard firms in China when it
entered the WTO upgraded output and inputs quality (and prices) faster than pre-entry
leaders. However, it that case, the evidence concerns exporting firms rather than my
paper with its focus on all products whether exported or not. Nataraj (2011) documents
large increases in productivity among the smallest, informal firms in India during the
1990s, but this result also concerns firms not products and, further, the main mechanism
22There still may be underlying changes in demand heterogeneity, but any demand increases due to
quality improvements are offset by a contraction in demand due to tougher competition.
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for this is via reallocation from the exit of the least efficient small firms due to foreign
competition. This reallocation channel is one that I have not considered, Prowess being
unsuitable for analysis of firm entry and exit because of its focus on large firms that
rarely exit the market. However, while selection effects – the exit of the least productive
firms and varieties – could be a concern for my analysis, existing evidence at the firm and
product level suggests that it was not a major driver of Indian economic performance over
the period. Goldberg et al. (2010b), using the Prowess data finds that product dropping
by firms was rare over the same period, with far less churn than comparable exercises in
advanced economies, while Harrison et al. (2013) and Bollard et al. (2013) using broader
datasets than Prowess also point to within-firm changes as being far more important than
between-firm reallocations in driving up Indian productivity.
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Table 2.11: Decomposition of impact of trade reform on low- and high-share
producers
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Change due to ...of which due ... of which due
trade reform to output tariffs to input tariffs
ln price† -11.23 -12.18*** 0.95
low share -10.56 -14.26** 3.70
high share -11.89 -9.92*** -1.97
lnmc† -23.92*** -4.52 -19.40*
low share -29.07*** -0.05 -29.02***
high share -17.80** -9.24* -8.56
lnµ† 12.69** -7.66* 20.35***
low share 18.51** -14.21* 32.72***
high share 5.91 -0.68 6.58
ln quantity† 22.03*** -1.04 23.07***
low share 32.35*** 0.35 32.00***
high share 8.77 -2.98 11.75*
a† 21.90** 6.39 15.51
low share 27.03*** 2.28 24.75**
high share 15.78** 10.73** 5.05
λ/µ‡ 5.01** -3.11** 8.12**
low share 5.54** -5.32* 10.85**
high share 4.55** -0.70 5.25***
1/µ‡ -1.96** 0.84** -2.80**
low share -2.19** 1.57 -3.76*
high share -1.75** 0.05 -1.79***
Notes: Compiled using results from Table A.6. The average decline in output tariffs of 68pp and the
average decline of 24pp in input tariffs are used to compute the mean of the impact on each dependent
variable shown in the first column, for (a) the whole sample, (b) low market share firms and (c) high
market share firms. Column 1 shows the overall impact of trade reform, summing the impacts of input
and output tariffs. Column 2 shows the output tariff component and column 3 the input tariff component.
†: percentage changes in variable. ‡: absolute change in variable. Significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper I reassemble the detailed product-level dataset used by DGKP and closely
follow its approach to estimating marginal costs and markups, while drawing on Forlani
et al. (2016) to obtain measures of consumer demand for products conditional on price
without the need for onerous demand-side assumptions.
I first show that the impacts of the tariff liberalization on prices (a reduction of 11.2%),
marginal costs (a reduction of 23.9%) and markups (an increase of 12.7%) are driven by
changes to the demand faced by firms for their products, most notably by the reductions in
input tariffs that allow firms to raise product quality. Conditional on this demand, prices
fell more (by 15.5%), marginal costs fell less (by 8.1%) and markups if anything also fell,
(by 7.4%). While both DGKP and my paper show factory gate prices falling by less than
marginal costs, implying that firms received most of the benefits of the trade liberalization,
the finding that product quality rose along with markups suggests that there were also
big benefits for consumers.
Second, I show significant heterogeneity in firm product performance, measured by
market shares, was such that almost all of the unconditional (on demand/quality) effects
of lower tariffs on markups were due to improvements in initially laggard varieties. While
average markups increased by 12.7% due to lower tariffs, the effects on below-median
market share varieties resulted in an 18.5% increase, with only a 5.9% increase for above-
median market share varieties. The initially poor performers saw the largest declines in
marginal costs and largest increases in product quality associated with lower tariffs on
imported intermediates.
The literature on the growth in revenue TFP in India after the 1991 reforms strongly
supports the role of within-firm TFP growth rather than reallocation towards more pro-
ductive firms (e.g. Harrison et al. (2013), Bollard et al. (2013)). A possible mechanism
would have been a within-firm reallocation towards higher productivity products (Harrison
et al., 2013; Bernard et al., 2010), the opposite of the effect I find and also inconsistent
with Goldberg et al. (2010b) that shows little evidence of Indian firms dropping products
during the period. The results presented in my paper offer an alternative mechanism
consistent with both the growth of within-firm productivity and limited product churn:
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that the input tariff reductions allowed firms to raise the quality, productivity and scale of
laggard products. Further research into the dynamics of changes in product quality within
multi-product firms in the Indian context would help build robustness to the results I have
presented.
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Chapter 3
On The Productivity Advantage of
Cities
Abstract
Ever since Marshall (1890) agglomeration externalities have been viewed as the key
factor explaining the existence of cities and their size. However, while the various mi-
cro foundations of agglomeration externalities stress the importance of Total Factor Pro-
ductivity (TFP), the empirical evidence on agglomeration externalities rests on measures
obtained using firm revenue or value-added as a measure of firm output: revenue-based
TFP (TFP-R). This paper uses data on French manufacturing firms’ revenue, quantity
and prices to estimate TFP and TFP-R and decompose the latter into various elements.
Our analysis suggests that the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas is mainly
driven by higher prices charged rather than differences in TFP. At the same time, firms
in denser areas are able to sell higher quantities, and generate higher revenues, despite
higher prices. These and other results we document suggest that firms in denser areas are
able to charge higher prices because they sell higher demand/quality products. Finally,
while the correlation between firm revenue TFP and firm size is positive in each location,
it is also systematically related to density: firms with higher (lower) TFP-R account for
a larger (smaller) share of total revenue in denser areas. These patterns thus amplify in
aggregate regional-level figures any firm-level differences in productivity across space.
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3.1 Introduction
A stylized fact of economic geography is that the productivity of firms increases with
city size and urban density (Combes and Gobillon, 2015), and a large literature going
back to Marshall (1890) explores the question of why cities have this productivity advant-
age. Micro-foundations put forward for these agglomeration externalities are now typically
grouped under the headings sharing, matching, learning and sorting (Duranton and Puga,
2004; Combes et al., 2008) and include different forms of knowledge spillovers between
firms, costly trade, pro-competitive effects of city size, and sorting of workers (Syverson,
2011). The empirical literature suggests a rather consistent, across countries and years,
range for the elasticity of productivity with respect to city size of 0.04-0.07 (Rosenthal and
Strange, 2004). However, while theoretical micro-foundations for agglomeration external-
ities rest on differences across space in total factor productivity (TFP), i.e., the capacity to
turn inputs into more physical output, empirical work has so far considered what we call
revenue TFP measures (TFP-R), i.e., productivity calculated using revenue as a measure
of output and so the capacity to turn inputs into more revenue.
To be more specific, researchers typically try to measure TFP as the residual obtained
by estimating a production function through a regression of some measure of firm out-
put on inputs. One key problem with this in practice is that usually the only output
measures available are gross revenues or value-added, and not quantities. Revenues are
of course made up of price and quantities. Even though industry-level price deflators are
usually available they are of little use if the goal of the analysis is to pick up differences
in productivity across space because they do not take into account differences in prices
across locations. More broadly, revenue-based measures of productivity will pick up any
heterogeneity in firm-level prices, confounding efforts to measure ‘true’ physical TFP. This
heterogeneity in prices across firms could be due to many factors including firm-level de-
mand shifters, markups and production scale. At a regional level, for instance, if firms
in larger cities systematically sell higher-priced, higher-quality goods, the econometrician
working with a measure of revenue TFP will overstate the impact of city size on TFP. At
the same time, establishing that part of the observed revenue productivity advantage of
cities is due to factors other than technical efficiency would require a substantial recon-
sideration of agglomeration economies and in particular of the related mechanisms and
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policy implications.
In order to address these issues we make use of high-quality and detailed quantity,
prices and revenue data on products produced by French manufacturing firms. This type
of data is becoming more widely available, allowing researchers to measure firm-specific
TFP while considering the presence of other forms of heterogeneities across firms, and that
is what we do in this paper. More specifically, we build upon the framework developed
in Forlani et al. (2016) – henceforth FMMM – that allows us to measure heterogeneity in
TFP, demand and markups across firms while further providing an exact decomposition
of revenue TFP. We employ the FMMM framework to measure these heterogeneities at
the firm level and subsequently aggregate them at the location level to analyze differences
in TFP, demand and markups across space.
We first highlight two strong patterns in the data relating revenue TFP and density.
First, a substantial portion of the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas stems
from product composition effects: denser areas are specialised in products generating a
higher revenue TFP. Second, the way one aggregates firm-level data into regional-level
data matters considerably for the measurement of the elasticity of revenue TFP with re-
spect to density. More specifically, magnitudes are considerably larger when considering
a weighted (by firm revenue or employment cost) as opposed to un-weighted data aggreg-
ation, while weighted results are also in line with the range suggested by regional-level
studies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). These patterns are driven by the relationship
between firm revenue TFP and firm size (as measured by either revenue or employment
cost) being positive in each location but systematically related to density: firms with
higher (lower) TFP-R account for a larger (smaller) share of total revenue in denser areas.
One way of interpreting this is that the market better allocates market shares across firms
with heterogeneous productivities in denser areas so amplifying in aggregate regional-level
figures any firm-level differences in productivity across space. These findings have import-
ant implications for regional policy. For example, they suggest that achieving regional
convergence is not only about improving the TFP or the revenue TFP of firms in lagging
regions but also increasing (decreasing) the relative size of the most (least) productive
firms in those regions which might be hindered more than in denser regions by factors like
inputs misallocation.
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Concerning the factors driving the revenue productivity advantage of firms in denser
areas that remains after accounting for the product composition and aggregation effects
described above, we start by highlighting how a properly defined and measured revenue
TFP should equal TFP plus the log price. Using information from the raw data we first
document that prices are higher in denser areas. At the same time, quantities sold at these
higher prices are also higher and so are revenues. This suggests that products sold by firms
located in denser areas face a higher demand. Using measures obtained with the FMMM
framework we subsequently establish that marginal costs are higher while markups are
lower in denser areas. Furthermore, there is no overall significant relationship between
TFP and density and so the revenue TFP advantage of denser areas is mainly driven by
higher prices.1 By using complementary information from exports data, we also provide
evidence that prices charged and quantities sold by firms located in denser areas are also
higher when conditioning to a given destination market so suggesting that products sold by
firms located in denser areas are of higher (actual and/or perceived) quality. The above
results have further implications for regional policy. In particular, the current policy
approach is based on the presumption that firms in lagging regions are characterized by a
lower TFP and so interventions are directed towards increasing their technical efficiency.
However, our evidence suggests that interventions should rather promote firms’ product
quality and marketing capabilities in order to increase revenue TFP in lagging regions.
In terms of data we make use of Eurostat’s Products of the European Community
(Prodcom) dataset. Prodcom consists of surveys, standardized across the European Union,
of firm-level production that cover over 90% of output in manufacturing industries at a
detailed (8-digit) level. We use the French Prodcom provided by the Institut National de
la Statistique et des Études Économiques (INSEE) for the 2008-15 period. Firm balance
sheet and location information comes from the Fichier Approché des Résultats d’Esane
(FARE) database and cover the same period 2008-2015. We use Zones d’Emploi (ZE) as
our spatial unit, a measure of local labour markets similar in construction to UK Travel-
To-Work-Areas.
In order to provide reassurance about the robustness of our results we employ two es-
1Our results refer to the aggregate of manufacturing products. Therefore, it might well be the case
that, for some specific products, there is a positive and significant relationship between TFP and density.
Indeed, we provide one such example in our analysis: ‘Ready mixed concrete’.
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timation techniques: the estimation procedure developed in FMMM as well the procedure
described in De Loecker et al. (2016) – henceforth DGKP. Indeed, under the assumptions
laid down in FMMM, the same revenue productivity decomposition holds and both estim-
ation procedures are valid. We find results of both procedures to be qualitatively identical
and also quantitatively very similar. We further provide a number of additional results
showing that our key findings are little affected by whether we focus on the sample of
single-product firms or the larger sample of single-product and multi-product firms, by
whether we employ the number of full-time equivalent employees or the total wage bill to
measure the labour input, by whether we consider firm revenue or firm wage bill to weight
observations, by whether we eliminate the Paris area or not, as well as by whether we use
a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog production function.
Our paper is closely related to the literature on the measurement of agglomeration
economies. Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Combes and Gobillon (2015) provide sum-
maries of this literature and agree on a range for the key elasticity of productivity with
respect to density of 0.04-0.07.2 These findings are robust to the endogeneity of current
economic density and in particular to the use of long lags of historical density as instru-
ments for current density (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002). However all these
findings, including Combes et al. (2012),3 relate to measures of revenue TFP. By contrast,
we use data on quantity, prices and revenue to measure TFP and, via the decomposi-
tion provided in FMMM, we unravel the revenue TFP advantage of denser areas into its
components.
Our paper is also related to the literature on firm TFP measurement on which Olley
and Pakes (1996) has had a deep impact. The key endogeneity issue addressed in Olley
and Pakes (1996) is omitted variables: the firm observes and takes decisions based on
productivity shocks that are unobservable to the econometrician. Yet, the econometrician
observes firm decisions (investments) that do not impact productivity today and that
can (under certain conditions) be used as a proxy for productivity shocks. This proxy
2See also Combes et al. (2008), Mion and Naticchioni (2009) and De La Roca and Puga (2017) for
estimates of the elasticity of worker-level wages with respect to density.
3Combes et al. (2012) use revenue TFP measures to establish whether and how the productivity ad-
vantage of large cities is due to agglomeration, measured as a right-shifting and dilation of the productivity
distribution, as opposed to firm selection, measured as a left-truncation of the productivity distribution.
In our analysis we do not explore the issues of right-shifting, dilation and left-truncation. However, our
framework could be used to establish if and how much the distribution of each component of revenue TFP
is subject to right-shifting and dilation and/or left-truncation.
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variable approach to tackle the issue of unobservable productivity shocks has been further
developed in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Wooldridge (2009) and Ackerberg et al. (2015)
while De Loecker et al. (2016) and Forlani et al. (2016) provide frameworks consistent
with the presence of heterogeneity across firms in TFP, demand and markups.
The outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides details on
the data we use. Section 3.3 presents the model and revenue TFP decomposition of FMMM
while further providing highlights of the estimation procedures. Section 3.4 presents our
main results and findings while Section 3.5 contains a number of additional results and
robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes while the Appendix provides additional Tables
and details of the estimation procedures.
3.2 Data
This Section describes the data used to study productivity and agglomeration in France.
Our analysis focuses on the period 2008-2015. The core data required to estimate firm-
level revenue productivity using standard methodologies comprises revenue (and/or value-
added), labour, intermediates and capital. For these variables we turn to FARE, an annual
census of French firms carried out by INSEE.
From the FARE dataset we take firm labour, intermediates and capital variables. The
capital stock variable represents the reported book value of capital while intermediates is
the value of intermediate inputs and services. For labour, we use the number of full-time
equivalent employees. Some productivity studies use the firm wage bill instead on the
grounds that this controls in some way for the ability of workers. We prefer to use the
number of full-time equivalent employees as benchmark, while providing additional results
obtained using the wage bill, for the following reasons. Our aim is not to establish what
share of the productivity advantage of denser areas is related to workers’ skills and abilities
(possibly due to sorting of better workers across space), but rather to establish how much
of the observed revenue-based productivity advantage of firms located in denser areas is
due to actual TFP differences as opposed to demand and markups differences. In this
light, we prefer to use a measure of the labour input allowing our firm-level revenue TFP
and quantity TFP to incorporate differences in workers’ skills and abilities across loca-
tions. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3.4, using the number of full-time equivalent
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employees allows us to more clearly establish whether products sold by firms located in
denser locations actually require more inputs to be produced as opposed to more expensive
inputs.
FARE can be matched, via the unique firm identifier (SIREN code), to another dataset,
the ‘Répertoire des entreprises et des établissements’, providing us with the location of the
establishments of each firm. We use information on the municipality (commune) which we
subsequently match to the corresponding ‘Zone d’Emploi’ (ZE), a measure of local labour
markets similar in construction to the UK Travel-To-Work-Areas, of which there are 297
in mainland France (excluding overseas territories and Corsica). In order to give a more
causal flavor to our results, in some of our regressions we instrument for current density
building on an approach that is standard in the literature: using long-lagged historical
densities as instruments for current densities (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). In particular,
we use population density in 1831, 1861 and 1891 as our instruments. In doing so, we
had to take into account two additional issues. First, historical censuses did not record
municipalities which had a population of less than 5,000 in their respective years. At the
ZE-level, this still leaves 24 ZEs as having zero population in 1831 so they exert no weight
in subsequent regressions. Second, historical municipalities do not exactly match those
of today. Several no longer exist having been subsumed over the course of 150 years of
administrative changes. We deal with these by manually matching to the modern ZE.
In our investigations, we consider firms as the unit of analysis and restrict our attention
to firms whose establishments (if more than one) are all located in the same ZE so that
we can uniquely associate a firm to a ZE at a given point in time. In this respect, we
believe that the most natural unit of analysis for productivity, demand and markups
heterogeneity is the firm and not the establishment. Furthermore, inputs and outputs
data are available at the level of the firm and not the establishment and so measuring
productivity, demand and markups heterogeneity across establishments would necessarily
involve debatable assignment procedures. In doing so, while applying some cleaning to
the data,4 we end up with 628,940 firm-year observations in NACE two-digit industries
4We eliminate firm-year observations with non-positive values of revenue and/or intermediates and/or
the wage bill and/or capital and/or value added. We then apply a small trimming (top and bottom 0.5%)
based on the distribution of the following four ratios: intermediates over sales, wage bill over sales, capital
over sales and sales in t over sales in t− 1. We further apply a final trimming based on the ratio between
intermediates plus the wage bill over sales and also drop 2 digit sections with less than 500 observations.
51
10-32 (Manufacturing), which we label the FARE sample.
Quantity TFP estimation requires data on production quantities and sales values, and
that information is available in the Products of the European Community (Prodcom)
dataset at a detailed product level. Prodcom is a firm-level survey of manufacturing and
production carried out by EU national statistical agencies using an 8-digit nomenclature
established by Eurostat. The first four digits correspond to the ‘Nomenclature Statistique
des Activités Economiques dans la Communauté Européenne’ (NACE) revision 2, and
the first six digits to the ‘Classification of Products by Activity’ (CPA) with the last 2
digits adding further detail. There are approximately 3,800 Prodcom codes per year.5
The Prodcom survey captures at least 90% of production in all the four digit industries
covered by the survey.
Table 3.1: CPA 13.10.61: Cotton yarn (other than sewing thread)
PRODCOM Description
13.10.61.32 Yarn of uncombed cotton, not per retail sale, for woven
fabrics (excluding for carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.33 Yarn of uncombed cotton, not per retail sale, for knit-
ted fabrics and hosiery
13.10.61.35 Yarn of uncombed cotton, not per retail sale, for other
uses (including carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.52 Yarn of combed cotton, not per retail sale, for woven
fabrics (excluding for carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.53 Yarn of combed cotton, not per retail sale, for knitted
fabrics and hosiery
13.10.61.55 Yarn of combed cotton, not per retail sale, for other
uses (including carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.60 Cotton yarn, per retail sale (excluding sewing thread)
Illustrating the advantages of highly disaggregated data, Table 3.1 shows an extract
from the 2014 Prodcom list for the six-digit code 13.10.61: ‘Cotton yarn (other than
sewing thread)’. As can be appreciated from Table 3.1, the eight-digit product breakdown
is quite detailed and working at this level of disaggregation allows us to take into account
rich differences in technology, demand and degree of competition across finely defined
products.
5In order to deal with Prodcom codes changing over time we use the correspondence Tables provided
by Eurostat RAMON and apply the methodology described in Van Beveren et al. (2012) to construct a
time-consistent products breakdown. In practice, from 2008 to 2015 there have been only minor changes
in Prodcom codes.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics, e000s
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fare sample Prodcom sample SP+MP sample SP sample
mean mean mean mean
(sd) (sd) (sd) (sd)
turnover 3,521.4 7,268.0 4,148.7 6,058.1
(132,954.4) (221,462.6) (43,741.7) (21,636.6)
value-added 994.1 2,015.9 1,141.7 1,689.1
(19,578.0) (26,607.0) (6,778.2) (4,493.5)
employees 14.6 29.2 19.9 28.5
(245.4) (400.3) (203.3) (60.7)
wage bill 718.2 1470.7 1002.5 1380.6
(15,430.3) (22,841.9) (11,517.6) (3,265.9)
materials 2,527.3 5,252.1 3,007.0 4,369.0
(115,529.0) (195,743.2) (37,627.6) (18,015.9)
capital 1,992.4 4,128.1 2,071.9 3,337.9
(93,695.4) (156,855.7) (13,595.9) (15,217.1)
value-added/worker 63.8 68.0 65.0 61.9
(273.1) (93.8) (76.6) (61.6)
Observation firm-year firm-year firm-prod-year firm-prod-year
Number of Observations 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432
The Fare sample includes firms with complete balance sheet data in NACE 2 industries 10-32 that remain after an
initial cleaning of the data. The Prodcom sample includes the subset of such firms that are in the Prodcom dataset.
In both samples, an observation is a firm-year combination. SP and MP refer to single-product and multi-product
firms in the Prodcom sample that have been subject to further data cleaning. We consider two samples: 1) the
sample of SP and MP; 2) the sample of SP. In both samples an observation is a firm-product-year combination.
For SP a firm-product-year combination corresponds to a unique firm-year combination. Monetary values are in
current thousands of euros.
The Fare sample can be matched to Prodcom by means of the unique firm identifier
(SIREN code). We label the matched sample, comprising 201,261 firm-year observations,
as Prodcom. We subsequently applied the following cleaning procedures:
 Drop products whose unit of measure is not consistent over time
 Drop observations with missing quantity and/or value information
 Drop observations with extreme prices (top and bottom 2.5% within a given 8-digit
product)
 Keep firms only if recorded Prodcom sales are consistent with FARE revenues
 We identify single-product firms as those firms that produce only one product or
produce a product representing 90% or more of their total sales.
 Drop 2 digit sections with less than 500 single-product firms observations
 Drop observations corresponding to extreme markups values (top and bottom 1%)
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This leaves us with a sample of 189,017 (121,004) firm-product-year (firm-year) ob-
servations for single-product and multi-product firms combined (SP+MP sample) and
55,432 firm-product-year observations for single-product firms only (SP sample). Clearly,
for single-product firms a firm-product-year combination corresponds to a unique firm-year
combination. Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for various samples.
Table 3.3: Industry groupings
NACE Industries Description
13+14+15 Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather and related
products
16+17 Wood and wood products; Paper and paper
products
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
20+22 Chemicals and chemical products; Rubber and
rubber products
23+24 Other non-metallic mineral products; Basic
metals
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery
and equipment
26+27+28 Computer, electronic and optical products;
Electrical equipment; Machinery and equipment
n.e.c.
29+30 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; Other
transport equipment
31 Furniture
32 Other manufacturing
There are several NACE sections missing from the SP+MP and SP samples. Section
19 (Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products) is not part of Prodcom. Sections
10-12 (Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products) are covered, and
in many countries typically provide both a large number of observations, and contribution
to economy-wide production. However, in France the Prodcom data for these sections is
collected and stored separately to the main survey and we do not have access to it. We
exclude section 21 (Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical
products) and section 30 (Manufacture of other transport equipment) when dropping
sections with less than 500 single-product firms observations. Finally, we apply some
aggregation across sections in order to increase the number of observations for industry-
specific production function estimations ending up with the industry grouping reported in
Table 3.3.
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3.3 The MULAMA model: TFP-R decomposed
This Section follows FMMM and in particular we provide here the single-product firm
version of the model. See FMMM and Appendix C for the multi-product firm extension of
the model. The model is labelled MULAMA because of the names of the 3 heterogeneities
it allows for: markups MU, demand LAMbda and quantity productivity A. Crucially,
the MULAMA model allows to derive an exact decomposition of revenue-based TFP in
terms of the underlying heterogeneities so bridging the gap between quantity TFP and
revenue TFP.
In our empirical investigations, we perform estimations and provide results based on
both the single-product firms sample and the larger sample of single and multi-product
firms. There are pros and cons for each of the two samples. On the one hand, the sample
of single and multi-product firms is larger and more representative of the population of
French manufacturing firms. On the other hand, using single-product firms requires fewer
assumptions in order to measure markups, demand and productivity heterogeneity. In
particular, as discussed in more detail in DGKP and FMMM, the key operational issue
with multi-product firms is the assignment of inputs to outputs. Produced quantities and
generated revenues are observable for the different products of each firm in databases like
ours. However, information on inputs used for a specific product is typically not avail-
able. Therefore, in order to handle multi-product firms, one needs to lay down additional
assumptions in order to solve the problem of assigning inputs to outputs. We provide in
Appendix C a full description of the procedure used to assign inputs to outputs. As in
DGKP, our procedure first requires estimating the parameters of the production function
using single-product firms only.
3.3.1 Demand heterogeneity
In what follows we index firms by i and time by t and denote with lower case the log
of a variable (for example rit denotes the natural logarithm of revenue Rit). Standard
profit maximization (marginal revenue equal to marginal costs) implies that the elasticity
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of revenue Rit with respect to quantity Qit is one over the profit maximizing markup:
∂rit
∂qit
=
∂Rit
∂Qit︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal revenue
Qit
Rit
=
∂Cit
∂Qit︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
Qit
PitQit
=
∂Cit
∂Qit
Pit
=
1
µit
, (3.1)
where µit =
Pit
∂Cit
∂Qit
is the profit maximizing markup. This result comes from static profit
maximization and holds under different assumptions about demand (representative con-
sumer and discrete choice models) and product market structure (monopolistic competi-
tion, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly).
Despite the log revenue function, i.e., the function relating log revenue to log quantity,
being both unknown and potentially different across firms, equation (3.1) provides us with
the slope of the firm-specific log revenue function for firm i while data on the actual log
revenue rit and log quantity qit referring to firm i provide us with a point where such a
firm-specific log revenue function cuts through the (q, r) space. If we now linearize the
log revenue function around the observed data point (qit, rit) with a slope given by
1
µit
we
can uniquely pin down an intercept for this linearized log revenue function on the r axis.
We use such intercept λ̃it as our measure of demand heterogeneity:
6
λ̃it ≡ rit −
∂rit
∂qit
qit = rit −
qit
µit
. (3.2)
Given our definition of λ̃it observed firm log revenue is simply
rit = λ̃it +
1
µit
qit, (3.3)
and so λ̃it is a firm-specific log revenue shifter
7 corresponding to the log price firm i would
face if selling one unit of its product.8
While being general and intuitive, this measure of demand heterogeneity also maps to
more formal and explicit differences in the underlying structure of preferences. In partic-
ular, FMMM show that λ̃it =
λit
µit
where λit is a parameter characterizing differences in
6To simplify notation we ignore components that are constant across firms in a given time period or
within a product category. Those constants will be captured in our empirical analysis by a suitable set of
dummies.
7Demand heterogeneity is the variation in revenue that is not explained by variation in quantities,
i.e., two firms selling the same quantity but generating a different revenue (because of a different price).
Therefore, demand heterogeneity is a firm-specific log revenue shifter given quantity (or equivalently a
firm-specific log price shifter given quantity).
8At the intercept point qit = 0 and so we have Qit = 1 from which Rit = Pit and rit = pit = λ̃it. Note
this has no implications whatsoever about the presence/absence of a choke price.
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utility derived from the consumption of products sold by different firms. More specifically,
consider a representative consumer who maximises at each point in time t a differentiable
utility function U(.) subject to budget Bt:
max
Q
{
U
(
Q̃
)}
s.t.
∫
i
PitQitdi−Bt = 0
where Q̃ is a vector of elements ΛitQit and λit = log(Λit). Therefore, while the represent-
ative consumer chooses quantities Q, these quantities enter into the utility function as Q̃
and Λit can be interpreted as a measure of the perceived quality/appeal of a particular
variety. FMMM show that the log revenue function corresponding to the above preferences
r(qit, λit) can be approximated, around the observed profit-maximizing solution, by the
linear function:
rit '
1
µit
(qit + λit), (3.4)
and so λit is:
λit ' µitrit − qit. (3.5)
Two things are worth nothing at this stage. First, (3.5) is valid as a first-order linear
approximation and is the counterpart of (3.2) meaning that the log revenue shifter λ̃it,
what FMMM label demand heterogeneity, maps via markups into differences in product
appeal across firms’ varieties λit = λ̃itµit. Second, while the shape of the function re-
lating revenue to quantity and product appeal will depend upon the specific underlying
preferences, FMMM show that (3.4) applies to any preferences structure that can be
used to model monopolistic competition and for which a well-behaved differentiable util-
ity function exists.9 This includes standard CES preferences as well as generalized CES
preferences (Spence, 1976)10, CARA preferences (Behrens et al., 2014), HARA prefer-
ences (Haltiwanger et al., 2018), Translog preferences (Feenstra, 2003) as well as the class
of Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) preferences discussed in Zhelobodko et al.
(2012) and Dhingra and Morrow (2019). For example, in the case of CARA preferences,
which are non-homothetic, the underlying utility behind heterogeneity in product appeal
9FMMM also show λit is a measure characterizing differences in utility in the oligopoly model developed
in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and further refined in Hottman et al. (2016)
10In the case of CES and generalized CES preferences (3.5) holds as an equality because the log revenue
function is linear in both qit and λit.
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across firms would be:
U
(
Q̃
)
=
∫
Ωt
[1− e−αQitΛit ]di,
where Ωt is the set of varieties available at time t.
Finally, FMMM provide examples suggesting that a log-linear approximation of the
revenue function, which is behind both the construction of λ̃it and its interpretation as
a markup-adjusted measure of product appeal, works well in many specifications. For
example, Figure 3.1 plots two CARA log revenue functions obtained using two different
values for product appeal: λit=1 for log revenue function 1 and λit=2 for log revenue
function 2.11 As can be appreciated from Figure 3.1, a linear approximation looks both
reasonable and accurate for most of the relevant part of the two log revenue functions,
i.e., within the range where log revenue (and revenue) is increasing because the marginal
revenue is positive and the demand is elastic.
Figure 3.1: CARA log revenue function examples
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3.3.2 Markups and marginal costs
As far as markups are concerned FMMM build upon a result, first highlighted in Hall
(1986) and implemented in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and DGKP among others,
based on cost-minimization of a variable input free of adjustment costs (materials in
11The other parameters are α=0.001 and the lagrange multiplier κt=0.001.
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our empirical implementation) and price-taking behaviour on the inputs side (the cost of
materials WMit is allowed to be firm-time specific but it is given to the firm). The proof
goes as follows. Starting from the definition of marginal cost:
∂Cit
∂Qit
=
∂Cit
∂Mit
∂Mit
∂Qit
= WMit
∂Mit
∂Qit
.
Now define the markup as:
µit ≡
Pit
∂Cit
∂Qit
.
We thus have:
Pit
µit
= WMit
∂Mit
∂Qit
.
Multiplying by Qit and dividing by Mit on both sides we get:
PitQit
Mitµit
=
Rit
Mitµit
= WMit
∂Mit
∂Qit
Qit
Mit
= WMit
∂mit
∂qit
.
Re-arranging we finally have:
µit =
∂qit
∂mit
WMitMit
Rit
=
∂qit
∂mit
sMit
. (3.6)
The simple rule to pin-down markups is consistent with many hypotheses on product mar-
ket structure (monopolistic competition, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly) and
consists in taking the ratio of the output elasticity of materials ( ∂qit∂mit ) to the share of ma-
terials in revenue (sMit ≡ WMitMitRit ). Measuring the output elasticity of materials requires
estimation of the coefficients of the production function while the share of materials in
revenue is directly observable in most datasets (including ours). For example, in the case
of a Cobb-Douglas production function with 3 inputs (labour L, materials M and capital
K) and with (log) quantity TFP being labeled as ait, log quantity is:
qit = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + ait, (3.7)
and so the output elasticity of materials is constant and equal to αM meaning that µit =
αM
sMit
. When instead considering a Translog production function log quantity is:
qit =
∑
x∈{m,l,k}
[
αXxit +
1
2
αXX (xit)
2
]
+ αMKmitkit + αMLmitlit + αLK litkit + ait, (3.8)
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and so:
µit =
αM + αMMmit + αMLlit + αMKkit
sMit
.
Therefore, with estimates of the production function coefficients at hand, (3.6) can be
used to recover firm-specific markups. At the same time, using information on prices and
markups, one can recover the marginal cost:
MCit =
Pit
µit
. (3.9)
Finally, with markups as well as log quantity and log revenue, (3.2) can be used to get a
measure of demand heterogeneity λ̃it.
3.3.3 Quantity TFP
The last step to close the model involves estimating the parameters of the production
function and so recover quantity TFP ait and subsequently markups, marginal costs and
demand heterogeneity as explained above. There are many different hypotheses, and
related estimation procedures, one can use in order to achieve this and in what follows we
provide two examples.
One readily available approach to estimate the production function, that is consist-
ent with the underlying presence of heterogeneity in markups and demand, is provided
in DGKP. This methodology relies on the popular proxy variable approach pioneered by
Olley and Pakes (1996) and in particular, starting from the conditional input demand for
materials, adds to such a function a number of observables (prices and market shares in
particular) to proxy for unobservables (markups and demand heterogeneity in our frame-
work) while further imposing invertibility of the conditional input demand for materials.
More specifically, DGKP build on the GMM approach outlined in Wooldridge (2009) and
in particular consider the leading case of an AR(1) process for productivity:
ait = φaait−1 +Gar + νait, (3.10)
where Gar represents geographical factors affecting productivity (like the density of eco-
nomic activities),12 and νait stands for productivity shocks that are iid and represent
12The index r denotes the region where firm i is located at time t. In our empirical analysis, we use
for Gar both the log of the 2009 population and the log of the land area of region r. Given our relatively
short time frame (2008-15), it would not make much sense to consider a time-varying population.
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innovations with respect to the information set of the firm in t−1. Therefore, productivity
shocks νait are uncorrelated with past values of all firm-level variables (capital, revenue,
quantity, etc.) including productivity. However, the productivity level ait is allowed to
be correlated with past and present firm-level variables and in particular is a variable
considered by the firm when making choices in t.
Under the (usual) additional assumption that capital is predetermined in t, i.e., capital
is chosen beforehand and cannot adjust immediately to shocks νait occurring in t,
13 the
firm will thus consider capital as given in t and will choose the optimal amount of materials
in order to minimize costs based on the given values of capital kit and TFP ait as well
as the price of materials WMit. Such optimal amount will in general be a deterministic
function h(.) of kit, ait andWMit. Furthermore, with underlying differences in markups and
demand, h(.) will also depend on markups µit and product appeal λit. Finally, if labour has
also been chosen prior to t (because it is like capital difficult to adjust in the wake of short-
term shocks νait), then h(.) will also contain lit: mit = h(kit, lit, ait,WMit, µit, λit). If h(.) is
globally invertible with respect to ait, the inverse function ait = g(kit, lit,mit,WMit, µit, λit)
exists and is well behaved and so one can use a semi-parametric polynomial approximation
of g(.) in order to proxy for the unobservable (to the econometrician) quantity TFP ait.
Furthermore, given alsoWMit, λit and µit are unobservable (to the econometrician), DGKP
suggest using regional variables Gr as well as the observable output price and market share
of firm i as proxies for WMit, λit and µit in the semi-parametric approximation of g(.),
14
that so becomes a function of observables only. Operationally, g(.) is thus approximated
by a polynomial function in the 3 inputs, Gr, the output price and the market share. We
provide more details on the DGKP approach and estimation procedure in Appendix A.
Two shortcomings of the DGKP approach are related to its implicit assumptions and
the amount of identifying variation. More specifically, existence and invertibility of a
suitable conditional input demand for materials implies making implicit assumptions about
demand and market structure that are nor readily verifiable. Furthermore, in the main
estimation procedure described in DGKP firm market share (de facto firm revenue) and
price in t− 1 are, among other things, added as covariates in a regression where quantity
13Capital can nonetheless adjust to shocks νait at time t+1.
14DGKP cite Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) who document how producers of more expensive products
also use more expensive inputs so suggesting that observable output prices could be reasonably used to
proxy for unobservable input prices.
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at time t in on the left-hand side. Therefore, there might be little variation left to precisely
identify technology parameters.15
In an attempt to address these two issues FMMM develop an alternative estimation
methodology that does not rely on the proxy variable approach. More specifically, FMMM
use both the first-order approximation of the log revenue function (3.4) and the produc-
tion function equation to recover technology parameters. Indeed, FMMM are sufficiently
explicit about demand to be able to explicitly write the log revenue function in terms of
observables and heterogeneities and use both this and the production function equation
to estimate technology parameters. The key disadvantage of this methodology is that one
has to be explicit about the process governing the evolution of product appeal λit and in
particular FMMM assume it follows an AR(1) process.16 In our analysis, we further allow
for product appeal to be related to geographical factors Gλr which is a straightforward
extension of FMMM. More specifically, in our implementation of the FMMM procedure
we use:
λit = φλλit−1 +Gλr + νλit, (3.11)
where Gλr represents geographical factors affecting demand (like the density of economic
activities),17 and νλit stands for product appeal shocks that are iid and represent innova-
tions with respect to the information set of the firm in t− 1. However, we do not impose
(in line with FMMM) any constraints on the correlation between product appeal shocks
νλit and quantity TFP shocks νait and so ultimately we do not impose a priori any con-
straints on the correlation between product appeal λit and quantity TFP ait. Indeed,
our results confirm previous findings in FMMM of a negative correlation between product
appeal (as well as demand heterogeneity) and quantity TFP irrespective of whether we
use the FMMM or the DGKP procedure. This is suggestive of a trade-off between the
appeal/perceived quality of a firm’s products and their production cost which is in line
with findings in the demand system literature (Ackerberg et al., 2007). We provide more
15DGKP use the market share in their preferred Translog production function specification. When using
a Cobb-Douglas production function, DGKP argue that there is no need to use the market share.
16λit captures consumers’ perception of a firm’s products quality and appeal; something that arguably
does not change much from one year to another. It takes years of effort and costly investments to firms
to establish their brand and build their customers’ base very much like it takes years of effort and costly
investments to firms to put in place and develop an efficient production process for their products. FMMM
thus argue that there are profound similarities between the processes of productivity (typically modelled
as an autoregressive process) and product appeal.
17In our empirical analysis, we use for Gλr both the log of the 2009 population and the log of the land
area of region r.
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details on the FMMM approach and estimation procedure, which builds upon both (3.10)
and (3.11), in Appendix A.
3.3.4 TFP-R decomposed
To appreciate how the MULAMA model is useful in linking revenue-based TFP and
quantity-based TFP note that, with standard Hicks-neutral TFP, one can write the log of
the production function as qit = q̄it + ait where q̄it is an index of inputs use that we label
log scale.18 And by defining revenue TFP as TFPRit ≡ rit − q̄it and using equation (3.3)
while substituting we get:
TFPRit =
ait
µit
+ λ̃it +
1− µit
µit
q̄it, (3.12)
meaning that TFPRit is a (non-linear) function of quantity-based TFP ait, the log revenue
shifter λ̃it, the profit-maximizing markup µit and log production scale q̄it. (3.12) can also
be made linear by considering markups-adjusted quantity TFP and log scale (ãit =
ait
µit
and ˜̄qit =
(1−µit)q̄it
µit
):
TFPRit = ãit + λ̃it + ˜̄qit, (3.13)
so that TFPRit differences across firms located in different regions can be decomposed as
the sum of differences in ãit, λ̃it and ˜̄qit across such firms. In this respect, we note again
that while the Urban Economics literature has focused on models featuring differences in
quantity TFP across space, the empirical evidence we have gathered so far is at best about
revenue TFP and in this respect our framework can shed new light on the determinants
of differences in TFPRit across space.
3.3.5 A few last remarks
In our empirical investigations, we perform estimations and provide results based on both
the DGKP and FMMM estimation procedures while considering the former as the baseline
procedure. In both cases, we consider the Cobb-Douglas production function (3.7) as the
leading case while providing some robustness results based on the Translog production
function (3.8). In all instances we assume, in light of the features of the heavily regulated
French labour market, that labour is predetermined, i.e., it cannot immediately adjust to
short-term productivity or demand shocks. Furthermore, we measure the labour input
18For example, with a Cobb-Douglas production technology q̄it = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit.
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with the number of full-time equivalent employees, as in Combes et al. (2012),19 while
providing some robustness results where we use the total wage bill to measure the labour
input. Crucially, we will see later on that our key findings are little affected by whether we
use the DGKP or the FMMM estimation procedure, by whether we employ the number of
full-time equivalent employees or the total wage bill to measure the labour input as well as
whether we use a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog production function. Last but not least, we
also provide results based on both the single-product firms sample and the larger sample
of single and multi-product firms while considering the latter as our preferred sample.
Again, our key findings are little affected by which sample we use.
Three last operational issues are worth noting. First, as customary in productivity
analyses, we correct (in all estimations) for the presence of measurement error in output
(quantity and revenue) and/or unanticipated (to the firm) shocks using the methodology
described in DGKP and on which we provide key highlights in Appendix B. Second, we
perform TFP estimations separately for each two-digit industry (NACE Sections) and
consider a full battery of 8-digit product dummies, as well as year dummies. Indeed,
quantity in the data is measured in units (kilograms, litres, number of items, etc.) that
are specific to each 8-digit product and so quantity TFP ait can be reasonably compared
across firms and space only within an 8-digit product category. For similar reasons, λit
can also be reasonably compared across firms and space only within an 8-digit product
category. Therefore, as we discuss in more detail below, our analysis will focus on dif-
ferences across locations in prices, quantities, quantity TFP, markups, etc. within 8-digit
product categories. Third, in comparing firm outcomes across space we are faced with
the issue of how to deal with firms having more than one establishment. One solution,
followed by Combes et al. (2012), is to consider single-establishment firms only. Despite
serving the purpose, we believe this strategy is not ideal because it leaves out the group of
large multi-establishment firms representing nearly half of employment. Therefore, in our
analysis we adopt a different approach. More specifically, we consider firms as the unit of
analysis and restrict our attention to firms whose establishments (if more than one) are all
located in the same ZE so that we can uniquely associate a firm to a ZE at a given point
in time. In this respect, we believe that the most natural unit of analysis for productivity,
19More precisely, Combes et al. (2012) use a Cobb-Douglas production function where the labour input
is further split into 3 occupational/skill categories each measured in terms of time units.
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demand and markups heterogeneity is the firm and not the establishment. Furthermore,
inputs and outputs data are available at the level of the firm and not the establishment
and so measuring productivity, demand and markups heterogeneity across establishments
would necessarily involve debatable assignment procedures.
3.4 Main results
3.4.1 Analysis of the firm-level measures obtained with the MULAMA
model
Table 3.4 provides estimates of the coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas production function
(3.7) obtained with the DGKP procedure applied the sample of single-product firms (as in
DGKP). Coefficient estimates are in line with expectations given a three inputs production
function and in particular materials coefficients are larger than labour coefficients which
are in turn larger than capital coefficients.20 Overall, there seems to be evidence of slightly
decreasing returns to scale while coefficients are comparable to those reported in FMMM
and DGKP using quantity and revenue data for Belgian and Indian firms, respectively.
Table 3.4: DGKP procedure: Cobb-Douglas production function estimations by industry
grouping (SP firms only)
Industry 13-15 16-17 18 20-22 23-24 25 26-28 29-30 31 32
Employment 0.160 0.136 0.133 0.185 0.143 0.157 0.169 0.161 0.147 0.152
(0.021)*** (0.035)*** (0.025)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.025)*** (0.016)*** (0.033)*** (0.023)*** (0.038)***
Materials 0.734 0.528 0.741 0.615 0.609 0.641 0.738 0.525 0.645 0.545
(0.066)*** (0.087)*** (0.187)*** (0.053)*** (0.051)*** (0.036)*** (0.027)*** (0.107)*** (0.050)*** (0.107)***
Capital 0.053 0.060 0.055 0.062 0.026 0.056 0.023 0.065 0.010 0.067
(0.025)** (0.013)*** (0.021)*** (0.014)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)** (0.018)*** (0.014) (0.031)**
Returns to scale 0.947 0.725 0.929 0.861 0.778 0.854 0.930 0.751 0.802 0.764
N 1,716 3,279 2,277 4,060 2,749 5,113 3,441 922 1,097 767
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm. Regressions include year dummies as well as
8-digit product dummies. See Data Section for industry groupings. Estimations are carried on SP firms only as in DGKP.
We start from the sample of single-product firms and, using materials, labour and cap-
ital coefficients from Table 3.4, as well as data on quantity produced and inputs used, we
compute quantity TFP ait as a residual from (3.7). Further using the coefficient of materi-
als, as well as the revenue share of materials, we get markups µit from (3.6). The marginal
cost MCit is obtained from (3.9) using prices and markups while demand heterogeneity
is computed from (3.2) using markups as well as log quantity and log revenue. Finally,
revenue TFP and its components are derived from (3.12) and (3.13). We subsequently
20Capital coefficients are on the low side, as it is usually the case in the literature, likely due to meas-
urement error particularly plaguing this variable as discussed in Griliches and Mairesse (1995).
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apply the inputs assignment procedure described in Appendix C to allocate inputs across
the different products of multi-product firms and use the above equations to obtain quant-
ity TFP, markups, marginal costs, demand heterogeneity, as well as revenue TFP and its
components, for each firm-product-year combination. The combined sample (that we la-
bel ‘SP+MP firms’) comprises both single-product and multi-product firms and spans a
total of 189,017 firm-product-year observations corresponding to 121,004 unique firm-year
combinations.
Table 3.5: DGKP procedure: summary statistics of MULAMA model measures
(SP+MP firms)
mean sd p50
TFP-R 2.1243 0.5481 2.0905
TFP a 3.6630 3.3983 3.1337
log revenue shifter λ̃ -1.2898 4.0277 -0.3409
log revenue slope 1/µ 0.9410 0.2618 0.9301
markup µ 1.1614 0.3878 1.0751
log marginal cost -1.6413 3.2204 -1.0117
log scale 4.3092 1.7338 4.3623
log price -1.5388 3.2173 -0.9191
N 189,017
Notes: Summary statistics refer to the sample of SP
and MP firms. An observation is a firm-product-year
combination. For SP a firm-product-year combination
corresponds to a unique firm-year combination.
Table 3.5 provides some summary statistics of the various MULAMA model measures
for the SP+MP firms sample. For most measures, averages and/or medians are of little
value per se and what matters is instead data variation. For revenue TFP we find, in
line with FMMM, that MULAMA TFP (TFP-R) is characterized by a standard deviation
of about 0.5, which is also in line with the standard deviation of other TFP-R measures
obtained from our data.21 As for the standard deviations of quantity TFP and demand
heterogeneity, they are again comparable to results reported in FMMM and much larger,
for both quantity TFP and demand heterogeneity, than the standard deviation of TFP-
R. Furthermore, there is actually more variation in demand heterogeneity values than
quantity TFP values so suggesting that heterogeneity in demand is a key component of
firm idiosyncrasies and is at least as sizeable as heterogeneity in productivity. Last but
not least, the average markup across observations is 1.161 which compares to a value of
21For example, the standard deviation of TFP-R computed following the methodology developed in
Wooldridge (2009) on our data is 0.6452.
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1.158 obtained by FMMM with data on Belgian firms.
Table 3.6: Some OLS regressions involving quantity TFP, log price, markup and log marginal
cost (SP+MP firms)
Dep. var. TFP markup log price
log marginal cost -0.9463 -0.1192 0.9095
(0.0021)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0018)***
R2 0.99 0.34 0.99
N 189,017 189,017 189,017
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered by firm. Regressions include year dummies as well
as 8-digit product dummies. Estimations are carried on the
sample of SP and MP firms.
Table 3.7: Some OLS regressions involving the log revenue shifter λ̃, the markup, log
turnover, log marginal cost and log price (SP+MP firms)
Dep. var. rev. shifter λ̃ markup log turnover log marg. cost log price
TFP -0.7622 0.1423 0.8453 -0.8276 -0.8311
(0.0124)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0031)***
rev. shifter λ̃ 0.1341 0.3994 0.0587 0.0519
(0.0009)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0020)***
rev. slope 1/µ 5.3231 1.3919 0.1901
(0.0879)*** (0.0183)*** (0.0183)***
log capital -0.0249
(0.0010)***
R2 0.78 0.72 0.58 0.99 0.99
N 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by firm. Regressions
include year dummies as well as 8-digit product dummies. Estimations are carried on the
sample of SP and MP firms.
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide a number of OLS regressions suggesting the correlations
between the various elements of the MULAMA model are coherent with both intuition
and economic theory. For example, column (1) of Table 3.6 provides results of a regres-
sion where quantity TFP is regressed on the marginal cost while further considering year
dummies as well as 8-digit product dummies and clustering standard errors at the firm
level. The coefficient is negative and highly significant, as expected, and quite close to one.
Column (2) of Table 3.6 displays results of a similar regression where the dependent vari-
able in now the markup. The coefficient is negative and significant indicating that firms
with a lower marginal cost charge a higher markup. In this respect, note that a negative
relationship between markups and marginal costs is not a property of any well-behaved
preferences structure: it points in the direction of preferences featuring increasing relative
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love for variety or sub-convexity from which pro-competitive effects come from.22
Moving to column (3) of Table 3.6 one can appreciate that prices are increasing with
the marginal cost with a pass-through elasticity of about 0.9, which is again in line with
results from FMMM. Related to this point, FMMM note that a 0.9 average cost pass-
through elasticity might seem too high compared to existing macro evidence (Campa and
Goldberg, 2005). However, by looking at detailed product-destination level price and
quantity data on French exporters, Berman et al. (2012) provide evidence that standard
macro/aggregate measures of pass-through elasticity mask substantial heterogeneity across
firms with many firms actually being characterized by a very high pass-through elasticity.
More specifically, they show that the pass-through elasticity is decreasing in firm size
and productivity with the un-weighted average across firms standing at 0.83 and a near
complete pass-through elasticity for smaller and less productive exporters.23
In Table 3.7, column (1) provides results of a regression where demand heterogeneity
(the revenue shifter λ̃) is regressed on quantity TFP while further considering year dum-
mies as well as 8-digit product dummies and clustering standard errors at the firm level.
The coefficient is negative and highly significant, as in FMMM, and is suggestive of a
trade-off between the appeal/perceived quality of a firm’s products and their production
cost as indicated in the demand system literature (Ackerberg et al., 2007). Column (2)
further indicates that markups are increasing in quantity TFP (again pointing in the dir-
ection of preferences featuring increasing relative love for variety or sub-convexity) as well
as in the revenue shifter λ̃. At the same time, firms with larger investments, i.e., firms
with a higher log capital in our regression, tend to charge (for given quantity TFP and
demand heterogeneity) lower markups, which is consistent with these firms maximising
their profits by selling higher quantities and so facing a more elastic portion of the de-
mand curve. Moving to column (3), one can appreciate that firm revenue is increasing, as
it should be, with respect to quantity TFP as well as with the revenue function shifter λ̃
and the revenue function slope 1/µ. In terms of marginal costs, column (4) indicates that
they are, as intuition would suggest, negatively related to TFP also when controlling for
22This is also associated to the presence of market distortions such that the market leads to too little
selection with respect to the social optimum. See Zhelobodko et al. (2012), Mrázová and Neary (2017)
and Dhingra and Morrow (2019) for further details.
23Using similar data for Belgium, Amiti et al. (2014) find an un-weighted average pass-through elasticity
of 0.80 for Belgian exporters with small exporters displaying a near complete pass-through.
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the intercept λ̃ and the slope 1/µ of the revenue function. Furthermore, marginal costs are
increasing in both λ̃ and 1/µ suggesting that firms facing a higher demand curve (because
of higher λ̃ and/or higher 1/µ) do spend more resources to produce their products. Such
products are thus likely to be higher quality products from a production point of view and
not simply from the view point of consumers’ perception. Finally, column (5) shows that
prices decrease with quantity TFP while increasing in both λ̃ and 1/µ, which is what one
would expect if our measures capture well what they are supposed to measure.
3.4.2 On the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas: aggrega-
tion and product composition
Table 3.8 provides a number of OLS regressions where standard revenue productivity
measures at the firm level are regressed on the log of population density of the ZE where
firms are located using various samples. More specifically, we use three measures of revenue
productivity and four different samples. The three revenue productivity measures are: 1)
log value added per worker; 2) revenue TFP obtained as a residual of a three inputs
Cobb-Douglas production function estimation where output is measured by revenue and
coefficients are estimated via OLS (OLS TFP-R); 3) revenue TFP obtained as a residual
of a three inputs Cobb-Douglas production function estimation where output is measured
by revenue and coefficients are estimated using the insights provided in Wooldridge (2009)
(Wooldridge TFP-R). In terms of samples we use: 1) the FARE sample; 2) the Prodcom
sample; 3) the SP+MP firms sample; 4) The SP firms sample. In all regressions, we add
time and industry (4-digit) dummies while standard errors are clustered at the ZE level.
Table 3.8: OLS regressions of standard revenue productivity measures on ZE population
density (various samples)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R
Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP
sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample
log density 0.0159 0.0313 0.0320 0.0312 0.0062 0.0113 0.0089 0.0107 0.0194 0.0120 0.0088 0.0068
(0.0039)*** (0.0068)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0020)*** (0.0016)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0031)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0021)***
R2 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.82 0.81 0.70 0.67 0.82 0.91 0.84 0.92
N 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the ZE level. Regressions include time and industry (4-digit) dummies. The
Fare sample includes firms with complete balance sheet data in NACE 2 industries 10-32 that remain after an initial cleaning of the data. The Prodcom sample
includes the subset of such firms that are in the Prodcom dataset. In both samples, an observation is a firm-year combination. SP and MP refer to single-product
and multi-product firms in the Prodcom sample that have been subject to further data cleaning. We consider two samples: 1) the sample of SP and MP; 2) the
sample of SP. In both samples an observation is a firm-product-year combination. For SP a firm-product-year combination corresponds to a unique firm-year
combination.
As one can appreciate, the density elasticity estimate varies depending on which revenue
TFP measure is considered. In particular, value added per worker is characterized by
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somewhat higher coefficients. However, coefficients remain rather stable across samples
for a given measure suggesting that focusing, as we do below, on the SP+MP sample or
the SP sample does not appear to be particularly at odds with the relationship between
revenue TFP and density in wider samples.
In Tables 3.9 and 3.10 we thus focus on the SP+MP sample and run very similar
regressions to those performed in Table 3.8. Again we consider the same three revenue
productivity measures employed for Table 3.8 while also adding MULAMA revenue TFP
(TFP-R). At the same time, we always add year dummies but consider either 2-digit
or 8-digit product dummies in order to highlight the importance of product composition
in measuring the elasticity of revenue TFP with respect to density. Furthermore, while
in Table 3.9 we perform weighted regressions giving equal weight to all firms located in
the same ZE (what we label as number of firms weighted),24 in Table 3.10 we perform
weighted regressions giving different weights to firms located in the same ZE depending
on their revenue (what we label as revenue weighted).25 In both cases we shift, by means
of regression weighting, the unit of analysis from firms (Table 3.8) to ZEs (Tables 3.9
and 3.10). However, in doing so we either give the same importance to all observations
corresponding to a ZE, which means we ultimately compare the average firm across ZEs
in the regressions, or we give an importance that is proportional to the revenue share
within a ZE, which means our regressions at the firm level should be more comparable to
macro/aggregate regressions run at the regional level. Finally, in all regressions we cluster
standard errors at the ZE level.
By looking at Tables 3.8 and 3.9 one can draw three conclusions. First, coefficient values
are very similar between the two Tables suggesting that whether the unit of analysis is
the firm or the average firm in a location does not matter much for the measurement of
the relationship between revenue TFP and density. Second, coefficients reported in Table
3.9 and obtained using either 2-digit or 8-digit dummies are very similar suggesting that
product composition effects do not play a big role here. Third, coefficients corresponding
to the MULAMA revenue TFP (TFP-R) are very much in line with other measures of
24In the number of firms weighted case, each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where
Nr is the total number of firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
25In the revenue weighted case, each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is
firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year
observations corresponding to the ZE r.
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revenue TFP (OLS and Wooldridge).
Table 3.9: Revenue productivity, density and product composition effects (number of firms
weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R TFP-R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log density 0.0442 0.0374 0.0120 0.0102 0.0221 0.0174 0.0145 0.0140
(0.0061)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0015)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0036)***
R2 0.07 0.20 0.69 0.65 0.81 0.75 0.52 0.70
N 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017
2-digit dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
8-digit dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by ZE. Regressions are weighted and
include year dummies as well as either 2-digit or 8-digit product dummies. Estimations are carried on the sample
of SP and MP firms. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r. Note that, since regressions use weights, the R2 does
not necessarily improves when considering 8-digit dummies instead of 2-digit dummies.
Table 3.10: Revenue productivity, density and product composition effects (revenue weighted,
SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R TFP-R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log density 0.0762 0.0442 0.0171 0.0116 0.0755 0.0369 0.0670 0.0292
(0.0137)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0148)*** (0.0073)***
R2 0.13 0.45 0.77 0.80 0.88 0.90 0.80 0.92
N 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017 189,017
2-digit dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
8-digit dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by ZE. Regressions are weighted and include
year dummies as well as either 2-digit or 8-digit product dummies. Estimations are carried on the sample of SP and
MP firms. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding
to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the
ZE r. Note that, since regressions use weights, the R2 does not necessarily improves when considering 8-digit
dummies instead of 2-digit dummies.
The comparison of Tables 3.9 and 3.10 is even more interesting and reveals two im-
portant results we highlight below:
Result 1: Weighting impacts the measurement of the elasticity of revenue productivity
with respect to density.
Result 2: A substantial portion of the aggregate revenue productivity advantage of
denser areas stems from product composition effects.
Regarding Result 1, by simply comparing Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 it appears prom-
inently that coefficients in the latter are larger and this is particularly the case when
considering 8-digit dummies. The reason for this behavior lies in the relationship between
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revenue TFP and revenue. In spatial models à la Melitz (2003) like, for example, Behrens
et al. (2017) there is a one to one mapping between firm TFP, as well as revenue TFP, and
firm revenue within each location: a firm with higher TFP/revenue TFP will have a higher
revenue and so a higher revenue share within a location. However, while the correlation
between firm revenue TFP and firm revenue in our data is positive in each and every ZE
(ranging between 0.050 and 0.788), it is far from one and systematically related to dens-
ity. In particular, in denser areas the linear relationship is stronger meaning that firms
with higher (lower) TFP-R account for a larger (smaller) share of total revenue in denser
regions. One way of interpreting this is that the market better allocates market shares
across firms with heterogeneous productivities in denser areas so amplifying in aggregate
revenue-weighted figures any firm-level differences in productivity across space.
Regarding Result 2, estimates obtained using 2-digit product dummies are systemat-
ically larger, sometimes close to a factor of two, than estimates obtained using 8-digit
product dummies and this is particularly the case when considering revenue weighting.
This suggests that a considerable portion of the observed aggregate revenue productivity
advantage of denser areas comes from these areas being specialised in 8-digit products
generating a higher revenue TFP as opposed to denser areas generating a higher revenue
TFP for a given 8-digit product.
Tables B.1 to B.4 in Appendix B-4 provide additional evidence of Results 1 and 2 by
further looking at other samples: FARE, Prodcom and SP firms. More specifically, Tables
B.1 and B.2 perform the very same analysis of Tables 3.9 and 3.10 for SP firms. Table
B.3 displays the same regressions reported in Table 3.8 with 2-digit industry dummies and
using revenue weighting across all firm samples. In the same vein, Table B.4 covers all
firm samples while using 6-digit industry dummies and revenue weighting.26
3.4.3 On the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas: demand
matters
From now onwards we systematically control for 8-digit product dummies, and so con-
centrate on the revenue productivity advantage stemming from denser areas generating a
higher revenue TFP for a given 8-digit product, while providing both revenue weighted
26We use 6-digit industry dummies for all samples instead of 8-digit product dummies because the latter
information is not available for firms that are not in Prodcom.
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and number of firms weighted results. In particular, we now exploit the valuable informa-
tion provide by the Prodcom database: quantities and prices. In doing so we more directly
move the center of the analysis from firms to locations by aggregating firm-level variables,
or more precisely firm-product-year variables, at the ZE level.27 However, before doing
any aggregation, we first demean these variables by 8-digit product and year. For the
aggregation, we use either revenue weights or number of firms weights as in the previous
Section while using robust standard errors in all ZE level regressions.
More specifically, in order to construct the unique log price measure corresponding to
the ZE r, we first subtract from the raw log price information of firms located in the ZE r
the corresponding, with respect to the specific product of the firm and the year, mean log
price across all locations. We then aggregate up these deviations from 8-digit product and
year averages across all firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r using,
for example in the case of revenue weights, the revenue share within ZE r corresponding
to each observation as weight.28
In doing so we thus end up with a unique measure of prices, quantities, and revenues,
for each ZE that is consistent across ZEs. We then regress these measures on the log of
population density corresponding to each ZE while clustering standard errors at the ZE
level. Furthermore, in order to give a more causal flavor to our results, we instrument
for current density building on an approach that is standard in the literature: using
long-lagged historical densities as instruments for current densities (Combes and Gobillon,
2015). In particular, we use population density in 1831, 1861 and 1891 as our instruments.
The corresponding under-identification and weak-identification tests are reported in Tables
3.11 and 3.12 and strongly support the use of such instruments.
The first three columns of Tables 3.11 and 3.12 provide results for log quantity, log
revenue and log price, respectively. Note that this part of our analysis simply makes use
of raw data and so it is not affected in any way by the possible limitations and restrictions
of the MULAMA model. Furthermore also note that, because of the way we constructed
variables and the properties of linear estimators, the density coefficient corresponding to
27Clearly, given that we use linear models, parameters’ estimates and standard errors would be identical
if we were to run the same regressions at the firm-product-year level while clustering standard errors at
the ZE level.
28Formally, our measure of log price is pr =
∑
ipt∈r
(pipt − p̄pt)wipt, where the weight wipt is either 1/Nr
or Ript/Rr.
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Table 3.11: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost
and log markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.1454 0.1868 0.0414 0.0462 -0.0048
(0.0602)** (0.0556)*** (0.0230)* (0.0232)** (0.0035)
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and
1891 log density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for
under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is
the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic
for weak identification. See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and
MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8
digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript
is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table 3.12: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost
and log markup on log density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.0483 0.0652 0.0169 0.0251 -0.0082
(0.0273)* (0.0246)*** (0.0080)** (0.0082)*** (0.0028)***
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and
1891 log density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for
under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is
the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic
for weak identification. See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and
MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8
digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is
the total number of firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
log revenue is equal to the sum of the density coefficients corresponding to log quantity
and log price. In this respect, inspection of Table 3.11 for revenue weighted results and
Table 3.12 for number of firms weighted results, reveals another important result:
Result 3: Prices are higher in denser areas. At the same time, quantities sold at this
higher prices are higher too and so are revenues.
Regarding Result 3, this evidence is present in both revenue weighted results and num-
ber of firms weighted results, while being quantitatively stronger in the former. Further-
more, Tables B.10 and B.11 discussed in the next Section also show these patterns hold in
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the SP firms sample data. Result 3 is consistent with the idea that firms located in denser
areas face, on average, higher demand curves than firms located in less dense areas so being
able to sell higher quantities even though charging higher prices. Result 3 also has clear and
strong implications for the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas. Indeed, from
the definition of revenue productivity we have TFPRit ≡ rit− q̄it = pit+qit− q̄it = pit+ait,
i.e., revenue TFP is quantity TFP plus the log price. Therefore, even if quantity TFP was
on average the same across locations, the fact that firms in denser areas are able to charge
higher prices will boost their revenue TFP.
The fact that demand and prices are higher for goods produced in denser regions
does not necessarily mean that firms located in such areas sell higher (actual and/or
perceived) quality products. For example, in the extreme case where demand is fully local
and products are only horizontally differentiated, demand and prices could be higher in
denser regions because of the high concentration of service sectors (driven by agglomeration
economies) consuming manufacturing products and boosting local wages and consumption.
In order to shed light on this issue we provide below two additional pieces of information.
First, in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 3.11 and 3.12 we push the analysis forward by
making use of some of the measures obtained from the MULAMA model: log marginal
costs and log markups. For an individual firm log price is equal to log marginal cost plus
log markup. In our aggregate regressions, because of the way we constructed variables and
the properties of linear estimators, the sum of the density coefficients of log marginal cost
and log markup equals the density coefficient of log price. In this respect, results provided
in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 strongly suggest that the single most important reason why prices
are higher in denser areas is because marginal costs are higher. Furthermore, given we use
the number of full-time equivalent employees to measure the labour input rather than the
wage bill, the fact that marginal costs are higher is not mechanically due to wages being
higher in denser areas. As far as log markups are concerned, they are lower in denser areas
but significantly so only in the case of number of firms weighted regressions.
The fact that marginal costs are higher in denser areas is in line with the idea that
products sold there are of higher actual quality, and so they require more inputs to be
produced, but it is not yet a proof. For example, marginal costs could be higher in
denser areas simply because firms located there move along an increasing marginal cost
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Table 3.13: OLS regression of log marginal costs on TFP and log quantity
(SP+MP firms)
Dep. Var. log marg. cost log marg. cost
TFP -1.1765 -1.2098
(0.0022)*** (0.0048)***
log quantity 0.2116 0.2279
(0.0016)*** (0.0033)***
Weighting un-weighted revenue
R2 0.9965 0.9986
N 189,017 189,017
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Stand-
ard errors clustered by firm. Regressions include year
dummies as well as 8-digit product dummies. Estim-
ations are carried on the sample of SP and MP firms.
The first column reports results of an un-weighted
OLS regression while column two provides results of
a weighted OLS regression where each firm-product-
year observation is weighted by Ript where Ript is firm
i revenue corresponding to product p at time t.
curve in order to meet the requirements of a higher demand rather than having their
marginal cost curve upward shifted because of a more expensive and higher quality product
being produced. In this respect, Table 3.13 shows the results of a simple OLS regression
across firm which is meant to give an idea of by how much marginal costs should be
higher in denser areas given the additional quantity sold. More specifically, in order to
reconstruct the shape of the log marginal cost curve, in Table 3.13 we regress the log
marginal cost corresponding to a firm-product-year observation in the SP+MP sample on
the corresponding quantity TFP and log quantity. To show that coefficients are not much
affected by firm weighting and/or sample choice we report in column 1 (2) of Table 3.13
simple un-weighted (firm-weighted) results while reporting in Table B.5 of Appendix B-4
both un-weighted and firm-weighted results for the SP firms sample. Turning to Table
3.13, the coefficient of quantity TFP is around -1 and strongly significant which makes
sense. As for the coefficient of log quantity, it is around 0.2 indicating that, for example, a
10% higher quantity for given TFP would imply 2% higher marginal costs. In this respect,
column 1 of Table 3.11 indicates that doubling density increases quantity sold by 14.54%
which should translate, for given TFP and marginal cost curve, into about 3% higher
marginal costs. Yet the same Table 3.11 indicates in column 4 that doubling density is
associated with a 4.62% higher marginal cost. Repeating the same exercise with Table 3.12
provides an expected, from Table 3.13 and column 1 of Table 3.12, higher marginal cost of
about 1% compared to a 2.51% coming from column 4 of Table 3.12. These findings are
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somewhat supportive of the idea that marginal costs are higher in denser areas compared
with what they would be if quantities sold were the same, i.e., that products sold by firms
located in denser areas cost more and are of a higher actual quality.
Table 3.14: Exports quantity, revenue and price analysis (export values weighted by ZE,
various samples)
FARE PRODCOM SP+MP SP
sample sample sample sample
Dep. var. log log log log log log log log log log log log
quantity revenue price quantity revenue price quantity revenue price quantity revenue price
log density 0.0819 0.1127 0.0308 0.0772 0.1138 0.0366 0.0851 0.1220 0.0369 0.0431 0.1026 0.0595
(0.0494)* (0.0492)** (0.0184)* (0.0391)** (0.0466)** (0.0211)* (0.0505)* (0.0493)** (0.0220)* (0.0430) (0.0607)* (0.0405)*
R2 0.87 0.77 0.92 0.88 0.80 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.96
N 2,220,803 2,220,803 2,220,803 1,705,905 1,705,905 1,705,905 1,361,002 1,361,002 1,361,002 442,301 442,301 442,301
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the ZE level. We use exports data provided by the French customs.
We first match exports data over the period 2008-2014 to the relevant sample data (FARE, Prodcom, SP+MP and SP) and so discard multi-ZE firms
from the analysis. We further eliminate observations with missing prices and trim the data based on the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of the
demeaned (by HS 8-digit product-country-year) log prices. We also apply a trimming based on the top 3% of the value of exports by ZE. We then use
as y variables firm-product-country-year log quantity, log revenue and log price and regress those variables on the log density of the location of the
firm along with product-destination-year dummies using the Stata command areg.
The second and more substantial piece of evidence to support the claim that products
of firms located in denser regions are of higher perceived/actual quality comes from exports
data. Exports represent a substantial portion of French manufacturing firms sales. For
example, the overall 2015 goods exports to manufacturing production ratio was 0.7727
while using the sum of manufacturing production and goods imports as denominator
delivers a ratio of 0.4187 for 2015. We thus match firm-product-country-year level data
on French exporters over the period 2008-201429 to our samples and compare quantities,
revenues and prices of the same product sold in the same destination and year by firms
located in more or less dense areas. We do so for all of the four firm samples we consider in
our analysis and overall find a consistent message provided in Table 3.14. More specifically,
in Table 3.14 we regress log export quantity, log export revenue and log export price (unit
value) on the log density of the location of the firm along with product-destination-year
dummies and using revenue weights. Evidence across samples is consistently supportive of
products coming from denser areas being sold in higher quantities, despite higher prices,
in the same market.
Considering all of the above evidence we draw Result 4:
Result 4: Marginal costs are higher and markups are lower in denser areas. At the
same time, marginal costs are higher in denser areas also because of a higher product
29French exporters data for the year 2015 is not available to us. A product is an HS 8-digit code. There
are roughly 10,000 such codes.
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quality.
3.4.4 On the revenue productivity advantage of denser areas: it is all
about demand
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 provide additional insights into the productivity advantage of denser
areas by exploiting more measures obtained from the MULAMA model. In particular,
columns (1) to (3) report MULAMA revenue TFP (TFP-R), quantity TFP (TFP) and
the log price. For an individual firm, revenue TFP is quantity TFP plus the log price. In
our aggregate regressions, because of the way we constructed variables and the properties
of linear estimators, the sum of the density coefficients of quantity TFP and log price
equals the density coefficient of revenue TFP. Results in Tables 3.15 and 3.16 point to the
same direction, with findings referring to revenue weights being stronger in magnitude as
in the rest of the analysis, and allow establishing a further important result:
Result 5: The revenue productivity advantage of denser areas is driven by higher prices
with no overall significant differences in quantity TFP.
The picture emerging by combining Results 3 to 5 can be summarized as follows. Man-
ufacturing firms located in denser areas are not necessarily characterized by a significantly
higher quantity TFP. They do, however, enjoy a revenue TFP advantage due to their ca-
pacity to produce and sell higher demand products at higher prices and in larger quantities
compared to firms located in less dense areas. Furthermore, their products are character-
ized by lower markups and higher marginal costs and part of this higher cost reflects an
actual higher product quality.
Additional insights are provided in columns (5) and (7) of Tables 3.15 and 3.16. More
specifically, looking at the density coefficients related to the log revenue function intercept
λ̃ and slope 1/µ reveals that only the latter is significantly and positively related to density
suggesting that firms in denser areas face a higher revenue function, i.e, face a higher
demand curve, mainly because of a higher slope. Finally, columns (4) to (6) provide
results of the revenue TFP decomposition of equation (3.13) with density coefficients of
columns (4) to (6) adding up to the density coefficient of revenue TFP in column (1). We
already discussed that λ̃ is not significantly increasing with density and column (4) points
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Table 3.15: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue
weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0418 0.0004 0.0414 0.0365 -0.1079 0.1132 0.0075
(0.0156)*** (0.0270) (0.0230)* (0.0455) (0.0652)* (0.0396)*** (0.0037)**
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard
errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding
p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for
weak identification. See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is
weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table 3.16: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number of
firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0149 -0.0020 0.0169 0.0222 -0.0363 0.0290 0.0076
(0.0042)*** (0.0094) (0.0080)** (0.0159) (0.0231) (0.0093)*** (0.0025)***
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard
errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding
p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for
weak identification. See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is
weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
to a similar result for markups-adjusted TFP ã. It is markups-adjusted scale ˜̄qit =
(1−µit)q̄it
µit
that is significantly higher in denser areas because of firms selling higher quantities and
using more inputs, and so having a larger scale, coupled with a higher revenue function
slope.30
3.4.5 Two examples
Results 1 to 5 refer to the aggregate of manufacturing products. Therefore, it might well
be the case that, for some specific products, there is a positive and significant relationship
between TFP and density. In this respect, we provide here one such example: ‘Ready
mixed concrete’ (NACE code 2363).31 Indeed, this particular industry/product has been
the object of a number of studies32 also suggesting that there are significant differences in
TFP across space. At the same time, we also provide an example, among many others,
30Note that (1−µit)
µit
= 1
µit
− 1 and so the higher the revenue function slope 1
µit
the higher is markups-
adjusted scale.
31‘Ready mixed concrete’ corresponds to a unique 8-digit Prodcom code.
32See, for example, Syverson (2004) and Syverson (2008).
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of a particular industry (‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’;
NACE code 293) behaving as the aggregate of manufacturing products.
Table 3.17: ‘Ready-mixed concrete’ industry (NACE code 2363): 2SLS regressions of firm log
quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log density (revenue
weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.5202 0.4959 -0.0243 -0.0080 -0.0163
(0.2083)** (0.2091)** (0.0225) (0.0253) (0.0180)
N 123 123 123 123 123
LM stat under-identif. 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
Under-identif. p-value 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Wald F stat weak identif. 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Focusing on the sample of SP and MP firms producing products
belonging to the ‘Ready-mixed concrete’ industry (NACE code 2363), firm-product-year variables
are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year
observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time
t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations (belonging to the industry
‘Ready-mixed concrete’) corresponding to the ZE r.
Tables 3.17 and 3.18 provide the same type of information contained in Tables 3.12
and 3.15, but refer to the sub-sample of firm-product-year observations corresponding to
the production of ‘Ready mixed concrete’.33 At the same time, Tables 3.19 and 3.20 refer
to the sub-sample of firm-product-year observations corresponding to the production of
‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’.34 Table 3.12 indicates
that, within the ‘Ready mixed concrete’ sample, firms located in denser areas sell higher
quantities and generate higher revenues but do not charge significantly higher or lower
prices, while having overall similar marginal costs and markups with respect to firms
located in less dense areas. Furthermore, Table 3.15 reveals that ‘Ready mixed concrete’
firms located in denser areas are characterized by a higher revenue TFP and that this is
entirely driven by a higher TFP. At the same time Table 3.19 indicates that, within the
‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’ sample, firms located in
denser areas sell higher quantities and generate higher revenues while charging significantly
higher prices and having higher marginal costs and lower markups than firms located in
less dense areas. Table 3.20 further shows that ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories
for motor vehicles’ firms located in denser areas are characterized by a higher revenue TFP
33There are 726 firm-product-year observations corresponding to ‘Ready mixed concrete’ distributed
across 123 ZEs.
34There are 2,036 firm-product-year observations corresponding to ‘Manufacture of other parts and
accessories for motor vehicles’ distributed across 184 ZEs.
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and that this is entirely driven by higher prices.
Table 3.18: ‘Ready-mixed concrete’ industry (NACE code 2363): 2SLS regressions of firm
TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.1151 0.1394 -0.0243 0.3195 -0.4780 0.2737 0.0241
(0.0450)** (0.0483)*** (0.0225) (0.1486)** (0.2794)* (0.1604)* (0.0205)
N 123 123 123 123 123 123 123
LM stat under-identif. 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8
Under-identif. p-value 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
Wald F stat weak identif. 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust
standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the
corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a
test statistic for weak identification. See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Focusing on the sample of SP and MP firms producing
products belonging to the ‘Ready-mixed concrete’ industry (NACE code 2363), firm-product-year variables are aggregated
at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr
where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year
observations (belonging to the industry ‘Ready-mixed concrete’) corresponding to the ZE r.
Table 3.19: ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’ industry (NACE
code 293): 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log
markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.3797 0.4772 0.0975 0.1370 -0.0396
(0.1625)** (0.1581)*** (0.0552)* (0.0613)** (0.0169)**
N 184 184 184 184 184
LM stat under-identif. 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Focusing on the sample of SP and MP firms producing products
belonging to the ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’ industry (NACE
code 293), firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit
product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i
revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-
year observations (belonging to the industry ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor
vehicles’) corresponding to the ZE r.
81
Table 3.20: ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’ industry (NACE
code 293): 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue
weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0991 0.0016 0.0975 0.1493 -0.4006 0.3504 0.0492
(0.0437)** (0.0691) (0.0552)* (0.1412) (0.2073)* (0.1180)*** (0.0200)**
N 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
LM stat under-identif. 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1 21.1
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1 169.1
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust
standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the
corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a
test statistic for weak identification. See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Focusing on the sample of SP and MP firms producing
products belonging to the ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles’ industry (NACE code 293), firm-
product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year
observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of
Ript across the firm-product-year observations (belonging to the industry ‘Manufacture of other parts and accessories for
motor vehicles’) corresponding to the ZE r.
3.5 Robustness checks
Results 1, 2 and 3 do not depend on the Mulama model assumptions and limitations
because they are either shown to be consistent across several methodologies (Results 1
and 2) or they come straight from the raw data (Result 3) while holding across several
samples and weighting approaches. As for Results 4 and 5, they are instead more reliant on
the Mulama model and in this Section we provide a number of additional results showing
that Results 4 and 5 are little affected by whether we use the DGKP or the FMMM
estimation procedure, by whether we use the single-product firms sample or the larger
sample of single-product and multi-product firms, by whether we employ the number
of full-time equivalent employees or the total wage bill to measure the labour input, by
whether we consider firm revenue or firm wage bill to weigh observations, by whether we
include or not the Paris area (specifically the Île de France region), as well as by whether
we use a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog production function.35
FMMM estimation procedure. Two shortcomings of the DGKP procedure are re-
lated to its implicit assumptions and the amount of identifying variation. More specific-
ally, existence and invertibility of a suitable conditional input demand for materials implies
making implicit assumptions about demand and market structure that are nor readily veri-
fiable. Furthermore, in the estimation procedure described in DGKP firm market share
(de facto firm revenue) and price in t− 1 are, among other things, added as covariates in
35The data samples used below are sometimes slightly different from the one used in the main analysis
because of data cleaning and particularly trimming on markups.
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a regression where quantity at time t in on the left-hand side. Therefore, there might be
little variation left to precisely identify technology parameters.
In an attempt to address these two issues FMMM develop an alternative estimation
methodology that does not rely on the proxy variable approach. More specifically, FMMM
use both the first-order approximation of the log revenue function (3.4) and the produc-
tion function equation to recover technology parameters. Indeed, FMMM are sufficiently
explicit about demand to be able to explicitly write the log revenue function in terms of
observables and heterogeneities and use both this and the production function equation
to estimate technology parameters. The key disadvantage of this methodology is that one
has to be explicit about the process governing the evolution of product appeal λit and in
particular we, as FMMM, assume it follows an AR(1) process.
Tables B.6 to B.9 in Appendix B-4 provide supporting evidence of Results 4 and 5
obtained using the FMMM procedure.
Single-product firms. The key advantage of using multi-product firms is coverage.
Multi-product firms are large and account for the lion’s share of manufacturing production.
However, their technology needs to be inferred from information on single-product firms
(the production function is actually estimated using data on single-product firms only),
and assumptions need to be made about how to split inputs across the different products
of a multi-product firm.
In order to side-step these limitations, Tables B.10 to B.13 in Appendix B-4 report
results referring to the smaller sample of single product firms. Again, evidence is in line
with Results 4 and 5.
Using firm wage bill to measure the labour input. Some spatial productivity
studies use the firm wage bill instead of the number of full time workers to measure the
labour input on the grounds that this controls in some way for the ability of workers.
However, our aim is not to establish what share of the productivity advantage of denser
areas is related to workers’ skills and abilities (possibly due to sorting of better workers
across space), but rather to establish how much of the observed revenue-based productivity
advantage of firms located in denser areas is due to actual TFP differences as opposed to
demand and markups differences. In this light, we prefer to use a measure of the labour
83
input allowing our firm-level revenue TFP and quantity TFP to incorporate differences
in workers’ skills and abilities across locations. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3.4,
using the number of full-time equivalent employees allows us to more clearly establish
whether products sold by firms located in denser locations actually require more inputs
to be produced as opposed to more expensive inputs.
We nevertheless provide evidence in Tables B.14 to B.17 in Appendix B-4 that Results
4 and 5 are qualitatively, and to a large extent also quantitatively, unaffected by using the
wage bill to measure the labour input.
Using firm wage bill to weigh observations. Using firm revenue to weigh observa-
tions is simple and straightforward. However, given that firms generating a similar revenue
might generate a very different value added over inputs, statistical offices often prefer to
use other approaches when aggregating firm-level data. The most common approach is
to consider either the number of employees or the wage bill. In Tables B.18 to B.19 in
Appendix B-4 we use the firm wage bill instead of firm revenue to weight observations and
in doing so we confirm Results 4 and 5.
Eliminating Paris. When considering the spatial distribution of economic activities
and/or regional differences in productivity and wages in France the elephant in the room
is the Paris area. To check whether or not our findings are driven by some particular
patterns arising in the Paris area we provide in Tables B.20 to B.23 in Appendix B-4
results obtained eliminating firms located in the Île de France region. Again, findings are
strongly supportive of Results 4 and 5.
Translog production function. The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely used
in productivity analyses including the spatial productivity investigation of Combes et al.
(2012). However, the Translog production function is more general albeit more demanding
in terms of number of parameters to estimate and degree of analytical complication. In
Tables B.24 and B.25 in Appendix B-4 we provide results obtained employing a Translog
production function while using product revenue shares in order to assign inputs to the
different products of a multi-product firm. Reassuringly, Results 4 and 5 find again strong
support.
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3.6 Conclusions
We make use of detailed quantity, prices and revenue data on products produced by
French manufacturing firms and, building upon FMMM, we quantify heterogeneity in
TFP, demand and markups across firms while further providing an exact decomposition
of revenue TFP. We measure these heterogeneities at the firm level and subsequently
aggregate them at the regional level to analyze differences in TFP, demand and markups
across space. We find a number of robust results providing fresh insights on agglomeration
economies that have implications for both economic theory and regional policy.
For example, the current policy approach is based on the presumption that firms in
lagging regions are characterized by a lower TFP and so interventions are directed towards
increasing their technical efficiency. In this respect, our evidence suggests that interven-
tions should rather promote firms’ product quality and marketing capabilities in order to
increase revenue TFP in lagging regions. Furthermore, our findings suggest that achieving
regional convergence has a lot to do with increasing the relative size of the most productive
firms in lagging regions which might be hindered more than in other regions by factors
like inputs misallocation.
On a concluding note, while our analysis provides a number of fresh insights on agglom-
eration economies it does not address the old question of what micro-channels generate the
observed advantages of denser areas and how important they are individually. However,
our analysis does suggest that micro-channels related to product quality and demand are
key to understand differences in revenue TFP across space while at the same time high-
lighting the importance of the largely understudied links between firm revenue TFP, firm
size and density in generating aggregate regional-level outcomes. In terms of avenues for
future research, we believe the analysis could be fruitfully pushed forward by exploring,
along the lines of Combes et al. (2012), if and how much the distribution of each com-
ponent of revenue TFP is subject to left-truncation (as a measure of the importance of
selection) and/or right-shifting and dilation (as a measure of the importance of agglomer-
ation economies).
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Chapter 4
The UK’s Great Demand
Recession
Abstract
We revisit the UK’s poor productivity performance since the Great Recession by means
of both a suitable theoretical framework and firm-level prices and quantities data for
detailed products. This allows us to both measure demand and its changes over time
and distinguish between quantity total factor productivity (TFP-Q), i.e., the capacity to
turn inputs into more physical output (number of shirts, liters of beer), and what we call
revenue total factor productivity (TFP-R), i.e., productivity calculated using (price-index
deflated) revenue or value-added as a measure of output and so the capacity to turn inputs
into more revenue/value-added. This in turn allows us to measure how changes in TFP-Q,
demand and markups ultimately affected revenue TFP, as well as labour productivity, over
the Great Recession. Our findings suggest that UK firms’ poor productivity performance
post-recession is due to both a weakening of demand and a decreasing TFP-Q pushing
down sales, markups, revenue TFP and labour productivity.
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4.1 Introduction
Nine years after the end of the Great Recession in the UK, labour productivity had barely
returned to the level it reached on the eve of the downturn at the end of 2007 (Office
for National Statistics, 2018b). Output per hour worked grew just 1.8% between the
start of 2008 and the end of 2017: had it grown at its 1994-2007 trend, it would have
been 19.6% higher.1 This poor performance is a puzzle. A sustained period of little to
no labour productivity growth following a recession is indeed rare in the UK’s historical
record.2 Furthermore, the productivity slowdown has occurred despite a buoyant labour
market,3 and the UK’s experience is widely judged to have been worse than most of its
EU and OECD peers.4 Despite many complementary explanations that have so far been
put forward, little attention has been paid to the role of demand and markups as well
as to the crucial distinction between quantity total factor productivity (TFP-Q), i.e., the
capacity to turn inputs into more physical output (number of shirts, litres of beer), and
what we call revenue total factor productivity (TFP-R), i.e., productivity calculated using
(price-index deflated) revenue or value-added as a measure of output and so the capacity
to turn inputs into more revenue/value-added.
Regarding the role of demand, the problem is that without actual data on products’
prices and quantities it is not possible to measure demand and its changes over time and
so assess whether, and to what extent, a fall in demand might have contributed to the UK
productivity slowdown. For example, if revenues increase less than the price index one
might well conjecture that the underlying unobservable quantities sold have decreased, but
it would not be possible to establish whether the decrease in quantities is simply due to
price changing, and firms moving along the same demand curve, or the underlying demand
curve firms face has changed. At the same time, the unavailability of data on products’
prices and quantities does not allow properly distinguishing between quantity TFP and
revenue TFP. To be more specific, both macro and micro productivity studies use price
1Our period of analysis ends in 2013 and at that point, output per hour was 1.7% lower than at the
end of 2007. Had it grown at its 1994-2007 trend rate, it would have been 14.4% higher.
2Four years after the end of the recessions that began in 1973, 1980 and 1990, labour productivity was
between 5% and 15% higher than its previous peak (Grice, 2012).
3See, for example, Bryson and Forth (2016) and Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014).
4See, for example, OECD (2018) and Office for National Statistics (2018a). There is evidence that the
productivity slowdown in the US and major European economies pre-dates the financial crisis (Cette et al.,
2016) but the UK experience, as documented by Office for National Statistics (2018b), shows a marked
slowdown of the productivity growth trend in the recovery from the 2008-9 recession.
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indices to deflate nominal sales, or value-added, in order to measure output and its changes
over time. Besides the usual caveats of aggregation bias and the presence of substantial
price heterogeneity across firms, the issue with this approach is that actual price changes
do not correspond to price index changes due to, for example, the imputation of part of
actual price changes to quality improvements to products or changes to the specification
of a product. Therefore, standard price-index deflated nominal values still contain a price
measure and that is why we label productivity measures obtained with this approach as
revenue-TFP measures.
In this paper we provide novel evidence that UK firms’ poor productivity performance
post-2008 is due to both weakening demand and sluggish TFP-Q growth pushing down
sales, markups and revenue TFP, as well as labour productivity. More specifically, in the
first part of our analysis we focus on manufacturing firms and use information on firm-
level prices and quantities for detailed products, from the UK Prodcom dataset, as well as
inputs over the period 2003-20135 to measure firm-level quantity TFP by building upon
the frameworks developed in De Loecker et al. (2016) and Forlani et al. (2016). This allows
us to quantify firm-level markups, as well as firm-level demand and its changes over time
and, while aggregating-up the information to the whole-of-manufacturing level, compare
the evolution of TFP-Q, markups and demand before and after 2008. Finally, we exploit
two exact decompositions for TFP-R and labour productivity to show how changes in
TFP-Q, markups and demand have affected the two productivity measures. Our results
strongly indicate that both a slowing down of demand and a decline in quantity TFP, and
the related fall in markups, are behind the decline in revenue TFP and labour productivity
in manufacturing. Furthermore, we show that the difference between actual price changes
and price index changes, that we label ‘real price changes’ and that reflect more than
just quality improvements to products, widened post-2008 in response to the increasing
production costs generated by a lower TFP-Q, so helping to contain the fall in TFP-R.
In the second part of our analysis, we consider service industries and estimate a re-
stricted version of the model due to the absence of reliable and meaningful information on
prices and quantities. In doing so we find, for those measures that are common to both
the full and restricted versions of the model, very similar patterns to those obtained for
5We consider the time frame 2003-2013 in our analysis for better comparability with previous studies
on the UK productivity puzzle.
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manufacturing. These findings, along with the absence of noticeable differences in capital
stock investment patterns between manufacturing and services industries, lead us to con-
jecture that both demand and TFP-Q are also responsible for the poor revenue TFP and
labour productivity performance of UK service industries.
We believe that our results are important for at least two reasons. First, they are
informative about the long-term impacts of the Great Recession. A fall in quantity TFP,
due for example to a decline in the rate of technical progress, represents a permanent loss of
productive potential with substantial long-term implications for the economy. By contrast
a demand downturn, due for example to a prolonged general climate of uncertainty, could
have less permanent consequences. Second, our results are informative about the policies
that could more effectively address the weak growth of labour productivity and revenue
TFP post-2008. In particular, our findings suggest that government policies should more
prominently act towards boosting demand for UK firms rather than focusing only on
productivity.
Our paper is related to the literature devoted to the UK productivity puzzle.6 This
literature has so far considered many complementary reasons for the poor post-2008 per-
formance relative to the long-term trend. Among these are: measurement errors in output
(Goodridge et al., 2016; Grice, 2012); productivity losses in specific sectors (Riley et al.,
2018); labour hoarding (Martin and Rowthorn, 2012); capital shallowing (Pessoa and Van
Reenen, 2014; Goodridge et al., 2016; Riley et al., 2018); the impact of badly-measured
intangible capital (Goodridge et al., 2013); changes to firm entry and exit behaviour in
the context of an impaired financial sector (Barnett et al., 2014; Riley et al., 2013, 2014);
a lengthening of the left tail of poorly performing firms in the productivity distribution
(Andrews et al., 2015); and a slowdown among high-performing firms in the right tail of
the distribution (Schneider, 2018). However, while there are many proposed culprits and
some fit certain features of the puzzle better than others, there is lack of consensus on
some key elements of the productivity downturn,7 while we know little about to what
6See Bryson and Forth (2016) and McCann (2018) for a literature review.
7For example, in manufacturing there is not a consensus on whether the labour productivity puzzle is
also a total factor productivity puzzle. More specifically, Goodridge et al. (2016) build upon an aggregate-
level growth accounting approach and find that labour productivity in manufacturing has declined because
of a decline in total factor productivity. By contrast, Harris and Moffat (2017) build upon a firm-level
approach and find that the labour productivity puzzle in manufacturing is mainly driven by a decline in
intermediates intensity while TFP growth continued.
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extent the puzzle is demand- and/or supply-driven and what is the macro role played by
markups (De Loecker et al., 2020).
Our paper is also related to the literature on heterogeneous markups and productivity
inspired by Hall (1986) and Olley and Pakes (1996) and further developed in Ackerberg
et al. (2015), De Loecker et al. (2016) and Forlani et al. (2016). More specifically, in our
analysis we estimate a quantity-based production function for UK manufacturing using two
estimation procedures, the one developed in De Loecker et al. (2016) (henceforth DGKP)
and the one described in Forlani et al. (2016) (henceforth FMMM). These two methods are
similar in their motivation to disentangle heterogeneity in revenue TFP into supply-side
differences between firms, notably TFP-Q, from demand-side differences in prices which
could be due to differences in input and/or output quality, demand and markups. As for
services, we instead estimate revenue-based production functions by building on either the
restricted version of the model introduced in FMMM or the more standard Wooldridge
(2009) approach (henceforth WLD). Again, our results are largely unaffected by whether
we use one or the other estimation method. For both manufacturing and services we
use the TFP-R decomposition provided in FMMM to break down revenue productivity
changes into underlying changes in TFP-Q and demand (for services, a composite of TFP-
Q and demand) as well as markups and production scale. We further develop a labour
productivity decomposition generalizing the standard formula used in growth accounting
exercises to the presence of heterogeneity in demand and markups. Finally, we show
that our results are robust to whether we use a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog production
function, to different weighting schemes (revenue, employment, un-weighted) and samples
(single-product vs. multi-product firms) as well as different estimation procedures.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents key highlights
of the FMMM model and related TFP-R and labour productivity decompositions. Sec-
tion 4.3 describes the datasets used and provides some summary statistics and high-level
patterns while Section 4.4 contains production function estimation results and develops a
number of useful insights into how to interpret the results. Section 4.5 presents baseline
results for both manufacturing and services while Section 4.6 contains a number of ad-
ditional findings showing the robustness of our results. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
Further details about the data and robustness findings are provided in Appendix C.
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4.2 The MULAMA model
This Section follows FMMM and in particular we provide here the single-product firm
version of the model. See FMMM for the multi-product firm extension of the model. The
model is labelled MULAMA because of the names of the 3 heterogeneities it allows for:
markups MU, demand LAMbda and quantity TFP A. FMMM also provide an estimation
procedure to quantity markups, demand and quantity TFP that we employ in our analysis.
At the same time, the estimation procedure developed in DGKP is also consistent with the
MULAMA model and we employ that estimation procedure to corroborate the robustness
of our findings. Furthermore, the MULAMA model allows for an exact decomposition of
revenue TFP in terms of the underlying heterogeneities. In addition, we develop below
a decomposition of labour productivity generalizing the standard formula used in growth
accounting exercises to the presence of heterogeneity in demand and markups.
4.2.1 Measuring demand
In what follows we index firms by i and time by t and denote with lower case the log
of a variable (for example rit denotes the natural logarithm of revenue Rit). Standard
profit maximization (marginal revenue equal to marginal costs) implies that the elasticity
of revenue Rit with respect to quantity Qit is one over the profit maximizing markup:
∂rit
∂qit
=
∂Rit
∂Qit︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal revenue
Qit
Rit
=
∂Cit
∂Qit︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
Qit
PitQit
=
∂Cit
∂Qit
Pit
=
1
µit
, (4.1)
where µit =
Pit
∂Cit
∂Qit
is the profit maximizing markup. This result comes from static profit
maximization and holds under different assumptions about demand (representative con-
sumer and discrete choice models) and product market structure (monopolistic competi-
tion, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly).
Despite the log revenue function, i.e., the function relating log revenue to log quantity,
being both unknown and potentially different across firms, equation (4.1) provides us with
the slope of the firm-specific log revenue function while data on the actual log revenue rit
and log quantity qit referring to firm i provide us with a point where such log revenue
function cuts through the (q, r) space. If we now linearize the log revenue function around
the observed data point (qit, rit) with a slope given by
1
µit
we can uniquely pin down an
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intercept for this linearized log revenue function on the r axis. We use such intercept λ̃it
as a measure of the firm-specific demand:8
λ̃it ≡ rit −
∂rit
∂qit
qit = rit −
qit
µit
. (4.2)
Given our definition of λ̃it observed firm log revenue is simply
rit = λ̃it +
1
µit
qit, (4.3)
and so λ̃it is a firm-specific log revenue shifter corresponding to the log price firm i would
face if selling one unit of its product.9
While being general and intuitive, this measure of firm-specific demand also maps to
more formal and explicit differences in the underlying structure of preferences. In partic-
ular, FMMM show that λ̃it =
λit
µit
where λit is a parameter characterizing differences in
utility derived from the consumption of products sold by different firms. More specifically,
consider a representative consumer who maximises at each point in time t a differentiable
utility function U(.) subject to budget Bt:
max
Q
{
U
(
Q̃
)}
s.t.
∫
i
PitQitdi−Bt = 0
where Q̃ is a vector of elements ΛitQit and λit = log(Λit). Therefore, while the represent-
ative consumer chooses quantities Q, these quantities enter into the utility function as Q̃
and Λit can be interpreted as a measure of the perceived quality/appeal of a particular
variety. In our analysis we employ λit as a complementary measure of the firm-specific
demand and sometimes refer to λ̃it as markup-adjusted demand.
10
8To simplify notation we ignore components that are constant across firms in a given time period or
within a product category. Those constants will be captured in our empirical analysis by a suitable set of
dummies.
9At the intercept point qit = 0 and so we have Qit = 1 from which Rit = Pit and rit = pit = λ̃it. Note
this has no implications whatsoever about the presence/absence of a choke price.
10The interpretation of Λit as a utility shifter and its relationship with the firm log revenue function are
based on a first-order linear approximation around the profit maximizing solution, i.e., rit ' 1µit (qit+λit).
In this respect, FMMM show that such linear approximation applies to any preferences structure that can
be used to model monopolistic competition, and for which a well-behaved differentiable utility function
exists, as well as to the oligopoly model developed in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and further refined in
Hottman et al. (2016). This includes standard CES preferences as well as generalized CES preferences
(Spence, 1976), CARA preferences (Behrens et al., 2014), HARA preferences (Haltiwanger et al., 2018),
Translog preferences (Feenstra, 2003) as well as the class of Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES)
preferences discussed in Zhelobodko et al. (2012) and Dhingra and Morrow (2019). Finally, FMMM
provide examples suggesting that a log-linear approximation of the revenue function, which is behind both
the construction of λ̃it and its interpretation as a markup-adjusted measure of product appeal, works well
for many utility specifications.
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4.2.2 Measuring Markups
As far as markups are concerned FMMM build upon a result, first highlighted in Hall
(1986) and implemented in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and DGKP among others,
based on cost-minimization of a variable input free of adjustment costs (materials in
our empirical implementation) and price-taking behaviour on the inputs side (the cost of
materials WMit is allowed to be firm-time specific but it is given to the firm). The proof
goes as follows. Starting from the definition of marginal cost:
∂Cit
∂Qit
=
∂Cit
∂Mit
∂Mit
∂Qit
= WMit
∂Mit
∂Qit
.
Now define the markup as:
µit ≡
Pit
∂Cit
∂Qit
.
We thus have:
Pit
µit
= WMit
∂Mit
∂Qit
.
Multiplying by Qit and dividing by Mit on both sides we get:
PitQit
Mitµit
=
Rit
Mitµit
= WMit
∂Mit
∂Qit
Qit
Mit
= WMit
∂mit
∂qit
.
Re-arranging we finally have:
µit =
∂qit
∂mit
WMitMit
Rit
=
∂qit
∂mit
sMit
. (4.4)
The simple rule to pin-down markups is consistent with many hypotheses on product mar-
ket structure (monopolistic competition, monopoly and standard forms of oligopoly) and
consists in taking the ratio of the output elasticity of materials ( ∂qit∂mit ) to the share of ma-
terials in revenue (sMit ≡ WMitMitRit ). Measuring the output elasticity of materials requires
estimation of the coefficients of the production function while the share of materials in
revenue is directly observable in most datasets (including ours). For example, in the case
of a Cobb-Douglas production function with 3 inputs (labour L, materials M and capital
K) and with (log) quantity TFP being labeled as ait, log quantity is:
qit = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + ait, (4.5)
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and so the output elasticity of materials is constant and equal to αM meaning that µit =
αM
sMit
. When instead considering a Translog production function log quantity is:
qit =
∑
x∈{m,l,k}
[
αXxit +
1
2
αXX (xit)
2
]
+ αMKmitkit + αMLmitlit + αLK litkit + ait, (4.6)
and so:
µit =
αM + αMMmit + αMLlit + αMKkit
sMit
.
Therefore, with estimates of the production function coefficients at hand, (4.4) can be used
to recover firm-specific markups. At the same time, with markups as well as log quantity
and log revenue, (4.2) can be used to get the demand measures λ̃it and λit.
4.2.3 Quantity TFP
The last step to close the model involves estimating the parameters of the production func-
tion and so recover quantity TFP ait and subsequently markups and demand as explained
above. There are many different hypotheses, and related estimation procedures, one can
use in order to achieve this and in what follows we describe and employ two techniques.
One readily available approach to estimate the production function, that is consistent
with the MULAMA model, is provided in DGKP. This methodology relies on the popular
proxy variable approach pioneered by Olley and Pakes (1996) and in particular, starting
from the conditional input demand for materials, adds to such function a number of
observables (prices and market shares in particular) to proxy for unobservables (markups
and demand heterogeneity in our framework) while further imposing invertibility of the
conditional input demand for materials. More specifically, DGKP build on the GMM
approach outlined in WLD and in particular consider the leading case of an AR(1) process
for productivity:
ait = φaait−1 + νait, (4.7)
where νait stands for productivity shocks that are iid and represent innovations with
respect to the information set of the firm in t− 1. Therefore, productivity shocks νait are
uncorrelated with past values of all firm-level variables (capital, revenue, quantity, etc.)
including productivity. However, the productivity level ait is allowed to be correlated with
past and present firm-level variables and in particular is a variable considered by the firm
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when making choices in t.
Under the (usual) additional assumption that capital is predetermined in t, i.e., capital
is chosen beforehand and cannot adjust immediately to shocks νait occurring in t,
11 the
firm will thus consider capital as given in t and will choose the optimal amount of materials
in order to minimize costs based on the given values of capital kit and TFP ait as well
as the price of materials WMit. Such optimal amount will in general be a deterministic
function h(.) of kit, ait andWMit. Furthermore, with underlying differences in markups and
demand, h(.) will also depend on markups µit and demand λit. Finally, if labour has also
been chosen prior to t (because it is like capital difficult to adjust in the wake of short-term
shocks νait),
12 then h(.) will also contain lit: mit = h(kit, lit, ait,WMit, µit, λit). If h(.) is
globally invertible with respect to ait, the inverse function ait = g(kit, lit,mit,WMit, µit, λit)
exists and is well behaved and so one can use a semi-parametric polynomial approximation
of g(.) in order to proxy for the unobservable (to the econometrician) quantity TFP ait.
Furthermore, given alsoWMit, λit and µit are unobservable (to the econometrician), DGKP
suggest using the observable output price and market share of firm i as proxies for WMit,
λit and µit in the semi-parametric approximation of g(.),
13 that so becomes a function of
observables only. Operationally, g(.) is thus approximated by a polynomial function in
the 3 inputs plus the output price and the market share.
Two shortcomings of the DGKP approach are related to its implicit assumptions and
the amount of identifying variation. More specifically, existence and invertibility of a suit-
able conditional input demand for materials implies making implicit assumptions about
demand and market structure that are nor readily verifiable. Furthermore, in the estima-
tion procedure described in DGKP firm market share (de facto firm revenue) and price in
t−1 are, among other things, added as covariates in a regression where quantity at time t
in on the left-hand side. Therefore, there might be little variation left to precisely identify
11Capital can nonetheless adjust to shocks νait at time t+1.
12Given the features of the UK labour market we do not assume, as DGKP do for India and we do in
Chapter 3 for France, that labour is, like capital, predetermined for the firm in t. More specifically we
consider, in both the DGKP and FMMM estimation procedures, that labour is a semi-flexible input that
is chosen at time t− b (0 < b < 1), i.e., it can be adjusted in light of contemporaneous shocks in t but not
as fully as materials. In practice, this means we consider it as an endogenous variable, and use its lags as
instruments in the estimation, but do not consider it flexible enough to use in the calculation of markups.
See FMMM for more details on how to deal with semi-flexible inputs.
13DGKP cite Kugler and Verhoogen (2011) who document how producers of more expensive products
also use more expensive inputs so suggesting that observable output prices could be reasonably used to
proxy for unobservable input prices.
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technology parameters.
In an attempt to address these two issues FMMM develop an alternative estimation
methodology that does not rely on the proxy variable approach. More specifically, FMMM
use both the first-order approximation of the log revenue function and the production
function to recover technology parameters. Indeed, FMMM are sufficiently explicit about
demand to be able to explicitly write the log revenue function in terms of observables
and heterogeneities and use both this and the production function equation to estimate
technology parameters. The key disadvantage of this methodology is that one has to be
explicit about the process governing the evolution of demand λit and in particular FMMM
assume it follows an AR(1) process.14 In our implementation of the FMMM procedure we
use:
λit = φλλit−1 + νλit, (4.8)
where νλit stands for demand shocks that are iid and represent innovations with respect to
the information set of the firm in t− 1. However, FMMM do not impose any constraints
on the correlation between demand shocks νλit and quantity TFP shocks νait and so
ultimately do not impose a priori any constraints on the correlation between demand λit
and quantity TFP ait. Indeed, our analyses confirm previous findings in FMMM of a
negative correlation between λit and ait irrespective of whether we use the FMMM or
the DGKP procedure. This is suggestive of a trade-off between the appeal/quality of a
firm’s products and their production cost which in line with findings in the demand system
literature (Ackerberg et al., 2007).
4.2.4 TFP-R decomposed
To appreciate how the MULAMA model is useful in linking revenue TFP and quantity
TFP note that, with standard Hicks-neutral TFP, one can write the log of the production
function as qit = q̄it+ait where q̄it is an index of inputs use that we label scale.
15 Revenue
TFP is simply log revenue minus scale TFPRit ≡ rit− q̄it = ait + pit, and it is also equal to
14λit captures consumers’ perception of a firm’s products quality and appeal; something that arguably
does not change much from one year to another. It takes years of effort and costly investments to firms
to establish their brand and build their customers’ base very much like it takes years of effort and costly
investments to firms to put in place and develop an efficient production process for their products. FMMM
thus argue that there are profound similarities between the processes of productivity (typically modelled
as an autoregressive process) and product appeal.
15For example, with a Cobb-Douglas production technology q̄it = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit.
96
quantity TFP plus log price. Using equation (4.3) to substitute for rit along with λ̃it =
λit
µit
we get:
TFPRit =
ait
µit
+
λit
µit
+
1− µit
µit
q̄it, (4.9)
meaning that TFPRit is a (non-linear) function of quantity-based TFP ait, demand λit,
the markup µit and production scale q̄it. (4.9) can also be made linear by considering
markup-adjusted quantity TFP and scale (ãit =
ait
µit
and ˜̄qit =
(1−µit)q̄it
µit
):
TFPRit = ãit + λ̃it + ˜̄qit, (4.10)
so that TFPRit differences across firms and time can be decomposed as the sum of dif-
ferences in ãit, λ̃it and ˜̄qit. In particular, using ∆ to denote changes between t − 1 and
t:
∆TFPRit = ∆ãit + ∆λ̃it + ∆˜̄qit. (4.11)
4.2.5 Labour productivity decomposed
TFP, whether of the quantity or revenue flavour, is not the only productivity measure
of interest to economists and policymakers. Labour productivity measured as output per
worker or per hour worked is widely used and is often more closely related to wages and
living standards. In many empirical settings researchers use a simple growth accounting
methodology to attribute (log) labour productivity changes to changes in the labour input,
other inputs and TFP building on the Cobb-Douglas production function:
rit = qit + pit = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + ait + pit︸ ︷︷ ︸
TFPRit
,
where ait + pit is nothing else than revenue TFP. By subtracting lit from both sides while
rearranging and considering time changes ∆, we have the following labour productivity
(LPit) decomposition:
∆LPit = ∆(rit − lit) = (αL − 1)∆lit + αM∆mit + αK∆kit + ∆TFPRit . (4.12)
The equivalent factor proportions version used in Goodridge et al. (2016), Harris and
Moffat (2017) and Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014) is:
∆LPit = γ∆lit + αM∆(mit − lit) + αK∆(kit − lit) + ∆TFPRit , (4.13)
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where γ = αL + αM + αK − 1 is a parameter measuring returns to scale.
Within the MULAMA model both decompositions can be further developed. More
specifically, substituting (4.11) for ∆TFPRit in (4.12) and simplifying leads to:
∆LPit = ∆[(
αL
µit
− 1)lit] + αM∆(
mit
µit
) + αK∆(
kit
µit
) + ∆(
ait
µit
) + ∆(
λit
µit
), (4.14)
while, in the factor proportions version, substituting (4.11) for ∆TFPRit in (4.13) delivers:
∆LPit = ∆[(
γ + 1
µit
− 1)lit] +αM∆(
mit − lit
µit
) +αK∆(
kit − lit
µit
) + ∆(
ait
µit
) + ∆(
λit
µit
). (4.15)
From (4.14) and (4.15) it now appears clearly how changes in labour productivity mater-
ialize as a consequence of changes in quantity TFP, demand, markups and inputs use.
4.2.6 The restricted model and services
Quantity and price data are very often not available to researchers, almost universally
for the service sectors where output measures can be particularly problematic (Office for
National Statistics, 2007). In such cases, the only available option is to estimate the
production function and related TFP using revenue, or value added, as a measure of
output, i.e., measure revenue TFP. This raises the issue, discussed above, of the bias in
the estimation of production function coefficients coming from any correlation between the
underlying prices and inputs use. In this respect, FMMM provide an overall reassuring
message.
More specifically, FMMM find that more standard revenue TFP measures obtained
using revenue as a measure of output are reasonably well correlated with revenue TFP
measures obtained using quantity as a measure of output; something we will show later on
holds in our data too. In other words, the bias involving production function coefficients
coming from the correlation between prices and inputs use is not a first-order issue. The
key insights about this finding are as follows. In the data firms with higher TFP-Q are
characterized by lower marginal costs and charge, as expected, lower prices while selling
higher quantities, so using more inputs, everything else equal. Furthermore, firms with
high demand λ are characterized by higher marginal costs and charge, as expected, higher
prices while selling higher quantities, so using more inputs, everything else equal. At
the same time, the data suggest a trade-off between producing large quantities at low
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marginal costs and prices (high TFP-Q and low λ firms) and producing large quantities at
high marginal costs and prices (low TFP-Q and high λ firms) which in line with findings
in the demand system literature (Ackerberg et al., 2007). Therefore, there is no overall
strong correlation between prices and inputs use and so the bias involving production
function coefficients, when using revenue as a measure of output, is present but it is such
that related TFP-R measures are still informative about the ‘true’ TFP-R.
FMMM further show that the key disadvantage of not having price and quantity data
is the fact that one cannot any more disentangle quantity TFP a from demand λ but only
retrieve a composite of the two: ωit = ait + λit. However, markups can still be computed
from the estimated production function coefficients using (4.4) while the TFP-R and labour
productivity decompositions provided above still hold by replacing the distinct a and λ
terms with a unique ω term. For example, considering (4.9) we have:
TFPRit =
ωit
µit
+
1− µit
µit
q̄it, (4.16)
which provides a formula to retrieve ωit from measures of revenue TFP, markups and
scale; measures that only require estimates of the production function coefficients. At the
same time, for example, (4.15) becomes:
∆LPit = ∆[(
γ + 1
µit
− 1)lit] + αM∆(
mit − lit
µit
) + αK∆(
kit − lit
µit
) + ∆(
ωit
µit
). (4.17)
FMMM label this restricted version of the model MUOMEGA in reference to the two
heterogeneities it allows for, markups (MU) and a composite of TFP-Q and λ (OMEGA).
FMMM also develop an estimation procedure for the restricted model.
In what follows we consider, in order to provide evidence of the robustness of our
results, revenue-based production function estimations for UK service sectors obtained
using either the estimation procedure provided in FMMM or the more standard WLD
approach.
4.2.7 Some additional remarks
Manufacturing. As far as manufacturing is concerned, we consider as baseline the im-
plementation of the MULAMA model and related decompositions based on the DGKP es-
timation method applied to the Cobb-Douglas production function (4.5) on single-product
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firms. However, we also present results based on the FMMM estimation method, also in
Cobb-Douglas form, as well as findings obtained from the Translog production function
(4.6) and the sample of multi-product firms for robustness. Our key findings are little
affected by whether we use the DGKP or the FMMM estimation procedure, by whether
we use a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog production function and whether we use the single-
product firms sample or the multi-product firms sample.
As is customary in productivity analyses, we correct (in all estimations) for the presence
of measurement error in output (quantity and revenue) and/or unanticipated (to the firm)
shocks using the methodology described in DGKP and FMMM. We also consider a full
battery of 8-digit product dummies, as well as year dummies in our production function
estimations. Indeed, quantity in the data is measured in units (kilograms, litres, number
of items, etc.) that are specific to each 8-digit product and so quantity TFP ait can be
reasonably compared across firms and time only within an 8-digit product category. For
similar reasons, also λit can be reasonably compared across firms and time only within an
8-digit product category.
In terms of the number of production function estimations, we are forced by sample
constraints to run a single estimation across the whole manufacturing firms sample instead
of by two-digit industry groupings. As explained more in detail below, we need firms to be
in both the Prodcom and ARDx datasets, which are described below, while also requiring
information on one and two period lags for all variables. In this respect, results obtained
using the more flexible Translog production function should reassure about the issue of
heterogeneity in output elasticities across firms and industries in manufacturing. At the
same time, we show later on that patterns of various TFP-R measures, as well as of value
added per worker and output per worker, are very similar when comparing our estimation
sample to the full set of manufacturing firms available in the ARDx dataset.
Services. As far as service industries are concerned, we consider as baseline the revenue
TFP estimations, and related MUOMEGA model decompositions, based on the WLD
approach applied to the Cobb-Douglas production function (4.5). We also present very
similar results based on the FMMM estimation method for the MUOMEGA model, also
in Cobb-Douglas form.
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Again, as is customary in productivity analyses, we correct (in all estimations) for the
presence of measurement error in revenue and/or unanticipated (to the firm) shocks using
the methodology described in DGKP and FMMM. Production function estimations are
run separately for each NACE Section (11 in total) and include a full battery of 2-digit
industry dummies as well as year dummies.
Composition effects and weighting. There are reasonable concerns about composi-
tion effects as the ARDx firm sample changes over time, and particularly so from 2007-8
when the ONS switched from producing the Annual Respondents Database to the An-
nual Business Survey. Therefore we present, as our baseline, results for what we label
the ‘within sample’ which compares the mean of within-firm changes between t− 1 and t.
The within sample is thus comprised of firms present in the data in both t− 1 and t (and
if manufacturing firms, also producing the same product in both years) and it allows us
to minimise the impact of sample composition effects, including those related to different
units of measurement for the products of manufacturing firms. We show below that the
within sample accounts for the lion’s share of overall firm revenue.
Finally, we choose to present our baseline results using revenue weights, given that
our research question is more closely aligned to understanding aggregate changes in pro-
ductivity rather than for the average firm. We also present robustness results based on
employment weights as well as on equal weights, i.e., un-weighted.
Operationally, we calculate an index for each variable of interest after averaging within-
firm changes between t− 1 and t:
∆ȳt =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
(yit − yit−1)wit, (4.18)
where yit is a variable of interest (TFP-Q, TFP-R, λ, µ, etc.), ∆ȳt is the weighted average
of within firm changes in yit, wit =
1
2(Rit + Rit−1) are the weights computed using the
average firm revenue between t− 1 and t,16 and Nt is the number of firms present in the
data in both t − 1 and t. We use this formula to construct the index of changes, setting
the base year to 2008 for manufacturing and 2007 for services.
16In terms of weighting we thus choose a compromise between Laspeyres and Paasche weights. In
unreported results we also experimented with Laspeyres and Paasche weights obtaining very similar results.
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4.3 Data and Descriptives
4.3.1 Data
The core data required to estimate firm-level revenue TFP using standard methodologies
comprise revenue, employment costs, intermediate inputs and capital stock. For these
variables we turn to the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Annual Respondents Database
X17 (ARDx). The ARDx is a recently-created dataset for researchers using ONS secure
access via the Virtual Microdata Library and the Secure Data Service. It combines and
standardizes data and variables across the period 1998-2017 from two surveys, the Annual
Business Survey (ABS) which has been carried out since 2009, and its predecessor, the
Annual Business Inquiry (ABI), which was carried out 1998-2008 and used to create the
Annual Respondents Database. These are the largest business surveys in the UK and have
been used by many UK productivity researchers including Barnett et al. (2014), Harris
and Moffat (2017) and Riley et al. (2013). The ABI and ABS are similar in sampling
method, structure and questions, and the ARDx was created to provide researchers with
a consistent dataset across time.
The ARDx covers around two-thirds of UK economic activity, comprising most SIC
2007 sections, except parts of sections A (agriculture) and K (finance), and all of O
(public administration and defence), T (activities of households) and U (extraterritorial
organisations). The sample frame of the ABS is the Inter-Departmental Business Register
(IDBR), a register of firms created from HM Revenue and Customs data on VAT and PAYE
details. The sample is stratified by SIC 2007 activities (at the 4-digit level), employment
size and country (England & Wales, and Scotland). A sample of 62,000 of the 2.1m firms
on the IDBR is drawn annually. All firms in the largest employment categories in each
cell are selected. Firms in each of the cells including smaller businesses are drawn for two
consecutive years only, and then not re-selected for at least two years afterwards. For
the smallest (0-9) employment category, firms are only selected in a single year, and then
not again for at least three years afterwards in respect of the Osmotherly rules to ensure
that the compliance burden on firms is proportionate. Because we require lagged values
of variables in our estimations, we drop these firms and focus on firms with at least 10
17Office for National Statistics. Virtual Microdata Laboratory, University of the West of England, Bristol
(2017)
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employees.
Table 4.1: Examples of 8 digit PRODCOM products within 6 digit CPA
categories
PRODCOM Description
Cotton yarn (other than sewing thread)
13.10.61.32 Yarn of uncombed cotton, not per retail sale, for woven fabrics
(excluding for carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.33 Yarn of uncombed cotton, not per retail sale, for knitted fabrics
and hosiery
13.10.61.35 Yarn of uncombed cotton, not per retail sale, for other uses
(including carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.52 Yarn of combed cotton, not per retail sale, for woven fabrics
(excluding for carpets and floor coverings)
13.10.61.53 Yarn of combed cotton, not per retail sale, for knitted fabrics
and hosiery
13.10.61.55 Yarn of combed cotton, not per retail sale, for other uses (in-
cluding carpets and floor coverings)
Input or output units, whether or not containing stor-
age units in the same housing
26.20.16.40 Printers, copying machines and facsimile machines, capable of
connecting to an automatic data processing machine or to a net-
work (excluding printing machinery used for printing by means
of plates, cylinders and other components, and machines per-
forming two or more of the functions of printing, copying or
facsimile transmission)
26.20.16.50 Keyboards
26.20.16.40 Other input or output units, whether or not containing storage
units in the same housing
Source: EC RAMON Database (2009 Prodcom List)
Estimation of quantity TFP and demand for the manufacturing sector requires data on
quantities sold and prices, information that is available in the Products of the European
Community (Prodcom) dataset.18 Prodcom is a standardized survey of production across
the European Union, collected by national statistical agencies using a 3,500 product list
in an 8-digit nomenclature established by Eurostat. The first four digits correspond to the
Nomenclature Statistique des Activités Economiques dans la Communauté Européenne
(NACE) using revision 1.1 up to 2007 and revision 2 from 2008, and the first six digits
to the Classification of Products by Activity (CPA) with the last 2 digits adding further
detail. It covers SIC 2007 sections B (mining) and C (manufacturing) sectors. We exclude
section B to focus on manufacturing. The survey captures at least 90% of production in
all the four digit industries covered by the survey.
18Office for National Statistics (2018c)
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Illustrating the advantages of highly disaggregated data, Table 4.1 shows an extract
from the 2009 Prodcom list for the six-digit codes 13.10.61: ‘Cotton yarn (other than
sewing thread)’ and 26.20.16: ‘Input or output units, whether or not containing storage
units in the same housing’. The latter example highlights how it can often be necessary
to work with 8-digit data rather than the already quite detailed 6-digit level, in order to
be confident to compare reasonably similar items. The former example, highlights instead
how a 8-digit product breakdown can be very precise in terms of narrowing down products
and so working at this level of disaggregation allows us to take into account rich differences
in technology, demand and degree of competition across finely defined products.
Around 20,000 firms a year, representing at least 90% of the value of production in each
4-digit industry, are surveyed to construct the Prodcom dataset using the IDBR as the
sample frame. The sample is stratified by employment size and SIC 2007 4-digit industry.
There are 3 employment band thresholds above which all firms are surveyed (20, 50 and
100), where the cut-off varies between industries. Below that firms are rotated through
the sample.
The quantity and value of sales are recorded for each 8-digit product produced by a firm
annually.19 We measure firm-product-year specific prices as the ratio of the value of sales
to the quantity and apply a small trimming on the distribution of prices by 8-digit product
to get rid of outliers. Prodcom product codes change occasionally over time and we employ
the methodology described in Van Beveren et al. (2012) to obtain a time-consistent product
classification. Appendix C-1 provides more details on the product concordance procedure.
We also ensure that the units of measure used to record quantities are consistent over
time. Metadata provided by the ONS for Prodcom links each product-year with a unit of
measure and where these units change over time within a product we define a new product,
leaving us a total of 5,028 product-units. Some products are reported within Prodcom
without quantity data and we drop these products, leaving 3,239 consistent product-units
with non-missing quantity data. Our unit of observation is strictly firm-product-unit-year
but for ease of exposition we refer to firm-product-year throughout the analysis.
19This introduces a discrepancy with the ARDx. In Prodcom, firms report calendar-year product sales
and quantities, while in the ARDx firms can report either calendar year or financial year revenue figures.
We deal with this by dropping firms that report values for ARDx sales that are outside a range of +/- 30%
of total Prodcom sales. This also has the effect of removing manufacturing firms with a high proportion
of services in revenues.
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Both datasets cover Great Britain while data for Northern Ireland are held separately
and are excluded from our analysis. Our analysis focuses on the period 2003-2013 in order
to both gain insights into the pre- and post-crisis productivity performance and provide
evidence comparable to previous studies. We deflate, as standard, both output and inputs
values from the ARDx using information provided by the ONS. Appendix C-1 provides
more details on the datasets, the construction of capital stocks and the deflators used in
the analysis while Table 4.2 describes the main variables used in our estimations.
Table 4.2: Description of main variables
Variable Description
Output £000s Approximate output at basic prices, calculated (following Ayoubkhani
(2014)) as ‘total turnover excluding VAT’ less ‘goods bought for resale’
plus ‘changes in stocks and work-in-progress’ less ‘changes in stocks of
materials, storage and fuels’ plus ‘work of a capital nature’ less ‘total
net taxes’ plus ‘business rates’ plus ‘net taxes on production’.
Intermediates £000s Approximate intermediate consumption at purchaser’s prices, calcu-
lated as ‘total purchases of goods and services’ less ‘value of insurance
claims received’ less ‘goods and services bought for resale’ less ‘changes
in stocks of materials, storage and fuels’.
Value added £000s Approximate GVA at basic prices, calculated as output less interme-
diates.
Capital stock £000s Plant and machinery capital stock, see Appendix C-1 for details of
calculation
Employment From Inter-departmental Business Register at time of sample selec-
tion, reported in ARDx
Wage bill £000s Total employment costs from ARDx
Quantity Volume of production sold from Prodcom, measured in product-
specific units
Sales Value of production sold from Prodcom
4.3.2 Descriptives
We merge the ARDx, capital stock and Prodcom data using a unique identifier for what
the ONS refers to as a ‘reporting unit’20 and we refer to as a firm, our unit of analysis.21
Manufacturing
Although the ARDx is a representative sample of private-sector firms and Prodcom is de-
signed to cover 90% of manufacturing output, there is not perfect overlap between the two
datasets, a problem compounded by the requirements of the DGKP and FMMM estima-
20Large businesses (”enterprises” to the ONS, and the legal entity of the business) may be split into a
number of reporting units, while reporting units can comprise a number of local units which are separated
geographically. Data in the ARDx are collected at the reporting unit level
21Some authors, e.g. Harris and Moffat (2017), argue that the local unit (plant) is the preferred unit of
analysis because it provides cleaner estimates of capital stock due to plant entry and exit within a firm,
but this requires apportioning firm-level inputs and outputs to plants, while information on production
from Prodcom is only available at the firm level.
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tion procedures. More specifically, to estimate the production function for manufacturing
firms while using quantity as a measure of output we require/impose:
 non-missing, positive values for employment, total turnover ex. VAT, purchases of
goods and materials, capital stock, total wages and salaries from the ARDx
 the firm is in the Prodcom survey
 that Prodcom records a non-zero value for quantity of this product
 the firm produces only 1 product in any given year
 and that firm revenues reported in Prodcom are within 30% of the output calculated
using ARDx data
These demands sharply reduce the available sample size and in Appendix C-1 we
provide more details on the merging process and the various constraints.22 We label
‘final sample’ the combined ARDx and Prodcom sample satisfying all our requirements.
We do not think of the final sample as being representative of the broader populations of
manufacturing firms and/or single-product firms as selection into the estimation sample is
unlikely to be random, particularly reflecting industry characteristics (for the availability
of physical quantity data in Prodcom) and firm size (for selection separately into the
Prodcom and ARDx surveys with differing stratification bands). Rather, we seek to show
that time trends in productivity measures within the group of firms for which we are
able to estimate the full MULAMA model (final sample) are similar to those in broader
samples. Our first step to do this is to estimate standard two-factor (value-added based)
and three-factor (revenue-based) production functions, using both the method of ordinary
least squares and the WLD approach, on the whole sample of manufacturing firms in the
ARDx for which revenue productivity can be estimated (‘all variables available’). We
report production function coefficients in Table C.4 in Appendix C-2, and use these to
calculate mean revenue-based and value-added-based TFP over time for different samples
going from the largest (‘all variables available’) to the final sample we use in our estimations
(‘...plus data constraints’). We graph the results, along with output per worker and value-
added per worker, in Figure 4.1. All the productivity measures we consider indeed display
22In our estimations we also apply some small trimming (top/bottom percentile) of unit prices by
product, the capital-to-labour ratio and labour-output ratio by 2-digit industry, and drop firm-year obser-
vations where the share of materials in output is less than 0.1 or greater than 0.95.
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Figure 4.1: Revenue TFP and labour productivity measures by sample,
Manufacturing, 2003-2013
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All revenue TFP and labour productivity measures are indexed: 2008=100. ’All variables available’ refer to
manufacturing firms in the ARDx that have a) at least 10 employees and b) have the following variables available:
employment, total turnover ex. VAT, purchases of goods and materials, capital stock, total wages and salaries.
‘...plus Prodcom’ adds the requirement that the firm-year observation is also in the Prodcom dataset. ‘...plus
single product’ adds the requirement that at least 90% of a firm’s output at basic prices is accounted for by sales
of a single product . ‘...plus data constraints’ adds the requirement that Prodcom measures a non-zero quantity of
production, and that firm revenues reported by Prodcom are within 30% of the output calculated from the ARDx.
Revenue TFP estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) or the Wooldridge procedure (WLD) in revenue and
value-added forms.
a very similar behavior across time for the four samples. This builds confidence that the
trends in quantity TFP, demand and markups for the wider sample of firms in the ARDx
are similar to those we uncover in the final sample.
One final issue we address is related to the ARDx sampling frame changing over time –
notably in 2008/9 when SIC 2008 replaced SIC 2004 – leading to concern that comparing
firm averages over time, whether weighted on un-weighted, will be biased by changes in
the sample composition. Because of this, in our results we focus, as already discussed
above, on within-firm changes over time using an unbalanced panel of firms for which we
have observations in both year t and year t− 1: the within sample.
Table 4.3 shows the number of observations by year corresponding to the final sample
and the within sample for manufacturing along with the share of revenue (combined rev-
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Table 4.3: Comparison of the final sample and the within sample: manufacturing
firms.
Year Final sample Within sample Within sample
N N revenue share
2003 1,193 641 –
2004 1,134 641 0.6838
2005 1,274 564 0.5686
2006 1,148 617 0.6742
2007 1,213 594 0.6556
2008 1,048 401 0.4981
2009 1,047 443 0.6315
2010 1,056 496 0.6991
2011 1,014 450 0.6870
2012 1,016 478 0.6711
2013 968 477 0.7401
The last column reports the share of revenue (combined revenue in t− 1 and t) accounted for by firms in
the within sample.
enue in t − 1 and t) accounted for by firms in the within sample. While within sample
observations account for fewer than half the available firm-year observations, they account
for roughly two-thirds of full-sample revenues. Summary statistics for key variables and
MULAMA model estimates (obtained with the DGKP estimation procedure) referring to
both samples are provided in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Summary statistics for the final sample and the within sample:
manufacturing firms.
Final sample Within sample
mean sd. mean sd.
log output 9.351 1.438 9.815 1.352
log wage bill 7.928 1.295 8.346 1.214
log intermediates 8.798 1.596 9.322 1.468
log capital stock 7.605 1.772 8.160 1.622
log price -2.380 3.368 -2.309 3.381
TFP-R (DGKP) 0.859 0.174 0.832 0.136
TFP-R (OLS) 1.050 0.134 1.048 0.129
TFP-R (WLD) 0.722 0.131 0.697 0.106
log value-add/worker 3.668 0.520 3.683 0.493
log revenue/worker 4.717 0.648 4.794 0.629
a 3.238 3.377 3.141 3.387
λ -0.932 5.859 -1.674 4.692
ω 2.307 4.875 1.467 3.276
µ 1.183 0.561 1.081 0.348
scale 8.492 1.463 8.983 1.353
adjusted a 3.060 3.461 3.120 3.564
adjusted λ -1.935 4.488 -2.332 4.433
adjusted ω 1.124 2.165 0.788 2.013
adjusted scale -0.265 2.080 0.045 1.969
N 12,111 5,802
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Table 4.5: Comparison of the final sample and the within sample: services firms.
Year Final sample Within sample Within sample
N N revenue share
2003 18,941 8,387 –
2004 18,063 8,387 0.71
2005 17,174 7,813 0.73
2006 14,024 6,438 0.73
2007 15,206 6,266 0.70
2008 12,945 5,674 0.68
2009 12,795 6,493 0.80
2010 12,086 6,079 0.82
2011 12,829 5,966 0.83
2012 12,983 6,404 0.82
2013 12,802 6,626 0.82
The last column reports the share of revenue (combined revenue in t− 1 and t) accounted for by firms in
the within sample.
Table 4.6: Summary statistics for the final sample and the within sample:
services firms.
Final sample Within sample
mean sd. mean sd.
log ouput 8.396 1.775 9.028 1.810
log wage bill 7.432 1.743 8.072 1.776
log intermediates 7.360 1.960 8.026 1.979
log capital stock 5.461 2.426 6.280 2.369
TFP-R (OLS) 1.165 0.164 1.166 0.169
TFP-R (WLD) 0.629 0.588 0.597 0.633
µ 1.720 0.878 1.631 0.748
ω 6.361 7.158 6.014 6.591
scale 7.767 2.017 8.431 2.063
adjusted ω 2.737 2.420 2.766 2.508
adjusted scale -2.108 2.417 -2.168 2.508
N 159,848 74,533
Services
For services firms we merge the ARDx and capital stock data, using the unique identifier
reporting unit, and impose non-missing, positive values for employment, total turnover ex.
VAT, purchases of goods and materials, capital stock and total wages and salaries. This
delivers the final sample for services firms.23 Again, because of concerns about sampling
frame changes, we focus on within-firm changes over time using an unbalanced panel of
firms for which we have observations in both year t and year t − 1: the within sample
for services. We also provide (very similar) results using both un-weighted and weighted
results.
Table 4.5 shows the number of observations by year corresponding to the final sample
23We also apply, in line with the manufacturing analysis, a small trimming based on the top/bottom
percentiles of the capital-to-labour ratio and labour-output ratio by 2-digit industry while dropping firm-
year observations where the share of materials in output is less than 0.1 or greater than 0.95.
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and the within sample for services along with the share of revenue (combined revenue in
t − 1 and t) accounted for by firms in the within sample. Again, while within sample
observations account for fewer than half the available firm-year observations, they account
for more than two-thirds of full-sample revenues. Summary statistics for key variables and
MUOMEGA model estimates (obtained with the WLD estimation procedure) referring to
both samples are provided in Table 4.6.
4.4 Estimates and insights
4.4.1 Manufacturing
Estimates of the Cobb-Douglas production function coefficients for manufacturing firms
belonging to the final sample using the DGKP procedure are shown in Table 4.7 while
descriptive statistics on the various MULAMA model components are displayed in Table
4.4 in Section 4.3. The coefficients are in line with those reported in DGKP for India,
FMMM for Belgium and in Chapter 3 for France using quantity as a measure of output
and follow the expected pattern; materials coefficient larger than that of labour, which
is larger than that of capital and evidence of roughly constant returns to scale. The
coefficients – representing estimates of quantity elasticities rather than revenue elasticities
– are reasonably close to those obtained in the revenue production function estimations
reported in Table C.4 in Appendix C-2, particularly the WLD method.
Table 4.7: Manufacturing. Production function coefficients from the DGKP
estimation procedure using quantity as a measure of output
log quantity
log wage bill 0.342
(0.015)***
log intermediates 0.636
(0.036)***
log capital stock 0.025
(0.012)**
Obs 3,002
Cobb-Douglas production function coefficients estimated using the DGKP method on the final sample of
manufacturing firms. The regression includes 8-digit product dummies and year dummies. The number of
observations refers to firms with at least 2-period lags for all variables required in the estimation procedure.
See FMMM for more details. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Production function estimation allows us to calculate quantity TFP ait along with
110
markups µit and demand λit, as well as revenue total factor productivity TFP
R
it , from
the corresponding equations in Section 4.2. With reference to revenue TFP, and in line
with evidence provided in FMMM discussed above, Table 4.8 shows that this measure
– TFP-R (DGKP) – is reasonably well correlated with alternative measures of revenue
productivity. More specifically, the correlation is stronger the more sophisticated the
alternative measure: low with output per worker, then increasing through value-added
per worker, OLS revenue TFP and most strongly with WLD revenue TFP. In a similar
spirit we show, building on the linear revenue TFP decomposition provided by (4.10), that
markup-adjusted TFP-Q ãit, markup-adjusted demand λ̃it and markup-adjusted scale ˜̄qit
explain a large share of the variation in OLS and WLD revenue TFP in both levels and
changes. This is reported in Table 4.9 along with coefficients (equal to one) and R2
(equal to one) related to the DGKP revenue TFP. Coefficients for OLS and WLD revenue
TFP indicate that an increase in markup-adjusted TFP-Q and/or demand and/or scale are
associated with an increase in firm revenue TFP. As discussed above, the evidence provided
in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 suggests that the bias involving production function coefficients in
revenue TFP estimations coming from the correlation between prices and inputs use is not
a first-order issue. In this respect, the real advantage of having price and quantity data is
the capacity to disentangle quantity TFP from demand.
Table 4.8: Pairwise correlation coefficients between revenue productivity
measures.
TFP-R TFP-R TFP-R log value-add log revenue
(OLS) (WLD) (DGKP) per worker per worker
TFP-R (OLS) 1
TFP-R (WLD) 0.791 1
TFP-R (DGKP) 0.638 0.783 1
log value-add per worker 0.425 0.262 0.506 1
log revenue per worker 0.542 0.0468 0.167 0.724 1
Obs 12,111
Correlations are across observations in the final sample for manufacturing firms.
In order to provide useful insights for our analysis, while confirming previous findings
in FMMM and in Chapter 3, Table 4.10 reports results of some simple regressions looking
at the relationship of prices and markups with the underlying driving variables of the MU-
LAMA model; namely quantity TFP, demand and the capital stock.24 More specifically,
24In the MULAMA model the capital stock is predetermined for the firm in t and so, along with quantity
TFP and demand, determines inputs choices and pricing.
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Table 4.9: Regressions of TFP-R measures on ã, λ̃ and ˜̄q
Levels Changes
OLS WLD DGKP OLS WLD DGKP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
adjusted a 0.713 0.698 1.000 0.699 0.660 1.000
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.000)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.000)***
adjusted λ 0.710 0.696 1.000 0.697 0.659 1.000
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.000)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.000)***
adjusted scale 0.744 0.698 1.000 0.732 0.667 1.000
(0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.000)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** (0.000)***
R2 0.88 0.86 1.00 0.79 0.80 1.00
N 12,111 12,111 12,111 5,161 5,161 5,161
Regressions in columns 1 to 3 use the manufacturing firms final sample and the levels of all variables, while
columns 4 to 6 use the manufacturing firms within sample and firm-level changes between t− 1 and t. All
regressions include a set of year dummies and 8-digit product dummies. Robust standard errors clustered
by firm. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
we regress log price pit and log markup log(µit) on quantity TFP ait, demand λit and log
capital stock kit. We estimate those regressions both in levels and in first-differences (find-
ing very similar coefficients), and include a full set of year dummies and 8-digit product
dummies while clustering standard errors at the firm-level.
Estimations referring to log prices (log markups) in columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) of Table
4.10 indicate, in line with expectations and previous results in FMMM and 3, that more
productive firms and/or an increase in productivity for a firm (higher ait) are associated
with both lower prices and higher markups, i.e., an incomplete pass-through. At the same
time firms facing a stronger demand and/or an increase in demand for a firm (higher λit)
are associated with both higher prices and higher markups, so confirming the relevance of
λit as a measure of firm-specific demand. Finally, larger firms and/or an increase in size
for a firm (higher kit) is associated with both lower prices and lower markups, which is in
line with the elasticity of demand decreasing along the demand curve.
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Table 4.10: Regressions of log prices and log markups on a, λ and log capital
log price log markup
Levels Changes Levels Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a -0.968 -0.944 0.118 0.109
(0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)***
λ 0.026 0.027 0.115 0.107
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
log capital -0.010 -0.013 -0.013 -0.005
(0.001)*** (0.006)** (0.001)*** (0.002)**
R2 1.00 0.96 0.98 0.98
N 12,111 5,161 12,111 5,161
Regressions in columns 1 and 3 use the manufacturing firms final sample and the levels of all variables,
while columns 2 and 4 use the manufacturing firms within sample and firm-level changes between t − 1
and t. All regressions include a set of year dummies and 8-digit product dummies. Robust standard errors
clustered by firm. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
4.4.2 Services
We estimate revenue-based production functions using the WLD approach by SIC section
and use the estimated coefficients to measure revenue TFP (TFP-R (WLD)) and further
employ the corresponding equations of the MUOMEGA model from Section 4.2 to quantify
markups, the composite of quantity TFP and demand (ω), and production scale.
Production function estimates are reported in Table 4.11 while descriptive statistics
on the various MUOMEGA model components are displayed in Table 4.6 in Section 4.3.
Coefficients are, as expected, on average higher for the labour input in services as com-
pared to manufacturing (a weighted average of 0.446 in services compared to the 0.342 for
manufacturing). The labour input coefficients is particularly high in sections one might
expect, for instance, ‘Q: Human health and social work’, and to a lesser extent in ‘I:
Accommodation and food service’, and low in ‘F: Construction’ and ‘H: Transport and
storage’. The opposite is true for the intermediates coefficient (a weighted average of 0.603
in services compared to 0.636 in manufacturing). Sections like construction and transport
are both at or above 0.8 but most others are well below 0.6. Capital stock coefficients
are small, as typically found in 3-factors production function estimations, and somewhat
noisy, which is likely related to the well-known issue of measurement error particularly
plaguing the capital stock (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995). Finally, there is evidence of
roughly constant or slightly increasing returns to scale.
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Table 4.11: Service industries: Production function coefficients from the WLD
estimation procedure using revenue as a measure of output.
SIC Section log wage bill log intermediates log capital Ret. to scale N
F 0.329 0.862 -0.013 1.178 16,340
(0.019)*** (0.138)*** (0.017)
G 0.499 0.485 0.025 1.009 50,758
(0.006)*** (0.016)*** (0.008)***
H 0.369 0.748 0.028 1.145 10,089
(0.011)*** (0.077)*** (0.016)*
I 0.529 0.503 0.037 1.069 11,948
(0.019)*** (0.054)*** (0.012)***
J 0.463 0.596 0.033 1.093 9,043
(0.013)*** (0.048)*** (0.020)*
L 0.430 0.533 0.032 0.995 4,064
(0.012)*** (0.045)*** (0.010)***
M 0.506 0.546 0.015 1.068 18,336
(0.015)*** (0.057)*** (0.012)
N 0.474 0.553 0.002 1.029 13,169
(0.011)*** (0.085)*** (0.015)
P 0.387 0.508 0.006 0.901 7,326
(0.030)*** (0.060)*** (0.018)
Q 0.690 0.292 0.046 1.028 8,539
(0.009)*** (0.024)*** (0.010)***
RSTU 0.369 0.660 -0.001 1.028 10,236
(0.016)*** (0.055)*** (0.018)
Estimations of Cobb-Douglas revenue production functions by SIC 2007 sector using the WLD method
applied to the final sample of services firms. Regressions include 2-digit industry and year dummies. The
number of observations refers to firms with at least 2-period lags for all variables required in the estimation
procedure. See FMMM for more details. Robust standard errors clustered by firm. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Manufacturing
We next turn to our main results and start by focusing on two features that our quantity
and price data allow us to analyze for manufacturing firms. For manufacturing, we find
more relevant to use the year 2008 to define the pre- and post-crisis periods.
The first feature is about prices, and in particular about the difference between actual
price changes and price index changes and how this impacts the measurement of pro-
ductivity. Producer price indices, and in particular the output price index we have used to
deflate sales in our data, should measure average changes in prices for the same product
over time. Actual price changes, that are typically not observable to researchers but are
observable in our data, instead reflect any changes in prices made by an individual firm and
so include, for example, quality improvements to products or changes to the specification
of a product. The procedure followed by statistical offices to translate actual price changes
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into average price changes for the same product, and so deliver official prices indices, is
complex and beyond the scope of this paper.25 However, all we want to highlight here is
that actual price changes and price index changes are two different things and, in principle,
the difference between the former and the latter, that we label ‘real prices changes’, will
partly reflect product quality improvements. At the same time, real prices changes are
included in standard micro and macro productivity analyses because nominal values are
deflated using prices indices and so what is left does contain real prices changes. This is
the reason why we label as revenue TFP those productivity measures obtained deflating
nominal values with a price index. By contrast, quantity TFP levels and changes are
in our framework derived from actual quantity data expressed in physical units that are
specific to each product (number of items, kilograms, litres, etc.) and, by construction,
the revenue TFP of a firm is the sum of the quantity TFP and the log real price.
Table 4.12, and the companion Figure C.1 in Appendix B, provide information on
changes in actual prices, the official price index and real prices for the manufacturing firm
within sample. More specifically, we start from the firm-product-specific actual prices
changes, and the industry/product-specific output price index changes, between t − 1 to
t and aggregate both changes across firms using revenue weights. At the same time,
we also construct real price changes starting from the differences between actual prices
changes and output price index changes and aggregating them up using again revenue
weights. Table 4.12 indicates that, on average, the official price index rose by 2.8% per
year for manufacturing products over the period 2003-2008 and by 2.3% per year over the
period 2008-2013. Meanwhile, actual prices increased more than the official price index
and particularly so in the post-2008 period. Indeed, real price changes averaged 0.7% per
year over 2003-2008 and a considerably higher 1.5% per year over 2008-2013. Therefore,
irrespective of whether real price changes only reflect product quality improvements or also
other elements, and in this respect the 2.2% real prices drop in 2008 does suggest that
real prices measure more than just quality improvements, these changes actually helped
mitigate the measured productivity slowdown. Indeed, everything else equal, revenue
TFP growth over 2008-2013 would have been 0.8=1.5-0.7 per cent lower had real prices
increased at the same rate as in the period 2003-2008. Tables C.5 and C.6 in Appendix B
further show that this result is robust to considering simple un-weighted changes as well
25See, for example, Office for National Statistics (2014).
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as to using the multi-products firms sample.
Table 4.12: Real, actual and official price index changes
∆ real ∆actual ∆ official
prices prices price index Obs
2004 0.014 0.022 0.008 641
2005 0.010 0.026 0.015 564
2006 0.010 0.034 0.024 617
2007 0.018 0.044 0.027 594
2008 -0.022 0.046 0.068 401
2009 0.042 0.069 0.028 443
2010 0.017 0.036 0.019 496
2011 0.001 0.041 0.040 450
2012 -0.001 0.011 0.011 478
2013 0.016 0.031 0.016 477
2003-2008 0.007 0.034 0.028 2,817
2008-2013 0.015 0.037 0.023 2,344
The Table shows mean revenue-weighted changes from t−1 to t, for the manufacturing firms within sample,
of real and actual prices as well as of the official price index. The final two rows show the mean of changes
over the two periods using all the annual observations.
The second feature we highlight here is that, the availability of both price and quantity
data, allows us to measure demand and in particular demand changes over time. The
demand measures λ̃it and λit obtained from the MULAMA model, that we use below to
analyze the evolution of demand over the time frame 2003-2013, are quite general in that
they allow for Variable Elasticity of Substitution (VES) preferences and for markups to
be different both across firms and across time. In terms of findings, both of our demand
measures λ̃it and λit indicate a significant slowdown of demand post-2008. In this respect,
Figure 4.2 provides complementary evidence of such a slowdown building on a more re-
strictive, albeit more widely used, framework to measure demand and demand changes
over time. More specifically, building on CES preferences and monopolistic competition,
and so constant markups across firms and time, we computed, for a given value of the
elasticity of substitution σ, a firm-product-time-specific demand measure dCESit matching
actual (log) quantity and (log) real price data: qit = d
CES
it − σpit.26 We then computed
within-firm (and product) time changes in dCESit and aggregate them up using revenue
weights to construct a demand measure index based on the year 2008 (2008=100). Fig-
ure 4.2 also provides, for each panel, two regression lines obtained by fitting index yearly
26This measure of demand dCESit = qit + σpit is, for example, used by Khandelwal et al. (2013) and
Stiebale and Vencappa (2018).
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changes between 2003 and 2008 (left regression line) and changes between 2009 and 2013
(right regression line). Figure 4.2 shows two CES demand indices, one constructed using
σ = 5 (left panel) and one constructed using σ = 10 (right panel),27 both pointing towards
a significant slowdown of demand particularly from 2011 onwards. Figure C.2 Appendix
C further show that this result is robust to considering simple un-weighted changes.
Figure 4.2: Manufacturing. CES demand measure for different values of σ
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(b) CES demand measure σ = 10
Indices of changes in CES demand measures (2008=100). Indices are computed for the manufacturing
firms within sample using revenue-weighted changes from t − 1 to t and two alternative values for the
elasticity of substitution: σ = 5 and σ = 10.
We now move to the results obtained from the MULAMA model and report in Table
4.13 mean revenue-weighted changes from t− 1 to t, referring to the manufacturing firms
within sample, in DGKP revenue TFP and its components building on the non-linear de-
composition of equation (4.9). We also report (column 1) mean revenue-weighted changes
in WLD revenue TFP as well as the mean revenue-weighted changes in real prices (column
4). First, we see a similar trend for the DGKP revenue TFP, reported in column 2, to that
illustrated across larger samples in Figure 4.1. The DGKP measure rises at a rate of 1.6
percentage points a year from 2003 to 2008, then falls by 2.2 points in 2008/9, averaging
across the 2008 to 2013 post-crisis period at a rate of 0.6pp per year, and leaving it 5
points below the pre-crisis trend by 2013. The WLD measure displays a similar pattern:
growth of 1.5pp a year through 2008, a drop of 2.3pp in 2008/9 and growing over the 2008
to 2013 post-crisis period at a rate of 0.8 points per year. These results are in line with
the evidence that the dismal post-crisis productivity performance of UK manufacturing
contains a strong productivity, and in particular revenue TFP, component. However, this
paper’s contribution is to disentangle the underlying causes of this revenue TFP drop and
in particular assess whether and how changes in quantity TFP, demand and markups have
27A value of σ between 5 and 10 is what the literature would typically suggest (Anderson and Van
Wincoop, 2004).
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generated the fall.
In this respect, columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.13 provide evidence that quantity TFP a
actually slowed more than revenue TFP in the post-crisis period. The average pre-crisis
TFP-Q growth rate of 0.9% turned into a -0.9% growth rate post-crisis leading to a 9
point gap with respect to the pre-crisis trend by 2013. At the same time, and as already
discussed above, real prices increased substantially more post-2008 switching from a 0.7%
growth rate pre-crisis to a 1.5% growth rate post-crisis. Revenue TFP changes (column
2), are the sum of quantity TFP changes (column 3) and real price changes (column 4),
and so the stronger real prices increase post-2008 helped to contain the fall in revenue
TFP to a 5 point gap with respect to the pre-crisis trend.
Table 4.13: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013.
∆ TFP-R ∆ TFP-R ∆a ∆p ∆λ ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale Obs
(WLD) (DGKP)
2004 0.007 0.021 0.008 0.013 0.232 0.240 0.020 0.040 641
2005 0.011 -0.004 -0.014 0.010 0.029 0.014 0.002 0.021 564
2006 0.020 0.016 0.006 0.010 0.094 0.100 0.007 0.021 617
2007 0.012 0.020 0.003 0.017 0.087 0.090 0.006 0.029 594
2008 0.028 0.022 0.044 -0.022 0.280 0.324 0.028 -0.037 401
2009 -0.023 -0.022 -0.064 0.042 -0.221 -0.284 -0.023 -0.071 443
2010 0.033 0.028 0.012 0.016 -0.009 0.003 -0.000 0.042 496
2011 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.001 0.305 0.328 0.027 0.019 450
2012 -0.008 -0.015 -0.014 -0.001 -0.043 -0.057 -0.003 0.017 478
2013 0.011 0.015 -0.001 0.016 0.187 0.186 0.015 0.024 477
2003-2008 0.015 0.016 0.009 0.007 0.143 0.152 0.013 0.016 2,817
2008-2013 0.008 0.006 -0.009 0.015 0.045 0.036 0.003 0.007 2,344
The Table shows mean revenue-weighted changes from t− 1 to t, for the manufacturing firms within
sample, of WLD and DGKP revenue TFP, of real prices p as well as of the various components of the
revenue TFP non-linear decomposition following from equation (4.9) applied to the DGKP revenue TFP.
The final two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual observations
shown above.
Without information on demand and markups, one would be left wondering what
caused the increase in real prices and how quantity TFP and real price changes translate
into firms’ profit margins and scale of operations. In this respect, column 5 indicates that
demand (as measured by changes in λ) also plunged in 2008-9 and overall slowed down
with respect to the pre-crisis growth trend. Therefore, the increasing real prices post-2008
are likely related to firms passing to consumers the increasing production costs driven
by the declining quantity TFP. The pass-through is incomplete as shown by both the
difference between the TFP-Q drop and the real prices increase with respect to the trend
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(1.8% drop in TFP-Q and 0.8% increase in real prices) and by the decline in markups in
column 7. Indeed, markups sharply declined in 2008-9 and growth slowed thereafter. One
important element to stress at this point is that the decline in demand, as measured by
λ, is on top of the negative effect on sales produced by increasing real prices post-2008.
Indeed, changes in λ measure changes in demand for the same price (and markup), i.e.,
changes in the underlying demand curve.
Therefore the depth of the crisis, and in particular its overall impact on sales, produc-
tion and inputs use, has been particularly severe due to both a supply (TFP-Q a) and
a demand (λ) downturn. This is, for example, reflected in the use of inputs by firms in
column 8 (scale). More specifically, the growth rate of the average inputs bundle turned
from a 1.6% pre-crisis growth rate to a 0.7% post-crisis growth rate, leading to a 4.5%
negative gap with respect to the pre-crisis trend. This is reflected also in the combined
TFP-Q and demand MULAMA component ω = a + λ (column 6) summarizing the neg-
ative supply and demand shocks. In terms of broader implications, the fact that in 2013
scale was up by 3.1% and quantity TFP was down by 4.4% with respect to their 2008
levels implies, given that (log) quantity is equal to TFP-Q plus scale at the firm-level as
well as in our aggregation, that quantities sold in 2013 were still 1.3% below their levels
back in 2008.
Figure 4.3 presents the results graphically. We construct an index for each variable,
setting 2008 as the reference year with a value of 100 so that the graph shows the percentage
deviation in the index. Figure 4.3 also provides two regression lines obtained by fitting
index yearly changes between 2003 and 2008 (left regression line) and changes between
2009 and 2013 (right regression line). Panels (a) and (b) show quite neatly the break
in WLD and DGKP revenue productivity growth before and after 2008 while panels (c)
and (d) highlight the more severe downturn in quantity TFP and the mitigating effect of
real prices. At the same time, panels (e) and (f) show the downturn in demand and the
overall combined change in the pattern of ω. Furthermore, panels (f) and (g) display the
post-2008 decline in the evolution of markups and production scale. Finally, Table C.7
in Appendix C-2 shows formal Chow test results regarding the presence of a structural
break for some key variables. As can be appreciated from Table C.7, there is indeed strong
support for the presence of a structural break in 2008.
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Figure 4.3: Manufacturing. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013.
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Indices (2008=100) calculated using revenue-weighted changes between t− 1 and t for the within sample
of manufacturing firms. Panels (a) and (b) refer to revenue TFP computed using the WLD method and
DGKP method, respectively. Panels (c)-(h) show real prices and components of the DGKP revenue TFP
following from equation (4.9).
A common approach in the literature on the UK productivity puzzle is to decompose
the shortfall in labour productivity into contributions of changes in factor inputs and TFP
or, to be more precise, factor inputs and revenue TFP as highlighted by equation (4.13)
in Section 4.2. Growth accounting exercises using sectoral national accounts data find
that the labour productivity puzzle turns out to be a revenue TFP puzzle (Goodridge
et al., 2013). That is, after accounting for changes to capital and labour inputs, the bulk
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of the ‘lost’ growth over 2008-2013 was due to a slower rate of revenue TFP growth.
More similar to our paper, is a bottom-up econometric approach that estimates revenue-
based production functions to obtain inputs parameters and firm-level TFP in Harris
and Moffat (2017).28 Harris and Moffat (2017) find that while in services the decline in
labour productivity growth is mostly the result of a decline in revenue TFP growth, in
manufacturing there is no revenue TFP puzzle: weighted plant-level revenue TFP barely
changed or grew in the 2008-12 period. Instead, a measured 19% decline over 2007-12 in
labour productivity is entirely due to changes in the intensity of inputs and in particular
the log intermediates per labour ratio ∆(mit − lit) in (4.13).
Table 4.14: Manufacturing. Standard labour productivity decomposition (factor
proportions version) over the period 2003-2013.
∆(r − l) ∆ TFP-R γ∆l (αM )∆(m− l) (αK)∆(k − l) Obs
(DGKP)
2004 0.062 0.035 -0.000 0.026 0.001 641
2005 0.012 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.001 564
2006 0.044 0.023 -0.000 0.024 -0.002 617
2007 0.040 0.019 0.000 0.021 0.000 594
2008 -0.035 0.006 0.000 -0.038 -0.002 401
2009 -0.092 -0.046 -0.000 -0.042 -0.004 443
2010 0.118 0.042 -0.000 0.074 0.002 496
2011 0.038 0.030 0.000 0.009 -0.001 450
2012 -0.012 -0.008 0.000 -0.004 0.000 478
2013 0.007 0.011 0.000 -0.005 0.000 477
2003-2008 0.027 0.018 0.000 0.009 -0.001 2,817
2008-2013 0.012 0.006 0.000 0.006 -0.000 2,344
See equation (4.13) in Section 4.2 for the derivation of this standard labour productivity decomposition.
Final two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual observations shown
above. Computations refer to revenue-weighted changes for the within sample of manufacturing firms.
Table 4.14 shows this standard labour productivity decomposition over the period 2003-
2013 for our revenue-weighted manufacturing firms within sample.29 Results indicate that
manufacturing labour productivity growth in the period 2003-2008 was around 2.7pp a
year and, while experiencing significant drops in 2008 and 2009, increased on average by
28It builds on previous work that estimates plant-level TFP (Harris and Drinkwater, 2000)
29In our analysis we use the firm wage bill, not the number of workers, as a measure of the labour
input because we do not want potential changes in worker quality to affect the results. However, to
show how changes in demand, TFP-Q and markups are important for labour productivity, it makes little
sense to consider the (log of the) ratio between revenue and the wage bill on the left hand side of the
decomposition. Instead we use, in our labour productivity decompositions, the (log) number of full-time-
equivalent employees as a measure of the labour input and, in order to make sure that the decomposition
goes through, we borrow our estimate of the output elasticity of labour, α̂L, and recompute TFP-Q, TFP-R
and scale accordingly. As can be appreciated from Table 4.14, this makes little difference in terms of the
patterns of TFP-Q, TFP-R and scale so far discussed.
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Table 4.15: Manufacturing. More detailed labour productivity decomposition
(factor proportions version) over the period 2003-2013.
∆(r − l) ∆(a/µ) ∆(λ/µ) ∆[(γ+1µ − 1)l] αM∆(
m−l
µ ) αK∆(
k−l
µ ) Obs
2004 0.062 -0.056 0.300 -0.139 -0.042 -0.001 641
2005 0.012 -0.012 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.001 564
2006 0.044 0.044 0.050 -0.053 0.005 -0.002 617
2007 0.040 -0.060 0.138 -0.035 -0.003 -0.001 594
2008 -0.035 -0.124 0.357 -0.151 -0.112 -0.005 401
2009 -0.092 0.011 -0.312 0.171 0.040 -0.002 443
2010 0.118 -0.020 0.082 -0.012 0.066 0.002 496
2011 0.038 -0.103 0.354 -0.150 -0.061 -0.003 450
2012 -0.012 0.002 -0.071 0.039 0.017 0.001 478
2013 0.007 -0.082 0.234 -0.091 -0.054 -0.001 477
2003-2008 0.027 -0.040 0.169 -0.074 -0.027 -0.002 2,817
2008-2013 0.012 -0.038 0.059 -0.009 0.001 -0.001 2,344
See equation (4.15) in Section 4.2 for the derivation of this more detailed labour productivity
decomposition. Final two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual
observations shown above. Computations refer to revenue-weighted changes for the within sample of
manufacturing firms.
only 1.2pp a year in the period 2008-2013 ending up almost 8pp below its per-crisis trend
(more if considering 2003-2007 as the baseline period). Column 2 of Table 4.14 indicates
that the main culprit of this under-performance is the drop in revenue TFP growth which
changed from about 1.8pp a year in the period 2003-2008 to 0.6pp per year post-2008,
i.e., [(1.8 − 0.6)/(2.7 − 1.2)]=80% of the labour productivity growth slowdown.30 The
remaining 20% is almost entirely accounted for by a reduction of the log intermediates to
labour ratio, i.e., the term ∆(m− l).
Table 4.15, based on the more involved decomposition provided by equation (4.15) in
Section 4.2, provides deeper insights on the decline in labour productivity by highlighting
the role of demand, quantity TFP and markups. Markup-adjusted TFP-Q barely changed
its growth rate in the two periods 2003-2008 and 2008-2013 while the largest growth rate
drop is related to markup-adjusted demand λ̃ experiencing a decline from the 16.9pp
per year average over 2003-2008 to only 5.9pp post-2008. At the same time, the related
slowdown of markups seen in Table 4.13 helped to contain the fall in labour productivity
through an increase in the average yearly growth rate of the markup-adjusted labour term
(∆[(γ+1µ − 1)l]) and intermediates over labour term (αM∆(
m−l
µ )).
31 Markup-adjusted
30Numbers for DGKP revenue TFP in column 2 of Tables 4.13 and 4.14 are slightly different because in
the latter case we use, as indicated in a previous footnote, the number of employees rather than the wage
bill as a measure of the labour input.
31From the expressions of these two terms it appears clearly how a reduction in markups µ increases both.
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capital over labour changes only weakly contributed throughout.
4.5.2 Services
Using the within sample for services, and weighting observations by revenues, we report
in Table 4.16 mean changes from t − 1 to t in WLD revenue TFP and its components
building on the decomposition of equation (4.16). For services, we find more relevant to
use the year 2007 to define the pre- and post-crisis periods.
First, revenue TFP growth in services was already rather weak before the crisis with
an average of 0.2pp per year in the period 2003-2007. This further weakened after the
crisis falling to 0.1pp per year over 2007-2013. In this respect, column 2 of Table 4.16
suggests (like for manufacturing) that a decline in the composite quantity TFP and demand
component ω has been driving the weakening of TFP-R growth in services. At the same
time, columns 3 and 4 indicate that this process has been accompanied by a decline in
markups and production scale growth, which is again in line with the evidence provided
above for manufacturing. Overall, this turned into a weakening of markup-adjusted ω
(column 5) while the reduction in markups helped, like in manufacturing, containing the
fall in revenue TFP through the increase in markup-adjusted scale (column 6), with the
two adjusted components adding up to the overall change in revenue TFP as from equation
(4.16).
Figure 4.4 presents the results graphically and it is constructed in the same way as
Figure 4.3 for manufacturing except that we now set 2007 as the reference year. Panels
(a) and (b) show quite neatly the break in revenue TFP and ω before and after 2007
while panels (c) and (d) highlight the decline in the evolution of markups and production
scale. Panels (e) and (f) visualize the downturn in adjusted ω and the counter-increase in
adjusted scale helping to contain the overall fall in TFP-R. Finally, Table C.8 in Appendix
C-2 shows formal Chow test results confirming the presence of a structural break around
2007.
Table 4.17 shows the standard labour productivity decomposition over the period 2003-
Markups are endogenous in the MULAMA/MUOMEGA models and their equilibrium level (determined
by profit maximization) increases with both TFP-Q and demand. A fall in demand and/or TFP-Q thus
pushes markups to decrease and this decrease in markups helps firms to contain the fall in both profits
and revenue TFP.
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Table 4.16: Services. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013.
∆ TFP-R ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale ∆ adjusted ω ∆ adjusted Obs
(WLD) scale
2004 0.004 0.154 0.011 0.044 0.070 -0.066 8,387
2005 -0.006 0.028 0.001 0.044 0.002 -0.007 7,813
2006 -0.001 -0.032 -0.005 0.044 0.038 -0.039 6,438
2007 0.008 0.258 0.019 0.042 0.101 -0.092 6,266
2008 -0.020 -0.185 -0.015 0.016 -0.090 0.070 5,674
2009 -0.002 0.042 0.005 -0.041 -0.011 0.010 6,493
2010 0.011 0.124 0.009 0.014 0.068 -0.057 6,079
2011 -0.000 -0.203 -0.018 0.017 -0.088 0.088 5,966
2012 0.017 0.141 0.009 0.022 0.073 -0.056 6,404
2013 -0.002 -0.066 -0.006 0.031 0.006 -0.008 6,626
2003-2007 0.002 0.104 0.007 0.043 0.053 -0.052 28,904
2007-2013 0.001 -0.021 -0.002 0.010 -0.005 0.006 37,242
The Table shows mean revenue-weighted changes from t− 1 to t, for the services firms within sample, of
WLD revenue TFP as well as of the various MUOMEGA model components following from the linear
revenue-TFP decomposition provided by equation (4.16) and applied to WLD revenue TFP. The final
two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual observations shown above.
2013 for our revenue-weighted services firms within sample.32 Results indicate that services
labour productivity growth in the period 2003-2007 was about 0.8pp a year and, while
experiencing large drops in 2008 and 2009, decreased on average by 1.1pp a year in the
period 2007-2013 ending up around 11.4pp below its per-crisis trend. Column 2 of Table
4.17 indicates that a key culprit of this under-performance is the drop in revenue TFP
growth which changed from a positive 0.3pp a year in the period 2003-2007 to a negative
-0.6pp per year post-2007, i.e., [(0.3 + 0.6)/(0.8 + 1.1)]=47.4% of the labour productivity
growth slowdown.33 The remaining share is almost entirely accounted for by a reduction
of the log intermediates to labour ratio, i.e., the term ∆(m− l).
Table 4.18 provides further insights on the decline in labour productivity by highlighting
the combined role of demand and TFP-Q as well as of markups. Markup-adjusted ω
experienced a strong growth decline from the 6.5pp per year average over 2003-2007 to
only 0.1pp post-2007. At the same time, the related slowdown of markups helped to
32As in the case of manufacturing we use, in our labour productivity decompositions, the (log) number
of full-time-equivalent employees as a measure of the labour input and, in order to make sure that the
decomposition goes through, we borrow our estimate of the output elasticity of labour, α̂L, and recompute
ω, TFP-R and scale accordingly. As can be appreciated from Table 4.17, this makes little difference in
terms of the overall patterns of ω, TFP-R and scale so far discussed.
33Numbers for WLD revenue TFP in column 1 of Table 4.16 and column 2 of Table 4.17 are different
because in the latter case we use, as indicated in a previous footnote, the number of employees rather than
the wage bill as a measure of the labour input.
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Figure 4.4: Services. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013.
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Index of revenue TFP (2007=100) calculated using revenue-weighted changes in mean annual value and
measured using the WLD method (a) for the within sample of services firms. Panels (b)-(f) show indices
of components of the WLD revenue TFP following from the decomposition (4.16).
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Table 4.17: Services. Standard labour productivity decomposition (factor
proportions version) over the period 2003-2013.
∆(r − l) ∆ TFP-R γ∆l (αM )∆(m− l) (αK)∆(k − l) Obs
(WLD)
2004 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001 8,387
2005 0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 7,813
2006 0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.001 6,438
2007 0.009 0.011 0.002 -0.005 0.001 6,266
2008 -0.049 -0.036 0.008 -0.021 -0.000 5,674
2009 -0.069 -0.024 -0.001 -0.043 -0.002 6,493
2010 0.039 0.017 -0.001 0.022 0.001 6,079
2011 -0.003 -0.009 -0.000 0.007 0.000 5,966
2012 0.011 0.013 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 6,404
2013 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.000 6,626
2003-2007 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 28,904
2007-2013 -0.011 -0.006 0.001 -0.006 -0.000 37,242
See equation (4.13) in Section 4.2 for the derivation of this standard labour productivity decomposition.
Final two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual observations shown
above. Computations refer to revenue-weighted changes for the within sample of services firms.
Table 4.18: Services. More detailed labour productivity decomposition (factor
proportions version) over the period 2003-2013.
∆(r − l) ∆(ω/µ) ∆[(γ+1µ − 1)l] αM∆(
m−l
µ ) αK∆(
k−l
µ ) Obs
2004 0.011 0.062 -0.041 -0.011 0.000 8,387
2005 0.004 0.002 0.006 -0.004 0.001 7,813
2006 0.007 0.033 -0.020 -0.005 -0.001 6,438
2007 0.009 0.091 -0.059 -0.024 0.001 6,266
2008 -0.049 -0.092 0.051 -0.009 0.001 5,674
2009 -0.069 -0.031 0.006 -0.043 -0.002 6,493
2010 0.039 0.062 -0.033 0.009 0.001 6,079
2011 -0.003 -0.084 0.055 0.025 0.000 5,966
2012 0.011 0.065 -0.038 -0.016 0.000 6,404
2013 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 6,626
2003-2007 0.008 0.047 -0.029 -0.011 0.000 28,904
2007-2013 -0.011 -0.011 0.005 -0.006 0.000 37,242
See equation (4.17) in Section 4.2 for the derivation of this more detailed labour productivity
decomposition. Final two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual
observations shown above. Computations refer to revenue-weighted changes for the within sample of
services firms.
contain the fall in labour productivity through a substantial improvement in the average
yearly growth rate of the markup-adjusted labour term (∆[(γ+1µ − 1)l]) and intermediates
over labour term (αM∆(
m−l
µ )).
34 Finally, markup-adjusted capital over labour changes
only weakly contributed throughout.
34As already highlighted above, markups are endogenous in the MULAMA/MUOMEGA models and
their equilibrium level (determined by profit maximization) increases with ω. A fall in ω thus pushes
markups to decrease and this decrease in markups helps firms to contain the fall in both profits and
revenue TFP.
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4.5.3 Comparing services with manufacturing
The evidence provided so far for manufacturing and services points to very similar patterns,
although with somewhat different magnitudes, in terms of the common measures. More
specifically, our results indicate that the labour productivity puzzle is to a large extent
also a revenue TFP puzzle while the downturn in revenue TFP has been largely driven by
a decline in the combined TFP-Q and demand component ω, to which firms have reacted
by decreasing both markups and production scale. In turn, this decrease of markups
and production scale has helped in containing the negative impact of the less favourable
post-crisis environment on TFP-R and so also on labour productivity.
Figure 4.5: Investment patterns in manufacturing and services over the period
2004-2013.
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Mean firm annual real investments in the capital stock in manufacturing and services. Computations
refer to the manufacturing and services within samples and are revenue-weighted.
In the case of manufacturing, our data allows us to go one step further and in par-
ticular assess whether the reduction in ω has been TFP-Q and/or demand driven. The
answer to that question is that both a supply and a demand shock have negatively af-
fected manufacturing revenue TFP. Our data does not allow us to directly answer the
question for services. However we might conjecture, based on one key element, that sup-
ply (and possibly also demand) contributed to the overall downturn of services TFP-R.
More specifically, we believe that the capital stock available to firms, which is generated by
yearly investments, is the production input most closely related to the level of technology,
i.e., quantity TFP used in the production process. In this respect, Figure 4.5 shows the
mean, across firms and revenue-weighted, annual level of real investments in the capital
stock in manufacturing (left panel) and services (right panel) over 2004-2013. The timing
and depth of the decrease in investments and subsequent recovery are somewhat different
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between manufacturing and services but the overall picture is rather similar: a deep slump
around the financial crisis and a sizeable (especially in manufacturing) recovery thereafter.
Given that the fall in investments in manufacturing has turned into a sizeable post-crisis
drop in TFP-Q, we can conjecture that a sizeable post-crisis drop in TFP-Q for services
is also likely.
4.6 Robustness
In what follows we provide evidence supporting the robustness of our results by using
different samples, different weighting schemes, different estimation techniques as well as a
Translog production function.
Using the multi-product firms sample for manufacturing. In our main analysis
for manufacturing we focus on single-product firms because dealing with multi-product
firms requires a number of additional assumptions. However, multi-product firms ac-
count for a large share of production and revenue in manufacturing. In order to analyse
multi-product firms we proceed as in FMMM and DGKP, i.e., we break them down into
several single-product firms by using a procedure to assign firm-level inputs to the dif-
ferent products produced by a multi-product firm (inputs assignment problem). In doing
so, we then consider again within firm and product changes between t − 1 and t and
weigh observations based on the corresponding firm-product-specific revenue. Results dis-
played in Table C.9 and Figure C.3 indicate that our key insights apply to the sample of
multi-product manufacturing firms too.
Using un-weighted or employment-weighted values. So far we have always con-
sidered firm revenue in order to weight observations because we want our results to be
representative of aggregate rather than average-firm outcomes. However, in Tables C.10
and C.11, and corresponding Figures C.4 and C.5, we provide results obtained using un-
weighted changes. As can be appreciated from the two Tables and Figures, our baseline
results are virtually unaffected. At the same time, Tables C.12 and C.13, and corres-
ponding Figures C.6 and C.7, show results obtained using firm employment to weight
observations and still confirm the robustness of our findings.
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Using alternative estimation procedures. In our baseline results, we use the DGKP
estimation procedure to estimate the production function and recover the different com-
ponents of the MULAMA model for manufacturing, while for services we use the WLD
estimation procedure to estimate the production function and recover the different com-
ponents of the restricted MUOMEGA model. In order to assess the robustness of our
results to the specific estimation technique employed we provide in Tables C.14 and C.15,
as well as in Figures C.8 and C.9, results obtained using the FMMM estimation procedures
for the MULAMA model (manufacturing) and MUOMEGA model (services). This new
set of results is again in line with our baseline findings.
Using the Translog production function for manufacturing. The limited over-
lap between the Prodcom and ARDx datasets force us to estimate a unique production
function for manufacturing firms rather than estimate different production functions for
different 2-digit industries. In this respect, results provided in Table C.16 and Figure C.10,
and obtained using the more flexible Translog production function, allay concerns about
the issue of heterogeneity in output elasticities across firms and industries in manufactur-
ing.
4.7 Conclusions
In this paper we provide novel evidence that UK firms’ poor productivity performance
post-2008 is due to a downturn in both quantity TFP and demand pushing down sales,
markups and revenue TFP, as well as labour productivity. More specifically, in the first
part of our analysis we focus on manufacturing firms and use information on firm-level
prices and quantities to measure firm-level quantity TFP by building upon the frameworks
developed in De Loecker et al. (2016) and Forlani et al. (2016). This allows us to further
quantify firm-level demand and markups and, while aggregating-up the information at
the manufacturing industry-level, compare the evolution of TFP-Q, markups and demand
before and after 2008. Finally, we exploit two exact decompositions for TFP-R and labour
productivity to show how changes in TFP-Q, markups and demand have affected the two
productivity measures. Our results suggest that both a slowing down of demand and a
decline in quantity TFP, and the related markups fall, are behind the decline in revenue
TFP and labour productivity in manufacturing.
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In the second part of our analysis, we instead consider service industries and estimate a
restricted version of the model due to the absence of reliable and meaningful information
on prices. In doing so we find, for those measures that are common to both the full and
restricted versions of the model, very similar patterns to those obtained for manufacturing.
These findings, along with the absence of noticeable differences in capital investments
patterns between manufacturing and services industries, lead us to conjecture that both
supply and demand also contributed to the poor revenue TFP and labour productivity
performance of UK service industries.
We believe that our results are important for at least two reasons. First, they are
informative about the long-term impacts of the Great Recession. A fall in quantity TFP,
due for example to a decline in the rate of technical progress, represents a permanent loss
of productive potential with substantial long-term implications for the economy. By con-
trast a demand downturn, due for example to a prolonged general climate of uncertainty,
could have less permanent consequences. Second, they are informative about the policies
that could more effectively address the weak growth of labour productivity and revenue
TFP post-crisis. In particular, our findings suggest that government policies should more
prominently act towards boosting demand for UK firms rather than focusing only on
productivity.
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
In this thesis I have exploited recent advances in estimating firm-level quantity-based
production functions to bring a new perspective on three long-standing questions of interest
to economists. First, I have asked whether improvements in product quality have a role
to play in a rise in price-marginal cost markups that have been observed following tariff
reductions during the Indian trade liberalisation of the 1990s. Then, together with a
co-author, I have asked whether the well-known finding that (revenue) productivity rises
with city size is due to firms being better able to turn a basket of physical inputs into
output (quantity TFP), or does it arise because large-city based firms are able to charge
higher prices? And finally, again with my co-author, I have explored UK firms’ post-crisis
productivity performance to ask if the fall in the growth rate of labour productivity and
revenue TFP is due to supply-side or demand-side factors.
To answer these questions I have made use of detailed quantity, prices and revenue
data for India, France and the UK respectively, and used it to first estimate quantity-
based production functions and then, building on FMMM, quantified heterogeneity in
TFP, demand and markups across firms.
In particular, Chapter 2 provided evidence that the impacts of the tariff liberalization
on prices, marginal costs and markups are driven by the reductions in input tariffs that
allowed firms to raise product quality. While both DGKP and my paper show factory gate
prices falling by less than marginal costs, implying that firms received most of the benefits
of the trade liberalization, the finding in my paper that product quality rose along with
markups is evidence that consumers benefited alongside firms. Chapter 2 also provided
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evidence consistent with two findings in the literature otherwise difficult to reconcile: that
the Indian trade reform raised within-firm productivity; and that it was not associated
with high product churn, i.e., the dropping by firms of badly-performing products. Instead,
product quality and quantity TFP gains were concentrated in previously laggard products
as lower input tariffs relaxed constraints.
In Chapter 3 we aggregated measures of TFP, demand and markups for French man-
ufacturing firms to the regional level. Our results indicate that first, that market shares
across firms with heterogeneous productivities are better allocated in denser areas than
less-dense areas, so amplifying in aggregate revenue-weighted figures firm-level differences
in productivity across space. Second, a substantial portion of the aggregate revenue pro-
ductivity advantage of denser areas stems from product composition effects. And third,
that manufacturing firms located in denser areas are not necessarily characterized by a
significantly higher quantity TFP, but they do have a revenue TFP advantage due to
their capacity to produce and sell higher demand products at higher prices and in larger
quantities with lower markups compared to firms located in less dense areas. They also
produce products with higher marginal costs and part of these higher costs reflects higher
product quality.
Chapter 4 provides novel evidence that UK firms’ poor productivity performance post-
2008 was due to a downturn in both quantity TFP and demand pushing down sales,
markups and revenue TFP, as well as labour productivity. Our results suggest that both
a slowing down of demand and a decline in quantity TFP, and the related markups fall,
are behind the decline in revenue TFP and labour productivity in manufacturing. In
the service industries we find, for those measures that are common to both the full and
restricted versions of the model, very similar patterns to those obtained for manufacturing.
What is common to the results presented in all three chapters is the evidence they show
of an important role for factors other than quantity TFP in measures of firm performance:
product quality/appeal in the response of firms to lower tariffs in India (Chapter 2),
and the revenue productivity of firms in France (Chapter 3); or demand-side conditions to
firms’ labour productivity and revenue TFP after the financial crisis in the UK (Chapter 4);
and the allocation of resources between firms to regional differences in revenue productivity
again in France.
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With detailed production datasets becoming more widely available, being able to dis-
entangle price changes from revenue productivity, demand and markups promises many
possible avenues for future research on a variety of topics linked to firm productivity.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2: Trade
Reform Redux: Prices, Markups
and Product Quality
A-1 Replication of DGKP results
This Appendix describes how my dataset replicates the main results presented in DGKP.
As described in Section 2.5, the preparation of my estimation sample delivers a sample size
of 27,504 firm-product-year observations, substantially more than the 21,246 in DGKP,
however this delivers quantitatively similar and qualitatively the same main results. I start
by showing in Table A.1 that although there are some large differences in mean industry-
level markups between DGKP and my data this is likely driven by outliers since the
medians are in almost all cases quite close. For instance, in NIC industry 31, “Electrical
machinery & communications”, DGKP report a mean markup of 5.66 while I find a mean
of 2.77, but both datasets deliver a median of 1.43.
DGKP present four key empirical results. Exploiting variation within firm-product
pairs they show (1) the pass-through of marginal cost to prices is incomplete; (2) that
the large fall in output tariffs over the 1989-1997 period is associated with only a small
fall in prices; (3) that the fall in input tariffs reduced marginal costs – and hence via (1),
generated higher markups; and (4) that when controlling for marginal cost in a regression
of markups on output tariffs so as to estimate the pure pro-competitive effect of trade
reform, that these effects helped to moderate the rise in markups.
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Table A.1: Markups by sector
Original New
Sector Mean Median Mean Median
15 Food products & beverages 1.78 1.15 1.68 1.29
17 Textiles, apparel 1.57 1.33 1.96 1.48
21 Paper & paper products 1.22 1.21 1.86 1.54
24 Chemicals 2.25 1.36 2.03 1.26
25 Rubber & plastic 4.52 1.37 1.62 1.29
26 Nonmetallic mineral products 4.57 2.27 3.24 1.57
27 Basic metals 2.54 1.20 1.69 1.21
28 Fabricated metal products 3.70 1.36 1.75 1.14
29 Machinery & equipment 2.48 1.34 2.48 1.33
31 Electrical machinery & communications 5.66 1.43 2.77 1.43
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 4.64 1.39 2.39 1.20
Average 2.70 1.34 2.01 1.34
Notes: Table shows mean and median markups by sector for the 1989-2003 sample. ’Original’ shows
results from DGKP, Table VI, page 483, while ’New’ shows the dataset from this paper. Both use a +/-
3% trimming of the markup distribution by sector.
To show incomplete pass-through, DGKP start by re-writing the identity pfjt = lnmcfjt+
lnµfjt by splitting markups into a time-invariant firm-product component and the time-
varying deviation:
pfjt = lnµfj + lnmcfjt + (lnµfjt − lnµfj) (A-1)
If markups are variable then DGKP argue the deviation of the markup from its average will
be correlated with marginal costs. When firms face a demand curve that features a price
elasticity of demand that is increasing in price, an increase in marginal cost that raises
price will be associated with a higher elasticity and a lower profit-maximising markup.
Marginal costs will then be negatively correlated with markups, so pass-through of changes
in marginal cost to changes in price will be incomplete. DGKP argue that any demand
system that delivers variable markups will also deliver incomplete pass-through. In the
data, there indeed appears to be a strong correlation between markups and marginal cost.
Figure A.1 uses the same within firm-product pair variation used in the main analysis,
demeaning log markups and log marginal cost by firm-product fixed effects, to show a
strong negative relationship between markups and marginal costs.
To estimate the degree of pass-through DGKP run an OLS regression of (log) prices
on (log) marginal cost and (log) markups at the firm-product-year level, together with
firm-product fixed effects:
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Figure A.1: Markups vs. Marginal cost
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Notes: Markups and marginal costs demeaned by firm-product-year fixed effects. Outliers of +/- 3% of
markup and marginal cost trimmed.
pfjt = αfj + ζ lnmcfjt + εfjt (A-2)
If markups were constant we would find full pass-through ζ̂ = 1 and a perfect fit of the
regression line (εfjt = 0), but with variable markups we would find ζ̂ < 1, i.e. incomplete
pass-through. However, estimation of (A-2) via OLS would only yield unbiased estimates
of ζ if marginal cost could be directly observed. Using ln m̂cfjt introduces measurement
error, leading to downward biased ζ̂ and risking erroneously finding incomplete pass-
through. To deal with this issue, DGKP instrument for marginal costs using input tariffs
(which vary only at the industry level) and lagged marginal costs (which vary at the
firm-product level). They do not require these lagged marginal costs to be uncorrelated
with the error term from (A-2), only uncorrelated with the measurement error, since the
correlation between markups and marginal costs is exactly what ζ should measure. In
some specifications they add a second lag of marginal cost in order to assuage concerns
about serial correlation in the errors.
DGKP report results from running the pass-through regression (A-2) using OLS (find-
ing a coefficient of 0.337, significant at the 1% level), and with the IV approach that
V
instruments for marginal cost with input tariffs and once lagged marginal cost (coefficient
of 0.305, significant at 1% level) and that instruments for marginal cost using input tariffs
and the second lag of marginal costs (coefficient of 0.406, significant at the 10.1% level).
However it is not clear from these results whether it is the use of the instrumental variables
to deal with measurement error that is driving the change in estimates, or whether it is
the smaller sample sizes associated with using one or two lags of data. I use the replication
data file to confirm that repeating the OLS regression using the first-lag IV sample deliv-
ers a coefficient of 0.264 (significant at 1% level), while using the second-lag IV sample
with OLS delivers a coefficient of 0.240 (significant at 1% level). These OLS coefficients
are both smaller than the comparable IV estimates using the same samples, indicating
that the use of instruments does appear to remove the downward bias in the pass-through
coefficient that stems from measurement error. However, as the sample size reduces as
the lag structure increases, so does the estimated coefficient, meaning it is not clear that
DGKP and this paper do not continue to underestimate the degree of pass-through.
Table A.2: Passthrough of marginal costs to prices
ln price
(1) (2) (3)
lnmc 0.413 0.303 0.370
(0.029)*** (0.055)*** (0.044)***
R2 0.35 0.29
N 27,504 15,848 15,848
Firm-product FEs yes yes yes
Instruments - yes -
First-stage F-stat 64.8
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Corresponds to DGKP, Table VII, p.488. Standard errors clustered by firm. All regressions
include a constant and firm-product fixed effects. Column 1 reports OLS results, column 2 instruments
log of marginal cost with input tariffs and the first lag of marginal costs, column 3 reports OLS results
using the same sample as column 2. First stage F-stat is the F test statistic corresponding to the excluded
instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. R2 is the Within R-squared.
Table A.2 shows that results using my dataset are qualitatively similar to DGKP with
a low degree of pass-through, a coefficient of 0.413 in column (1). As discussed above, I
may be underestimating due to measurement error in marginal costs. Column (2) repeats
the IV approach of DGKP and finds that the coefficient falls to 0.303, from a sample of
around half the size due to the need for lagged values as instruments. In column (3), I use
the same, smaller, sample to run the OLS regression and find that the smaller sample by
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itself delivers a lower value of ζ̂, making conclusions about the true value imprecise but
indicating that pass-through is far from complete.
Having established this basic feature of the data, DGKP’s second key result is the
finding that the 62 percentage point lowering of output tarrifs during the Indian trade
liberalisation from 1989-1997 was associated with a reduction of (real) prices of just 10.4%.
To do so, they estimate (A-3), using variation within firm-product pairs.
pfjt = αfj + αst + β1τ
out
it + εfjt (A-3)
They report a β1 of 0.136 (significant at 5%) when controlling for year fixed effects
and a β1 of 0.167 (significant at 1%) when controlling for sector-year fixed effects (so
controlling for industry-specific cycles). This estimate implies that a 10pp fall in output
tariffs reduces prices by 1.67%, and by multiplying the coefficient by the average tariff
change over the period, the overall impact is calculated as a 10.4% decline in prices, with
a standard error of 3.3 (significant at the 1% level).
My estimates of β1, shown in Table A.3, are slightly higher but qualitatively identical.
The output average tariff change in my data is 68.3 percentage points, which leads to an
overall impact on prices of -12.1% (significant at 1%) when using sector-year fixed effects.
Table A.3: Prices and output tariffs
ln price ln price
τ output 0.145 0.177
(0.069)** (0.050)***
R2 0.01 0.03
N 27,504 27,504
Firm-product FEs Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes No
Sector-Year FEs No Yes
Overall impact -9.9 -12.1
Standard error 4.7 3.4
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Notes: Corresponds to DGKP, Table VIII, p.490. Standard errors clustered by industry. All regressions
include a constant and firm-product fixed effects. Column 1 reports OLS results with year fixed effects and
column 2 reports OLS results with sector×year fixed effects. The last two rows use the average decline in
output tariffs of 68pp to compute the mean and standard error of the impact on prices. R2 is the Within
R-squared.
The third key result is to build on evidence from Amiti and Konings (2007) and oth-
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ers, that firms’ responses to the fall in input tariffs associated with trade reform are an
important part of the adjustment. By estimating (A-4), separately including output and
input tariffs, DGKP show the independent effects of output and input tariffs. Results for
my data are shown in Column (1) of Table A.4.
pfjt = αfj + αst + β1τ
out
it + β2τ
in
it + εfjt (A-4)
Controlling for input tariffs barely changes the coefficient on output tariffs estimated
in Table A.3 column (2), while the coefficient on input tariffs itself is not different from
zero at any reasonable level of significance. This suggests firms adjust prices to demand-
side conditions but not to changes to supply-side inputs-market conditions. This result is
similar to that found by DGKP – a 0.156 output tariff coefficient, significant at 1% level
and a 0.352 coefficient on input tariffs, not significant at any reasonable level. For an
overall effect of trade reform on prices, DGKP find an 18.1% fall, significant at 5%, larger
and more precise than the 11.2% fall in my data, largely due to the influence of a larger,
if still imprecise, effect of input tariffs.
Table A.4: Regressions of prices, marginal costs and markups on output and
input tariffs
ln price lnmc lnµ
τ output 0.1788 0.0664 0.1125
(0.0590)*** (0.0591) (0.0647)*
τ input -0.0385 0.7862 -0.8247
(0.5066) (0.4408)* (0.2952)***
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01
N 27,504 27,504 27,504
Firm-product FEs Yes Yes Yes
Sector-Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Overall impact -11.2 -23.9 12.7
Standard error 10.6 9.0 6.2
Notes: Corresponds to DGKP, Table IX, p.491. Standard errors clustered by industry. All regressions
include a constant, firm-product fixed effects and sector×year fixed effects. The last two rows use the
average decline in output tariffs of 68pp and the averge decline of 24pp in input tariffs to compute the
mean and standard error of the overall impact on prices. R2 is the Within R-squared. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Since log prices are the sum of log marginal costs and log markups, running (A-4)
with first lnmcfjt and then lnµfjt as the left hand side variable, provides estimates of
coefficients that sum to the change in prices, allowing a deeper understanding of the change
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in prices.
Column (2) shows results for marginal costs: a change in output tariffs has no significant
effect, while a 10pp fall in input tariffs is associated with a 7.86% fall in marginal costs.
Over the course of the liberalisation, the fall in both tariffs reduced firms’ marginal costs
by 23.9% – far more than 11.2% reduction in factory-gate prices. Column (3) shows how
the effects of price and marginal cost changes associated with tariff changes led to changes
in markups. The fall in output tariffs, leading to lower prices but largely unchanged
marginal costs weakly acts to reduce markups. However, it is the fall in input tariffs that
sharply reduces marginal costs without much affecting pricing that strongly acts to raise
markups. The combined impact of the tariff changes is to raise markups by an estimated
12.7%.
These results are again similar to those found by DGKP. They report a somewhat
larger effect of input tariffs on marginal cost (and consequently, a larger overall effect of
trade reform of -30.7%), but similar effects on markups (overall effect of 12.6% although
less-precisely estimated with a standard error of 11.9).
The fourth key result presented by DGKP is to disentangle the direct pro-competitive
effect of output tariff liberalisation on markups from any sort of X-efficiencies made by
firms that change costs and lead to markup adjustment. To do so, DGKP re-run the
markup regression while controlling for marginal costs, (A-5)
µfjt = αfj + αst + β3τ
out
it + βmc lnmcfjt + βmc2(lnmcfjt)
2 + εfjt (A-5)
Results are shown in Table A.5, with the coefficients on marginal cost suppressed.
Column (1) shows that a firm experiencing a 10pp fall in output tariffs will reduce markups
by 1.7% conditional on any impact of trade reform on marginal costs. Column (2) instru-
ments marginal costs to deal with measurement error as above. These coefficients are
somewhat higher and more precise than those reported by DGKP (with OLS, a β3 of
0.143 with a standard error of 0.05 and with the IV a β3 of 0.150 with a standard error of
0.062), but qualitatively similar. Both show that output tariff reductions served to mod-
erate the rise in markups that were due firms being able to resist cutting prices despite
trade lowering their marginal costs.
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Table A.5: Pro-competitive effects of output tariffs on markups
lnµ lnµ
τ output 0.141 0.180
(0.020)*** (0.046)***
N 27,504 15,848
R2 0.53 0.53
Controls for marginal cost yes yes
Firm-product FEs yes yes
Sector-year FEs yes yes
Instruments no yes
First-stage F-test 9.3
Notes: Corresponds to DGKP, Table X, p.494. Standard errors clustered by industry. All regressions
include a constant, firm-product fixed effects and sector×year fixed effects. Column 1 controls for marginal
costs with a 2nd-order polynomial of log marginal cost, column 2 instruments for the polynomial with
current period input tariffs and a lagged 2nd-order polynomial of marginal costs. First stage F-stat is the
F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
R2 is the Within R-squared. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
A-2 Additional table
Table A.6: OLS regressions of firm-product characteristics on tariffs with market
share interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln quantity ln price lnmc lnµ a λ/µ 1/µ
τ output -0.005 0.209 0.001 0.209 -0.033 7.807 -2.301
(0.082) (0.104)** (0.059) (0.110)* (0.068) (4.614)* (1.520)
τ output ∗ top 0.049 -0.064 0.135 -0.199 -0.124 -6.780 2.230
(0.077) (0.109) (0.060)** (0.142) (0.053)** (5.701) (1.918)
τ input -1.297 -0.150 1.176 -1.326 -1.003 -43.985 15.227
(0.395)*** (0.662) (0.424)*** (0.481)*** (0.410)** (21.613)** (7.886)*
τ input ∗ top 0.821 0.230 -0.829 1.059 0.798 22.718 -7.961
(0.268)*** (0.360) (0.216)*** (0.474)** (0.205)*** (18.338) (6.348)
R2 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
N 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504 27,504
Firm-product FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table provides regression coefficients used to construct Table 2.11. mc is marginal cost, µ is
markup, a is TFP, λ/µ is the demand shifter and 1/µ is the demand slope. top is a time-invariant dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if on the first appearance of a firm-product in the data it has an above
median market share within a 4-digit industry, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include firm-product fixed
effects and sector×year dummies. R2 is the Within R-squared. Significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3: On The
Productivity Advantage of Cities
B-1 Closing the model: the DGKP and FMMM estimation
procedures
B-1.1 Closing the model
We index firms by i and time by t. In what follows we consider a Cobb-Douglas production
technology with 3 production factors: labour (L), materials (M) and capital (K). In line
with the existing literature we assume capital to be a dynamic input that is predetermined
in the short-run, i.e., current capital has been chosen in the past and cannot immediately
adjust to current period shocks.I We further assume, as standard in the literature, that
materials are a variable input free of adjustment costs. Concerning labor we could assume
it is a variable input free of adjustment costs, or we could assume it is, very much like
capital, predetermined in the short-run as in DGKP, or we could also assume, following
Ackerberg et al. (2015), it is a semi-flexible input.II In light of the features of the French
labor market we opt for the predetermined case.
IAs described in Ackerberg et al. (2015) capital is often assumed to be a dynamic input subject to an
investment process with the period t capital stock of the firm actually determined at period t-1. Intuitively,
the restriction behind this assumption is that it takes a full period for new capital to be ordered, delivered,
and installed.
IIMore precisely, in the semi-flexible case Lit is chosen by firm i at time t−b (0 < b < 1), after Kit being
chosen at t−1 but prior to Mit being chosen at t. In this case, one should expect Lit to be correlated with
productivity shocks in t. Yet labour would not adjust fully to such shocks as materials do. The choice
between predetermined and semi-flexible for Lit does not change the structure of the model and estimation
procedure we provide below but only affects the set of moments used in the estimation. We highlight any
differences later on.
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We further assume firms are single-product, while relaxing this assumption in Appendix
C, and minimize costs while taking the price of materials WMit, which is allowed to be
firm-time specific, as given. Consequently, at any given point in time, each firm i is dealing
with the following short-run cost minimization problem:III
min
Mit
{MitWMit} s.t. Qit = AitLαLit M
αM
it K
αK
it ,
where Ait is quantity TFP which is observable to the firm (and influences her choices)
but not to the econometrician. In what follows we refer to the Cobb-Douglas production
technology as the quantity equation and denote with lower case the log of a variable (for
example ait denotes the natural logarithm of Ait). The quantity equation can thus be
written as:
qit = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + ait. (B-1)
First order conditions to the firm’s cost minimization problem imply that:
WMit = χit
Qit
Mit
αM (B-2)
where χit is a Lagrange multiplier.
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We can thus write the short-run cost function as:
Cit = MitWMit = χitQitαM = WMit
(
Qit
Ait
) 1
αM
L
− αL
αM
it K
− αK
αM
it . (B-3)
Marginal cost thus satisfies the following property:
∂Cit
∂Qit
=
1
αM
Cit
Qit
. (B-4)
By combining equations (B-2), (B-3) and (B-4) one obtains the result provided in
Section 3.3.2 that the markup can be computed as the ratio of the output elasticity of
IIITo simplify notation we ignore components that are constant across firms in a given time period as
they will be controlled for by suitable dummies.
IVχit =
WMit
αM
Q
1
αM
−1
it A
− 1
αM
it L
− αL
αM
it K
− αK
αM
it .
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material to the share of materials’ expenditure in revenue:
µit =
αM
sMit
. (B-5)
Moving to the time process of quantity TFP ait we assume, as standard, it can be
characterized by a Markov process and in particular we consider the leading AR(1) case.
More specifically we assume:
ait = φaait−1 +Gar + νait, (B-6)
where Gar represents geographical factors affecting productivity (like the density of eco-
nomic activities), and νait stands for productivity shocks that are iid and represent innov-
ations with respect to the information set of the firm in t− 1.
B-1.2 The DGKP estimation procedure
From the above equations, the optimal expenditure on materials (B-3) is a function of
labour, capital, the unit cost of materials and quantity TFP (which are known and given
to the firm in t) as well as of the optimal quantity produced. The latter is obtained
by equalizing the marginal cost and the marginal revenue and will thus depend upon
the same 4 variables (labour, capital, the unit cost of materials and quantity TFP) plus
factors characterizing the specific demand facing firm i. DGKP suggest to proxy for the
unobservable unit cost of materials and firm-specific demand factors with the observable
price and marker share of firm i as well as regional variables Gr. Operationally, they thus
assume the conditional (log) input demand for materials can be expressed as a function
h(.) of kit, lit, ait, pit, Gr, and the market share MSit. If h(.) is globally invertible with
respect to ait, the inverse function ait = g(kit, lit,mit, pit,MSit, Gr) exists and is well
behaved and so one can use a semi-parametric polynomial approximation of g(.) in order
to proxy for the unobservable (to the econometrician) quantity TFP ait. Operationally,
we use a second order polynomial in the arguments of g(.) to proxy this function. By
labeling this polynomial Polyit we thus have ait = Polyit.
Using ait−1 = Polyit−1 in (B-6) we have:
ait = φaPolyit−1 +Gar + νait,
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while substituting this into the production function one gets:
qit = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + φaPolyit−1 +Gar + νait. (B-7)
Note that in (B-7) one does not need to identify the parameter φa nor separately identify
Gar form the Gr contained in Polyit−1. Therefore, one can write:
qit = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + Poly
′
it−1 + νait. (B-8)
where Poly
′
it−1 is simply a second order polynomial in kit−1, lit−1, mit−1, pit−1, Gr and
MSit−1.
V Given the assumption that productivity shocks νait are innovations with re-
spect to the information set of the firm in t − 1, νait is uncorrelated with Poly
′
it−1 in
(B-8). Furthermore, labour and capital are predetermined and so uncorrelated with νait
too. Therefore, the only endogenous variable in (B-8) is materials mit and parameters can
be estimated by exploiting additional moments conditions. More specifically, we use ma-
terials, labour and capital at time t− 2 as instruments for materials in t. This ultimately
allows us to get estimates of the production function parameters α̂L, α̂M and α̂K as well as
productivity âit=qit− α̂Llit− α̂Mmit− α̂Kkit. (3.6) and (3.9) can then be used to recover
the firm-specific markup and marginal cost while (3.2) delivers demand heterogeneity λ̃it.
We perform estimations of (B-8) separately for each two-digit industry (NACE Sections)
and consider a full battery of 8-digit product dummies, as well as year dummies.
B-1.3 The FMMM estimation procedure
As in FMMM we assume that product appeal follows an AR(1) process and in particular:
λit = φλλit−1 +Gλr + νλit, (B-9)
where Gλr represents geographical factors affecting demand (like the density of economic
activities) and νλit stands for product appeal shocks that are iid and represent innovations
VThere is, however, an identification issue with both (B-7) and (B-8) in the DGKP procedure which does
not apply to the FMMM procedure. Firm market share and price in t−1 are, among other things, present
as covariates in (B-7) and (B-8) where quantity at time t in on the left-hand side. In this respect using the
market share of firm i as a proxy is equivalent to using the revenue of firm i as a proxy. Indeed, market
share is firm revenue divided by industry-level sales and the denominator can be basically considered
a constant across firms when in the regression there is a set of industry or product dummies. Lagged
revenue and price obviously perfectly predict lagged quantity which is a powerful predictor of current
quantity. Therefore, there might be little variation left to precisely identify technology parameters. In our
analyses we actually encountered such problems and ultimately decided to drop firm market share from
the polynomial approximation.
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with respect to the information set of the firm in t− 1. Furthermore, we make use of the
result that the log revenue function can be approximated (up to a constant across firms
that will be controlled for by using suitable dummies) by a linear function of quantity and
product appeal and, to avoid burdening notation, we use = instead of ':
rit =
1
µit
(qit + λit). (B-10)
We label (B-10) the revenue equation.
This estimation procedure builds upon (B-10) and uses both the revenue and quantity
equations to estimate technology parameters. The two-steps procedure described below
is not the only one that can be used to recover technology parameters under our set of
assumptions but has the advantage of being simple to implement and linear. In what
follows, it is convenient to rewrite the Cobb-Douglas production function as:
qit = αLlit + αMmit + (γ − αL − αM )kit + ait, (B-11)
where γ characterizes returns to scale. By substituting qit with the formula of the Cobb-
Douglas we can transform (B-10) further as:
rit =
αL
µit
(lit − kit) +
αM
µit
(mit − kit) +
γ
µit
kit +
1
µit
(ait + λit) .
Furthermore, by using (B-5), we get:
LHSit ≡
rit − sMit (mit − kit)
sMit
=
αL
αM
(lit − kit) +
γ
αM
kit +
1
αM
(ait + λit) . (B-12)
where LHSit is made out of observables only.
We then build upon our assumptions on the time process for ait and λit: (B-6) and
(B-9). However, before substituting (B-6) and (B-9) into (B-12) we need to find a con-
venient way to express ait−1 and λit−1. By using (B-5) and (B-10) we have:
λit−1 = rit−1µit−1 − qit−1 = rit−1
αM
sMit−1
− qit−1. (B-13)
At the same time plugging (B-13) into (B-12) and re-arranging yields:
ait−1 = αMLHSit−1 − αL (lit−1 − kit−1)− γkit−1 −
(
rit−1
αM
sMit−1
− qit−1
)
. (B-14)
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Finally, by combining (B-6), (B-9), (B-13) and (B-14) into (B-12) we obtain:
LHSit =
γ
αM
kit +
αL
αM
(lit − kit) + φaLHSit−1 − φa
γ
αM
kit−1 − φa
αL
αM
(lit−1 − kit−1)
+ (φλ − φa)
(
rit−1
sMit−1
− qit−1
αM
)
+
1
αM
(Gar +Gλr) +
1
αM
(νait + νλit) . (B-15)
Note that the revenue equation (B-15) is, besides the idiosyncratic productivity and
demand shocks νait and νλit, now entirely written in terms of observables and useful
parameters. There are various ways of estimating (B-15) and here we use perhaps the
simplest one. More specifically, we rewrite (B-15) as the following linear regression:
LHSit = b1z1it + b2z2it + b3z3it + b4z4it + b5z5it + b6z6it + b7z7it + ur + uit, (B-16)
where z1it=kit, z2it=(lit − kit), z3it=LHSit−1, z4it=kit−1, z5it=(lit−1 − kit−1), z6it= rit−1sMit−1 ,
z7it=qit−1, ur=
1
αM
(Gar +Gλr), uit=
1
αM
(νait + νλit) as well as b1=
γ
αM
, b2=
αL
αM
, b3=φa,
b4=−φa γαM , b5=−φa
αL
αM
, b6=(φλ − φa) and b7=− (φλ − φa) 1αM .
Given our assumptions, the error term uit in (B-16) is uncorrelated with current capital
and labour as well as with lagged inputs use, quantity and revenue. Therefore, z1it to z7it
are uncorrelated to uit. Concerning ur, it is also uncorrelated with uit and so (B-16) can
be estimated by OLS. Indeed, given we do not need to separately identify the impact of
geographical factors affecting productivity and demand but simply control for them, we
simply replace ur with the log of the 2009 population and the log of the land area of
region r and use them as controls in (B-16). Operationally, we augment (B-16) with a
full battery of 8-digit product dummies, as well as year dummies, and finally set γ̂αM =b̂1,
α̂L
αM
=b̂2 and φ̂a=b̂3 without exploiting parameters’ constraints in the estimation.
We now turn to estimating γ from the quantity equation in a second step. Combining
(B-1) and (B-5) we have:
qit = µitsMit (mit − kit) + αL (lit − kit) + γkit + ait. (B-17)
Further using αM =
γ
b1
as well as αL =
γb2
b1
and we get:
qit =
γ
b̂1
(mit − kit) +
γb̂2
b̂1
(lit − kit) + γkit + ait, (B-18)
XVI
where we replace b1 and b2 with their estimates b̂1 and b̂2 coming from (B-16). Finally,
using (B-6) to substitute for ait and using (B-14) we obtain:
qit =
γ
b̂1
(mit − kit) +
γb̂2
b̂1
(lit − kit) + γkit + γ
φ̂a
b̂1
LHSit−1 −
γb̂2φ̂a
b̂1
(lit−1 − kit−1)
− γφ̂akit−1 − φ̂a
(
rit−1
γ
b̂1sMit−1
− qit−1
)
+Gar + νait. (B-19)
Note that the only unobservable in (B-19) is the idiosyncratic productivity shock νait
while the only important parameter left to identify is γ. Indeed, the impact of geographical
factors affecting productivity is simply a control in our framework and we use the log of
the 2009 population and the log of the land area of region r to replace Gar. We can more
compactly write (B-19) as the following linear regression:
LHSit = b8z8it +Gar + νait (B-20)
where:
LHSit = qit − φ̂aqit−1
z8it =
1
b̂1
(mit − kit) +
b̂2
b̂1
(lit − kit) + kit +
φ̂a
b̂1
LHSit−1
− b̂2φ̂a
b̂1
(lit−1 − kit−1)− φ̂akit−1 −
φ̂arit−1
b̂1sMit−1
as well as b8=γ. Concerning z8it, it is endogenous but we can use and have used sev-
eral moment conditions for identification: E {νaitkit} = E {νaitlit} = E {νaitlit−1} =
E {νaitmit−1} = E {νaitkit−1} = E {νaitqit−1} = E {νaitrit−1} = 0. As for Gar, it is
under our assumptions uncorrelated with νait. Operationally, we perform estimations of
(B-20) separately for each two-digit industry (NACE Sections) and consider a full battery
of 8-digit product dummies, as well as year dummies. IV estimation of (B-20) provides an
estimate of γ that, together with γ̂αM and
α̂L
αM
coming from the first stage revenue equation,
uniquely delivers production function parameters (α̂L, α̂M and γ̂) as well as productivity
âit=qit − α̂Llit − α̂Mmit − (γ̂ − α̂L − α̂M )kit. (3.6) and (3.9) can then be used to recover
the firm-specific markup and marginal cost while (3.2) delivers demand heterogeneity λ̃it.
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B-2 Measurement error in output and unanticipated shocks
As customary in productivity analyses, an issue to account for before proceeding to any es-
timations of the production function is the presence of measurement error in output and/or
unanticipated productivity shocks. In the former case, instead of qit, the econometrician
might be observing q′it=qit + eit where eit is standard measurement error. Another inter-
pretation of the same equation is that eit represents productivity shocks unanticipated by
the firm. (B-1) thus becomes:
q′it = αLlit + αMmit + αKkit + ait + eit.
The approach suggested by the literature (Ackerberg et al., 2015; De Loecker et al., 2016)
to deal with measurement error in output and/or unanticipated shocks eit is based on the
proxy variable framework and a semi-parametric implementation. We follow this approach
and, building on the same logic of equation (19) in DGKP, we estimate:
q′it = poly(lit,mit, pit, kit) + eit, (B-21)
where q′it is (log) quantity as reported in the data and poly(.) is a third-order polynomial in
lit, mit, pit and kit.
VI We run (B-21) separately for each two-digit industry while including
the log of the 2009 population and the log of the land area of region r, as well as a full set
of 8-digit product dummies and year dummies, to (B-21). We then use the OLS prediction
of q′it, that we label q̂
′OLS
it , as quantity in the both the DGKP and FMMM procedures.
We also use the same approach for revenue and consider:
r′it = poly(lit,mit, pit, kit) + ēit, (B-22)
where ēit now contains measurement error in both quantity and prices, as well as unob-
served productivity shocks, and use the OLS prediction of r′it, that we label r̂
′OLS
it , as
revenue in the both the DGKP and FMMM procedures. Again, we run (B-22) separately
VIThe logic behind using (B-21) to purge quantity from measurement error and unanticipated shocks is
quite simple. From the quantity equation (B-1) qit is a function of lit, mit, kit and ait. Using prices pit
as a proxy for ait, while assuming invertibility, one can then write ait as a function of lit, mit, pit and kit.
Overall, qit is thus a function of lit, mit, pit and kit than can be semi-parametrically approximated by a
polynomial function. Crucially, measurement error and/or unanticipated shocks to do influence a firm’s
choices and so their are not part of the polynomial approximation but rather the residual of equation
(B-21).
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for each two-digit industry while including the log of the 2009 population and the log of the
land area of region r, as well as a full set of 8-digit product dummies and year dummies,
to (B-22). Also note that, as suggested in DGKP, by purging revenue from measurement
error and using r̂′
OLS
it instead of r
′
it, we obtain a more reliable measure of the share of
materials in revenue (sMit) that is needed to compute markups.
B-3 Multi-product firms
Produced quantities and generated revenues may be observable for the different products
of each firm in databases like ours. However, information on inputs used for a specific
product is typically not available. We report here an extension of the MULAMA model
from FMMM to solve the problem of assigning inputs to outputs for multi-product firms.
As usual we denote a firm by i and time by t. A firm i produces in t one or more
products indexed by p and the number of products produced by the firm is denoted by
Iit. In our data p is an 8-digit prodcom product code but in other data, like the bar-code
data used in Hottman et al. (2016), can be much more detailed. We assume product
appeal is firm-time specific (λit) while we allow markups (µipt) and productivity (aipt) to
be firm-product-time specific. The production function for product p produced by firm i
is given by:
Qipt = CpCtAiptL
αLg
ipt M
αMg
ipt K
γg−αMg−αLg
ipt , (B-23)
where Cp and Ct are innocuous product and time constants (that will be controlled for by
suitable dummies) we disregard in what follows and g identifies a product group/industry.
Production function coefficients are the same for products within a product group because
a certain level of data aggregation is needed to deliver enough observations to estimate
parameters. (B-23) means we allow for technology (αLg, αMg, γg) to differ across the
different products p produced by a multi-product firm. At the same time productivity is
allowed to vary across products within a firm and information coming from single-product
firms need to be used to infer the technology of multi-product firms, i.e., we rule out
physical synergies in production but allow for some of the economies (diseconomies) of
scope discussed in DGKP. Furthermore, we assume firm i to maximize profits and choose
(for each product p) the amount of labour Lipt and materials Mipt in order to minimize
short-term costs while taking capital Kipt, as well as productivity aipt and product appeal
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λit as given. We make use of (3.4) and in particular:
ript '
1
µipt
(qipt + λit). (B-24)
Profit maximization implies:
Pipt = µipt
∂Cipt
∂Qipt
, (B-25)
so that we can, starting from data on prices and markups, recover marginal costs. Also
note that the marginal cost is equal toVII
∂Cipt
∂Qipt
= A
− 1
αLg+αMg
ipt Q
1−αLg−αMg
αLg+αMg
ipt K
γg−αLg−αMg
αLg+αMg
ipt (B-26)
Firms minimize costs and so markups are such that:
µipt =
αMg
sMipt
(B-27)
where sMipt is the expenditure share of materials for product p at time t in firm revenue
for product p at time t.
As far as single-product firms are concerned, the DGKP procedure or the FMMM pro-
cedure described in Appendix A can be used to recover quantity TFP, markups, marginal
costs and demand heterogeneity. Turning to multi-product firms we impose, as in DGKP,
that the same technology parameters coming from single-product producers extend to
the products of the former. Yet, in order to quantify multi-product firms productivity,
markups, marginal costs and demand heterogeneity we still need to solve the issue of how
to assign inputs to outputs and we do so by building on the above assumptions and the
parameters estimated for single-product firms. As far as materials are concerned, we need
to assign the observable total firm material expenditure Mit across the Iit products pro-
duced by firm i at time t, i.e., we need to assign values to Mipt such that
∑Iit
p=1Mipt = Mit.
We can use this condition along with (B-27) and (B-24) to operate this assignment. Sub-
stituting (B-27) into (B-24) and adding
∑Iit
p=1Mipt = Mit provides a system of Iit + 1
equations in Iit + 1 unknowns; the Iit inputs expenditures Mipt plus λit. Indeed, at this
stage we have data on ript, qipt, αMg and Mit. Operationally, one can actually proceed
in two stages. Combining the above equations one has
∑Iit
p=1
αMgriptRipt
qipt+λit
= Mit. This
VIIWe omit the innocuous product-time constant
(
WLpt
αLg
) αLg
αLg+αMg
(
WMpt
αMg
) αMg
αLg+αMg
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equation is solved for each firm and delivers λit. With this at hand one can then ob-
tain materials expenditure from Mipt =
αMgriptRipt
qipt+λit
. By recovering inputs expenditures
Mipt we subsequently compute materials expenditure shares in revenues sMipt and so use
(B-27) to recover a firm-product-time specific markup µipt as well as the marginal cost
from (B-25). Since labour is a variable input a condition analogous to (B-27) holds for
this input and so we use the computed markups µipt and information on αLg to derive
labour expenditure: Lipt =
αLgRipt
µipt
. Operationally, this is not guaranteed to satisfy the
constraint
∑Iit
p=1 Lipt = Lit for each firm and so the Lipt are re-scaled for each firm.
The above procedure allows so far to obtain markups, marginal costs and product
appeal/demand heterogeneity, as well as information on labour and materials use, for
each of the products of a multi-product firm. However, in order to recover productivity
aipt we still need values for capital Kipt. To do this one can proceed as follows. Combining
the marginal cost, profit maximization and quantity equations one gets:
Kipt =
(
Pipt
µiptQ
a+b
ipt L
−aαLg
ipt M
−aαMg
ipt
)( 1
c−aαKg
)
(B-28)
where a = − 1αLg+αMg , b =
1−αLg−αMg
αLg+αMg
, c =
γg−αLg−αMg
αLg+αMg
and αKg = γg − αMg − αLg is
the capital coefficient. We further refine those values by running an estimation where the
computed Kipt from (B-28) is regressed on Ript, Mipt, Lipt as well as total firm expenditure
on materials and labour plus the capital stock and a full battery of year and product
dummies. The predicted values of such regression are then re-scaled for each firm to meet
the constraint
∑Iit
p=1Kipt = Kit.
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B-4 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Revenue productivity, density and product composition effects (number of firms
weighted, SP sample)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R TFP-R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log density 0.0432 0.0328 0.0136 0.0108 0.0210 0.0175 0.0210 0.0163
(0.0073)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0019)*** (0.0052)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0050)*** (0.0033)***
R2 0.02 0.17 0.56 0.69 0.87 0.91 0.78 0.87
N 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432
2-digit dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
8-digit dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by ZE. Regressions are weighted and include
year dummies as well as either 2-digit or 8-digit product dummies. Estimations are carried on the sample of SP firms.
Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year observations
corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.2: Revenue productivity, density and product composition effects (revenue weighted,
SP sample)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R TFP-R
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log density 0.0899 0.0621 0.0189 0.0120 0.0525 0.0298 0.0515 0.0300
(0.0147)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0022)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0078)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0074)***
R2 0.04 0.33 0.57 0.80 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.95
N 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432 55,432
2-digit dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
8-digit dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by ZE. Regressions are weighted and include
year dummies as well as either 2-digit or 8-digit product dummies. Estimations are carried on the sample of SP firms.
Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at
time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
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Table B.3: OLS regressions of standard revenue productivity measures on ZE population
density (revenue weighted, 2-digit dummies, various samples)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R
Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP
sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample
log density 0.0662 0.0759 0.0762 0.0899 0.0162 0.0170 0.0171 0.0189 0.0632 0.0554 0.0755 0.0525
(0.0119)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0147)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0150)*** (0.0116)***
2-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.81 0.83 0.77 0.57 0.80 0.93 0.88 0.90
N 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the ZE level. Regressions include time and industry (2-digit) dummies.
The Fare sample includes firms with complete balance sheet data in NACE 2 industries 10-32 that remain after an initial cleaning of the data. The
Prodcom sample includes the subset of such firms that are in the Prodcom dataset. In both samples, an observation is a firm-year combination.
Each firm-year observation is weighted by Rit/Rr where Rit is firm i revenue at time t and Rr is the sum of Rit across the firm-year observations
corresponding to the ZE r. SP and MP refer to single-product and multi-product firms in the Prodcom sample that have been subject to further
data cleaning. We consider two samples: 1) the sample of SP and MP; 2) the sample of SP. In both samples an observation is a firm-product-year
combination. For SP a firm-product-year combination corresponds to a unique firm-year combination. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted
by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations
corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.4: OLS regressions of standard revenue productivity measures on ZE population
density (revenue weighted, 6-digit dummies, various samples)
Dep. var. log VA per worker OLS TFP-R Wooldridge TFP-R
Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP Fare Prodcom SP+MP SP
sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample sample
log density 0.0565 0.0611 0.0596 0.0783 0.0137 0.0142 0.0139 0.0159 0.0572 0.0382 0.0545 0.0385
(0.0119)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0114)*** (0.0147)*** (0.0024)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0168)*** (0.0137)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0116)***
6-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.16 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.66 0.89 0.94 0.91 0.92
N 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432 628,940 201,261 189,017 55,432
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the ZE level. Regressions include time and industry (6-digit) dummies. The
Fare sample includes firms with complete balance sheet data in NACE 2 industries 10-32 that remain after an initial cleaning of the data. The Prodcom
sample includes the subset of such firms that are in the Prodcom dataset. In both samples, an observation is a firm-year combination. Each firm-year
observation is weighted by Rit/Rr where Rit is firm i revenue at time t and Rr is the sum of Rit across the firm-year observations corresponding to the ZE
r. SP and MP refer to single-product and multi-product firms in the Prodcom sample that have been subject to further data cleaning. We consider two
samples: 1) the sample of SP and MP; 2) the sample of SP. In both samples an observation is a firm-product-year combination. For SP a firm-product-year
combination corresponds to a unique firm-year combination. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue
corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.5: OLS regression of log marginal costs on TFP and log quantity (SP
firms)
Dep. Var. log marg. cost log marg. cost
TFP -1.1936 -1.2092
(0.0027)*** (0.0061)***
log quantity 0.2157 0.2294
(0.0020)*** (0.0039)***
Weighting un-weighted revenue
R2 0.9974 0.9985
N 55,432 55,432
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Stand-
ard errors clustered by firm. Regressions include year
dummies as well as 8-digit product dummies. Estima-
tions are carried on the sample of SP firms. The first
column reports results of an un-weighted OLS regres-
sion while column two provides results of a weighted
OLS regression where each firm-product-year observa-
tion is weighted by Ript where Ript is firm i revenue
corresponding to product p at time t.
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Table B.6: FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price,
log marginal cost and log markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.1032 0.1353 0.0321 0.0346 -0.0025
(0.0546)* (0.0489)*** (0.0188)* (0.0188)* (0.0031)
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product
p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the
ZE r.
Table B.7: FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price,
log marginal cost and log markup on log density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.0386 0.0549 0.0163 0.0225 -0.0062
(0.0270) (0.0243)** (0.0081)** (0.0081)*** (0.0028)**
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year
observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.8: FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log
density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0158 -0.0163 0.0321 0.0040 -0.0722 0.0840 0.0042
(0.0091)* (0.0222) (0.0188)* (0.0444) (0.0639) (0.0336)** (0.0036)
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue
corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
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Table B.9: FMMM procedure: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log
density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0211 0.0048 0.0163 0.0276 -0.0387 0.0323 0.0074
(0.0034)*** (0.0091) (0.0081)** (0.0207) (0.0312) (0.0139)** (0.0030)**
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.10: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost
and log markup on log density (revenue weighted, SP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.1196 0.1975 0.0779 0.0864 -0.0085
(0.0629)* (0.0554)*** (0.0305)** (0.0311)*** (0.0040)**
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP firms, firm-product-year variables are
aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year
observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product p at time
t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.11: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost
and log markup on log density (number of firms weighted, SP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.0518 0.0770 0.0252 0.0329 -0.0077
(0.0340) (0.0288)*** (0.0151)* (0.0160)** (0.0028)***
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP firms, firm-product-year variables are
aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year
observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year observations
corresponding to the ZE r.
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Table B.12: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue
weighted, SP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0428 -0.0351 0.0779 0.0135 -0.1026 0.1319 0.0117
(0.0122)*** (0.0322) (0.0305)** (0.0460) (0.0713) (0.0425)*** (0.0044)***
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F
stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See Stock
J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning
by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to
product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.13: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number
of firms weighted, SP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0168 -0.0084 0.0252 0.0148 -0.0403 0.0423 0.0081
(0.0042)*** (0.0162) (0.0151)* (0.0200) (0.0281) (0.0134)*** (0.0025)***
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F
stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See Stock
J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning
by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year
observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.14: DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS
regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log
density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.1487 0.1899 0.0413 0.0473 -0.0060
(0.0602)** (0.0556)*** (0.0228)* (0.0230)** (0.0034)*
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product
p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the
ZE r.
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Table B.15: DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS
regressions of firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log
density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.0524 0.0675 0.0151 0.0237 -0.0086
(0.0271)* (0.0245)*** (0.0079)* (0.0081)*** (0.0029)***
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year
observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.16: DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS
regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP
sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0064 -0.0349 0.0413 -0.0250 -0.1013 0.1328 0.0085
(0.0059) (0.0254) (0.0228)* (0.0361) (0.0492)** (0.0349)*** (0.0032)***
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue
corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.17: DGKP procedure with total wage bill to measure the labour input: 2SLS
regressions of firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number of firms weighted,
SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0035 -0.0116 0.0151 0.0076 -0.0465 0.0424 0.0082
(0.0025) (0.0087) (0.0079)* (0.0176) (0.0226)** (0.0122)*** (0.0025)***
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
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Table B.18: DGKP procedure with wage bill weights: 2SLS regressions of firm log quantity,
log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log density (revenue weighted,
SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.1120 0.1496 0.0376 0.0397 -0.0021
(0.0556)** (0.0507)*** (0.0223)* (0.0229)* (0.0039)
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-
year variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each
firm-product-year observation is weighted by Wipt/Wr where Wipt is firm i wage bill corresponding to
product p at time t and Wr is the sum of Wipt across the firm-product-year observations corresponding
to the ZE r.
Table B.19: DGKP procedure with wage bill weights: 2SLS regressions of firm TFP-R and
Mulama measures on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0340 -0.0036 0.0376 0.0200 -0.0680 0.0820 0.0047
(0.0138)** (0.0260) (0.0223)* (0.0403) (0.0616) (0.0390)** (0.0036)
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Wipt/Wr where Wipt is firm i wage bill
corresponding to product p at time t and Wr is the sum of Wipt across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.20: DGKP procedure excluding firms located in Île de France: 2SLS regressions of
firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log density
(revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.1263 0.1794 0.0530 0.0605 -0.0074
(0.0821) (0.0767)** (0.0275)* (0.0277)** (0.0046)
N 257 257 257 257 257
LM stat under-identif. 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product
p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the
ZE r.
XXVIII
Table B.21: DGKP procedure excluding firms located in Île de France: 2SLS regressions of
firm log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log density
(number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.0650 0.0830 0.0180 0.0282 -0.0101
(0.0317)** (0.0273)*** (0.0100)* (0.0100)*** (0.0033)***
N 257 257 257 257 257
LM stat under-identif. 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of firm-product-year
observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.22: DGKP procedure excluding firms located in Île de France: 2SLS regressions of
firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (revenue weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0357 -0.0173 0.0530 0.0361 -0.1148 0.1144 0.0099
(0.0199)* (0.0342) (0.0275)* (0.0596) (0.0875) (0.0529)** (0.0051)*
N 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
LM stat under-identif. 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue
corresponding to product p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
Table B.23: DGKP procedure excluding firms located in Île de France: 2SLS regressions of
firm TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0170 -0.0010 0.0180 0.0331 -0.0514 0.0353 0.0094
(0.0051)*** (0.0118) (0.0100)* (0.0189)* (0.0273)* (0.0107)*** (0.0028)***
N 257 257 257 257 257 257 257
LM stat under-identif. 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9 42.9
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2 202.2
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
XXIX
Table B.24: DGKP procedure with Translog production function: 2SLS regressions of firm
log quantity, log revenue, log price, log marginal cost and log markup on log density (number of
firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. log quantity log revenue log price log marg. cost log markup
log density 0.0458 0.0624 0.0166 0.0225 -0.0059
(0.0264)* (0.0239)*** (0.0080)** (0.0081)*** (0.0026)**
N 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log
density. Robust standard errors reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification
and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald F stat’ is the first-stage F test
statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification.
See Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year
variables are aggregated at the ZE level after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-
product-year observation is weighted by Ript/Rr where Ript is firm i revenue corresponding to product
p at time t and Rr is the sum of Ript across the firm-product-year observations corresponding to the
ZE r.
Table B.25: DGKP procedure with Translog production function: 2SLS regressions of firm
TFP-R and Mulama measures on log density (number of firms weighted, SP+MP sample)
Dep. var. TFP-R TFP log price Adj. TFP ã rev. shifter λ̃ Adj. scale ˜̄q rev. slope 1/µ
log density 0.0076 -0.0090 0.0166 -0.0075 0.0073 0.0078 0.0043
(0.0026)*** (0.0082) (0.0080)** (0.0125) (0.0202) (0.0095) (0.0020)**
N 273 273 273 273 273 273 273
LM stat under-identif. 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4 29.4
Under-identif. p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald F stat weak identif. 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9 225.9
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Instruments for log density are 1831, 1861 and 1891 log density. Robust standard errors
reported. The ‘LM stat’ is a LM test statistic for under-identification and ‘Under-identif. p-value’ is the corresponding p-value. ‘Wald
F stat’ is the first-stage F test statistic corresponding to the excluded instruments and is a test statistic for weak identification. See
Stock J.H. and Yogo (2005). Starting from the sample of SP and MP firms, firm-product-year variables are aggregated at the ZE level
after demeaning by 8 digit product and year. Each firm-product-year observation is weighted by 1/Nr where Nr is the total number of
firm-product-year observations corresponding to the ZE r.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4: The UK’s
Great Demand Recession
C-1 Data appendix
C-1.1 The ARDx
The ARDx covers around two-thirds of UK economic activity, comprising most SIC 2007
sections, except parts of sections A (agriculture) and K (finance), and all of O (public
administration and defence), T (activities of households) and U (extraterritorial organisa-
tions). We split the data in order to run the full model on manufacturing and the restricted
model on services as described in section 4.2.6 above. Tables C.1 and C.2 show the ARDx
coverage for these sectors for firms with 10 or more employees, weighting the survey data
using sampling weights based on the stratification of country, 4-digit SIC 2007 headings
and employment band. Monetary values in the data are deflated using appropriate series
published by the ONS (see below for details) and are reported in 2010 £s.
The recession of 2008-9 is clearly visible for both manufacturing and services, with
output and gross value-added dropping substantially for both. The picture for inputs is
mixed, however, with manufacturing employment shrinking substantially over the entire
2003-13 period, while real capital stock and real intermediates consumption also declined.
The services sectors saw a substantial post-recession rebound in employment, capital stock,
and intermediates consumption. We also note a pronounced fall in the number of firms
sampled from the manufacturing industries from 2007 to 2008 when the survey changed
from the ABI to the ABS, leading us to prefer our within-firm analysis that is likely to be
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Table C.1: Manufacturing aggregates by year (using deflated prices)
Observations Firms Output GVA Intermediates Capital Employment
£bn £bn £bn £bn m
2003 9,277 37,048 390.47 110.33 280.14 111.45 2.75
2004 8,910 35,337 396.73 115.79 280.94 108.66 2.60
2005 8,406 34,279 389.92 117.58 272.35 106.38 2.47
2006 7,718 37,732 384.96 123.77 261.19 93.40 2.36
2007 8,360 36,271 421.76 136.63 285.13 91.70 2.31
2008 5,223 34,771 427.56 142.44 285.11 95.14 2.35
2009 4,813 30,349 372.08 118.64 253.44 72.74 2.25
2010 4,901 28,994 393.36 131.94 261.42 72.14 2.09
2011 4,554 28,485 401.68 137.72 263.96 71.35 2.05
2012 4,694 29,378 397.11 135.78 261.33 70.78 2.06
2013 4,543 29,034 394.84 136.57 258.27 70.87 2.07
GVA, output and intermediates all calculated at basic prices from ARDx dataset for firms with 10 or
more employees. Manufacturing firms SIC 2007 industries 10-33. Capital stock estimated using ARDx
and perpetual inventory method code supplied by ONS to SecureLab users. Employment at time of ARDx
sample selection. First column shows un-weighted cell count, all other columns weighted using ARDx
sample weights with appropriate auxiliary variable.
less heavily biased by selection effects (see main text).
C-1.2 Revenue, value added and labour measures
As a measure of firms’ revenues from production we calculate what the ONS labels ‘output
at basic prices’ by adjusting reported firm turnover for value-added tax, goods bought
and sold for resale (i.e. where no production has taken place), changes in stocks and
work-in-progress, and changes in stocks of materials, storage and fuels, see Ayoubkhani
(2014). We similarly calculate gross value added, measuring intermediates as consumption
at purchaser prices, less goods and services bought for resale and changes in stocks of
materials, storage and fuels.
We use the firm wage bill as our preferred measure of labour input, instead of the
number of employees, as it controls for ability differences across workers over time. In
our setting in particular, if firms responded to the recession by substituting workers of
different skill levels – with a corresponding difference in wages – we would if using the
headcount measure mistakenly pick this up in our estimates of revenue TFP and TFP.
C-1.3 Capital stock
The ARD/ABS does not report a capital stock variable but it does have investment data
allowing capital stock to be estimated using the perpetual inventory method. The ONS
made available supplementary data files and its Stata code that allow researchers to con-
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Table C.2: Services aggregates by year (using deflated prices)
Year Observations Firms Output GVA Intermediates Capital Employment
£bn £bn £bn £bn m
2003 24,059 162,782 888.43 437.05 451.38 151.25 11.42
2004 23,353 162,321 944.75 470.77 473.98 166.74 11.84
2005 22,810 166,425 963.46 475.33 488.13 179.60 12.03
2006 19,643 247,799 983.87 487.82 496.05 159.89 11.67
2007 21,766 270,784 1,089.66 536.77 552.89 179.76 12.38
2008 19,369 282,954 1,167.54 560.97 606.58 197.72 13.65
2009 17,627 179,346 1,074.91 514.30 560.62 170.20 13.93
2010 16,381 177,204 1,088.87 521.79 567.08 166.36 13.40
2011 17,532 181,681 1,096.46 522.17 574.30 168.53 13.60
2012 18,100 194,493 1,117.38 529.87 587.50 171.48 14.26
2013 17,949 201,314 1,179.53 557.94 621.59 177.70 14.58
GVA, output and intermediates all calculated at basic prices from ARDx dataset for firms with 10 or more
employees.Services firms SIC 2007 sectors F-U, excluding K. Capital stock estimated using ARDx and
perpetual inventory method code supplied by ONS to SecureLab users. Employment at time of ARDx
sample selection. First column shows un-weighted cell count, all other columns weighted using ARDx
sample weights with appropriate auxiliary variable.
struct firm capital stocks over any time period and with suitable parameters. We construct
the variable for the years 2003-2013 using data for the period 1998-2013.
The perpetual inventory method requires a value for the capital stock on the first
observation of a firm in the data. The ONS solution is to compare the amount of investment
in the survey data with the amount of investment known to occur from National Accounts
data, in order to establish the proportion of observed investment to total investment at a
(letter code) industry level. This proportion is assumed to also apply to capital stocks. We
then obtain a measure of industry level capital stocks (again using the National Accounts
estimates of capital services) in the observed data. All that remains is to share this among
firms within each industry, which we do based on the IDBR turnover variable.
The procedure also needs to deal with the unbalanced nature of the panel giving rise to
many missing observations for investment for all but the largest firms. These missing values
are imputed using the average of investment per employee for observed years. We keep
observations when capex is negative, even if total capex for a firm over time is negative,
dealing with negative capital stocks instead at the end of the process. This procedure
first attempts to ‘correct’ negative capital stocks by rebasing the initial estimate and then
recalculating subsequent observations, iterating five times or until the process leads to a
positive capital stock. Those that remain negative are removed from our final dataset.
Standard ONS industry and national accounts data contains 10 types of capital, while
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the ABS/ABI has investment data for only three types: buildings, vehicles and plant and
machinery, the latter being a residual ‘other’ category. Our preferred capital stock is to use
plant and machinery, following Harris and Drinkwater (2000); Harris and Moffat (2017).
In doing so we do not require detailed user costs in order to aggregate different types of
capital stock. We use an annual depreciation rate of 10% for plant and machinery.
Firms are also asked about capital hires in the ABS/ABI surveys but, since in our
model capital must be pre-decided in each period, we do not add this to the capital stock
as it is presumably more flexible than the fixed stock. Instead, it will be included in firms’
intermediates expenditures.
C-1.4 Product concordance
The core Prodcom list is published annually by Eurostat, however until 2005 it con-
tained some aggregate codes and some national-level codes. These national level codes are
dropped from the analysis. The Prodcom list typically has minor changes from year to
year as new codes are added, obsolete products removed, and other codes either merged or
split. However, the 2007/8 revision of NACE, and corresponding move from UK Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) 2003 to SIC 2007, involved wholesale changes to Prodcom
when 4,396 Prodcom codes were made obsolete and replaced with 3,864 new codes. Since
we need to track a firm’s production and sales of a product over time, we need a concord-
ance procedure to give us a consistent set of products. For this we borrow the procedure
and Stata code due to Van Beveren et al. (2012). The concordance works by grouping
together new codes that map from obsolete codes into a synthetic code, and then keeps
track of these family trees. Each ‘tree’ becomes a new product, and we are left with
3,795 consistent products. We drop firm-product-year observations that we are not able
to match using the concordance procedure.
C-1.5 Deflators
We deflate all monetary variables to constant 2010 prices. For output price deflators we
use a series provided by the ONS, ‘Experimental Industry Level Deflators’I.
These are a mixture of 2-, 3- and 4-digit deflators produced by aggregating industry
IDownloaded from https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/adhocs/
006718industryleveldeflatorsexperimentaluk1997to2015
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product deflators based on their use of products in line with the National Accounts supple-
use framework. Finance (SIC section K) is excluded, and we drop the section from the
services analysis. For most service sectors, the deepest level of detail available is at the
SIC division (2-digit) level.
Detailed input price deflators are available for manufacturing but not services. For
manufacturing we turn to the ONS Producer Price Index (PPI) time seriesII which provides
Gross Sector Input (GSI) deflators at the one to four digit SIC 2007 level, depending on
GSI sub-section. Each GSI sub-section can span several SIC divisions (the 2 digit level),
while data for some levels of aggregation are not available. We group the data in such a
way as to produce deflators at the SIC division level. MostIII SIC divisions map 1:1 to the
GSI deflators we have availableIV.
For services inputs we deflate using the same output price series described above. Our
estimates of the plant and machinery capital stock are deflated by the ONS deflator seriesV
for other machinery & equipment by SIC section.
We use the output price deflators to convert wage costs into real terms. Calculations
of value added for manufacturing are made using double deflation, deflating output and
inputs separately before calculating value added.
C-1.6 Merging the ARDx and Prodcom
The merging process, and the impact it has on the mean values of key variables, is shown
in Table C.3. Firms in Prodcom and the ARDx (column 2) are on average larger by
every metric than those only in the ARDx (column 1) while single product firms are
smaller (column 3). Firms in the final single product estimation sample (column 4) have
slightly higher output, intermediates and capital stock than all the single product firms,
and slightly lower value added, wage bills and employment.
IIDownloaded from https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/datasets/
producerpriceindex
IIIThe exceptions are Food (SIC division 10), Beverages (11) and Tobacco (12) for which we use the
combined GSI sub-section ’Food, Beverages and Tobacco’.
IVWe map SIC division 22 (‘Rubber and Plastic Products’) to GSI sub-section ‘Other manufactured
goods n.e.c.’; division 23 (‘Other non-metallic mineral products’) to ‘Cement, Lime & Plaster’; division
27 (‘Electrical equipment’) to ‘Computer, Elect & Optical Products’; division 30 (‘Other transport equip-
ment’) to ‘Motor Vehicles’; and division 33 (‘Repair and Installation’) to ‘Other manufactured goods
n.e.c.’.
VDownloaded from: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/
datasets/capitalservicesestimates
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Table C.3: Summary statistics and data constraints
All variables ...plus ... plus ... plus
available Prodcom single product data constraints
Output £m 45.86 50.65 35.80 37.08
Value-added £m 15.35 17.52 12.67 12.11
Intermediates £m 30.51 33.13 23.13 24.97
Capital £m 10.07 11.33 8.42 9.28
Wage Bill £m 8.49 9.72 7.35 6.89
Employment 239.40 279.48 217.79 217.07
Average N per year 5,731 4,268 2,266 1,140
Means of variables by sample. ’All variables available’ is the number of manufacturing sector firms in the ARDx that
have a) at least 10 employees and b) have the following variables available: employment, total turnover ex. VAT,
purchases of goods and materials, capital stock, total wages and salaries. ‘...plus Prodcom’ adds the requirement
that the firm-year observation is also in the Prodcom dataset. ‘...plus single product’ adds the requirement that at
least 90% of a firm’s output at basic prices is accounted for by sales of a single product . ‘...plus data constaints’
adds the requirement that Prodcom measures a non-zero quantity of production, and that firm revenues reported
by Prodcom are within 30% of the output calculated from the ARDx.
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C-2 Additional results
Table C.4: Revenue production function estimates for the whole sample of
manufacturing firms in the ARDx.
log output log value-added
(1) OLS (2) WLD (3) OLS (4) WLD
log wage bill 0.421 0.358 0.946 0.914
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)***
log intermediates 0.549 0.646
(0.002)*** (0.016)***
log capital stock 0.016 0.013 0.030 0.064
(0.001)*** (0.007)* (0.001)*** (0.008)***
R2 0.99 0.99
Obs 63,043 16,050 63,043 16,050
All regressions include 2-digit industry and year dummies. Standard errors clustered by firm. * p < 0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure C.1: Real, actual and official price index changes: manufacturing,
revenue-weighted, within sample
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(b) Official price index
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(c) Real prices
Indices of prices (2008=100) calculated using revenue-weighted changes from t− 1 to t for the
manufacturing firms within sample.
Table C.5: Real, actual and official price index changes: manufacturing,
un-weighted, within sample
∆ real ∆actual ∆ official
prices prices price index Obs
2004 0.009 0.018 0.009 641
2005 0.009 0.027 0.018 564
2006 0.002 0.025 0.023 617
2007 0.014 0.042 0.028 594
2008 -0.001 0.069 0.069 401
2009 0.024 0.047 0.024 443
2010 0.015 0.036 0.021 496
2011 -0.001 0.039 0.040 450
2012 0.003 0.012 0.009 478
2013 -0.001 0.012 0.012 477
2003-2008 0.007 0.033 0.026 2,817
2008-2013 0.008 0.029 0.021 2,344
The Table shows mean un-weighted within-firm changes from t − 1 to t for the within sample. The final
two rows show the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual observations.
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Table C.6: Real, actual and official price index changes: manufacturing,
multi-product firms, within changes, revenue-weighted
∆ real ∆actual ∆ official
prices prices price index Obs
2004 0.002 0.011 0.008 2,189
2005 -0.007 0.008 0.015 1,891
2006 -0.005 0.017 0.023 2,376
2007 0.007 0.034 0.027 2,368
2008 -0.012 0.075 0.087 1,657
2009 0.010 0.040 0.030 2,079
2010 0.005 0.023 0.017 2,267
2011 0.008 0.056 0.048 2,277
2012 -0.012 0.002 0.014 2,243
2013 0.007 0.024 0.017 2,210
2003-2008 -0.003 0.029 0.032 10,481
2008-2013 0.003 0.029 0.026 11,076
The Table shows mean revenue-weighted within-firm-product changes from t−1 to t for the multi-product
firms sample, where the weights used are average revenues in the two periods. The final two rows show
the mean of changes over the two periods using all the annual observations.
Figure C.2: CES demand measure for different values of σ: manufacturing,
within sample, un-weighted
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(b) CES demand measure σ = 10,
un-weighted
Indices of changes in CES demand measures (2008=100). Indices are computed for the manufacturing
firms within sample using un-weighted within changes and two alternative values for the elasticity of
substitution: σ = 5 and σ = 10.
Table C.7: Chow tests on changes in revenue TFP and its components:
manufacturing, within sample, revenue weighted.
F(k,N-2k) p N
∆ TFP-R (WLD) 54.89 0.000 5,161
∆ TFP-R (DGKP) 28.54 0.000 5,161
∆a 19.16 0.000 5,161
∆λ 27.43 0.000 5,161
∆ω 35.93 0.000 5,161
∆µ 28.64 0.000 5,161
∆ scale 54.43 0.000 5,161
The Table shows the F-stat and corresponding p-value from Chow tests of the null hypothesis of no
structural break in each listed variable in 2008, where k = 2.
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Table C.8: Chow tests on changes in revenue TFP and its components: services,
within sample, revenue weighted.
F(k,N-k) p N
∆ TFP-R (WLD) 36.12 0.000 66,146
∆ω 17.71 0.000 66,146
∆µ 9.39 0.000 66,146
∆ scale 156.43 0.000 66,146
∆ adjusted ω 34.71 0.000 66,146
∆ adjusted scale 26.20 0.000 66,146
The Table shows the F-stat and corresponding p-value from Chow tests of the null hypothesis of no
structural break in each listed variable in 2008, where k = 2.
Table C.9: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. Multi-product firms, within changes, revenue-weighted.
∆ TFP-R ∆ TFP-R ∆a ∆λ ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale Obs
(WLD) (DGKP)
2004 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.022 -0.022 -0.002 0.019 2,189
2005 -0.000 -0.002 0.006 0.004 0.010 0.004 -0.027 1,891
2006 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.061 0.074 0.005 -0.017 2,376
2007 0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.088 0.087 0.009 0.021 2,368
2008 0.026 0.041 0.053 -0.030 0.023 -0.000 -0.074 1,657
2009 -0.014 -0.012 -0.023 -0.170 -0.192 -0.017 -0.057 2,079
2010 0.031 0.036 0.031 0.272 0.302 0.023 0.008 2,267
2011 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.075 0.082 0.007 0.013 2,277
2012 0.003 -0.002 0.010 0.075 0.085 0.009 -0.025 2,243
2013 0.000 0.002 -0.005 0.018 0.014 0.000 0.009 2,210
2003-2008 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.023 0.036 0.003 -0.014 10,481
2008-2013 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.058 0.062 0.005 -0.009 11,076
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Figure C.3: Manufacturing. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Multi-product firms, within changes, revenue-weighted.
90
95
10
0
10
5
11
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(a) WLD rev TFP
90
95
10
0
10
5
11
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(b) DGKP rev TFP
90
95
10
0
10
5
11
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(c) a
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(d) λ
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(e) ω
98
99
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(f) µ
95
10
0
10
5
11
0
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Trend: 2003-2008 Trend: 2009-2013
Index level (2008=100)
(g) scale
XLI
Table C.10: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Within sample, un-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ TFP-R ∆a ∆λ ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale Obs
(WLD) (DGKP)
2004 0.008 0.018 0.010 0.162 0.171 0.016 0.036 641
2005 0.016 0.002 -0.007 0.078 0.071 0.008 0.001 564
2006 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.023 0.036 0.002 0.008 617
2007 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.150 0.150 0.016 0.015 594
2008 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.321 0.348 0.032 -0.054 401
2009 -0.025 -0.026 -0.050 -0.260 -0.310 -0.027 -0.084 443
2010 0.037 0.030 0.016 0.179 0.194 0.019 0.026 496
2011 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.195 0.218 0.019 0.015 450
2012 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 0.050 0.042 0.007 0.001 478
2013 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.132 0.144 0.013 0.019 477
2003-2008 0.014 0.015 0.008 0.135 0.142 0.014 0.005 2,817
2008-2013 0.009 0.007 -0.001 0.063 0.062 0.007 -0.003 2,344
Table C.11: Services. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. Within sample, un-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale ∆ adjusted ω ∆ adjusted Obs
(WLD) scale
2004 0.002 0.096 0.008 0.042 0.044 -0.043 8,387
2005 -0.008 0.038 0.005 0.022 0.019 -0.026 7,813
2006 0.004 -0.024 -0.004 0.022 0.003 0.001 6,438
2007 0.006 0.129 0.008 0.033 0.058 -0.052 6,266
2008 -0.017 -0.219 -0.021 -0.005 -0.105 0.088 5,674
2009 -0.005 0.052 0.011 -0.048 -0.005 -0.000 6,493
2010 0.012 0.073 0.005 0.018 0.049 -0.037 6,079
2011 -0.002 -0.150 -0.015 0.012 -0.058 0.056 5,966
2012 0.011 0.053 0.002 0.012 0.044 -0.034 6,404
2013 0.002 -0.013 -0.003 0.025 0.016 -0.014 6,626
2003-2007 0.001 0.061 0.004 0.030 0.031 -0.030 28,904
2007-2013 0.000 -0.030 -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.008 37,242
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Figure C.4: Manufacturing. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Within sample, un-weighted
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Figure C.5: Services. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. Within sample, un-weighted
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Table C.12: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Within sample, employment-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ TFP-R ∆a ∆λ ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale Obs
(WLD) (DGKP)
2004 0.006 0.019 0.015 0.214 0.229 0.019 0.030 641
2005 0.013 -0.002 -0.017 0.065 0.049 0.006 0.007 564
2006 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.111 0.129 0.010 0.009 617
2007 0.011 0.017 -0.007 0.155 0.148 0.011 0.024 594
2008 0.025 0.022 0.030 0.352 0.382 0.033 -0.052 401
2009 -0.022 -0.019 -0.056 -0.306 -0.362 -0.031 -0.080 443
2010 0.028 0.022 0.009 -0.013 -0.004 -0.000 0.035 496
2011 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.295 0.312 0.026 0.011 450
2012 -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.027 -0.027 -0.001 0.009 478
2013 0.011 0.014 0.001 0.177 0.178 0.014 0.021 477
2003-2008 0.014 0.015 0.008 0.176 0.184 0.016 0.006 2,817
2008-2013 0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.024 0.018 0.002 -0.001 2,344
Table C.13: Services. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. Within sample, employment-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale ∆ adjusted ω ∆ adjusted Obs
(WLD) scale
2004 0.005 0.051 0.002 0.042 0.044 -0.039 8,387
2005 -0.008 -0.013 -0.002 0.047 -0.030 0.022 7,813
2006 0.002 -0.036 -0.004 0.024 0.019 -0.017 6,438
2007 0.006 0.174 0.013 0.031 0.061 -0.055 6,266
2008 -0.021 -0.238 -0.019 0.013 -0.118 0.098 5,674
2009 -0.006 -0.033 -0.001 -0.029 -0.090 0.084 6,493
2010 0.009 0.131 0.010 0.021 0.081 -0.071 6,079
2011 -0.002 -0.298 -0.026 0.012 -0.068 0.066 5,966
2012 0.011 0.062 0.001 0.029 0.058 -0.047 6,404
2013 0.001 -0.064 -0.006 0.040 0.025 -0.024 6,626
2003-2007 0.001 0.045 0.002 0.036 0.024 -0.023 28,904
2007-2013 -0.001 -0.070 -0.007 0.015 -0.016 0.015 37,242
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Figure C.6: Manufacturing. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Within sample, employment-weighted
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Figure C.7: Services. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. Within sample, employment-weighted
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Table C.14: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. FMMM estimation procedure, within sample,
revenue-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ TFP-R ∆a ∆λ ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale Obs
(WLD) (FMMM)
2004 0.007 0.024 0.011 0.123 0.133 0.012 0.031 576
2005 0.011 -0.011 -0.012 0.026 0.014 0.003 0.022 498
2006 0.018 0.046 0.039 0.060 0.099 0.006 -0.016 548
2007 0.012 0.025 0.015 -0.004 0.010 0.001 0.026 519
2008 0.028 0.032 0.064 0.149 0.213 0.016 -0.045 355
2009 -0.025 -0.000 -0.046 -0.096 -0.142 -0.015 -0.093 364
2010 0.031 0.031 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.032 435
2011 0.023 0.038 0.050 0.168 0.217 0.017 0.003 387
2012 -0.008 -0.015 -0.021 0.005 -0.016 0.000 0.018 405
2013 0.013 0.012 -0.012 0.094 0.082 0.007 0.025 417
2003-2008 0.015 0.024 0.023 0.070 0.094 0.007 0.004 2,496
2008-2013 0.007 0.013 -0.005 0.035 0.030 0.002 -0.003 2,008
Table C.15: Services. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. FMMM estimation procedure, within sample, revenue-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale ∆ adjusted ω ∆ adjusted Obs
(FMMM) scale
2004 -0.004 0.083 0.007 0.052 0.050 -0.054 8,387
2005 -0.012 -0.034 -0.002 0.049 -0.017 0.006 7,813
2006 0.008 -0.017 -0.002 0.035 0.026 -0.017 6,438
2007 -0.001 0.166 0.014 0.051 0.113 -0.114 6,266
2008 -0.014 -0.159 -0.012 0.010 -0.124 0.110 5,674
2009 -0.027 -0.018 0.001 -0.016 0.011 -0.038 6,493
2010 0.011 0.097 0.008 0.014 0.079 -0.068 6,079
2011 0.018 -0.132 -0.013 -0.002 -0.108 0.126 5,966
2012 0.030 0.101 0.006 0.009 0.088 -0.058 6,404
2013 0.004 -0.022 -0.002 0.024 -0.012 0.016 6,626
2003-2007 -0.002 0.051 0.004 0.047 0.044 -0.046 28,904
2007-2013 0.004 -0.019 -0.002 0.007 -0.008 0.012 37,242
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Figure C.8: Manufacturing. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. FMMM estimation procedure, within sample,
revenue-weighted
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Figure C.9: Services. Evolution of revenue TFP and its components over the
period 2003-2013. FMMM estimation procedure, within sample, revenue-weighted
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Table C.16: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Translog production function, within sample,
revenue-weighted
∆ TFP-R ∆ TFP-R ∆a ∆λ ∆ω ∆µ ∆ scale Obs
(WLD) (DGKP)
2004 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.227 0.240 0.020 0.040 659
2005 0.012 -0.002 -0.015 -0.005 -0.020 -0.001 0.018 572
2006 0.018 0.015 0.005 0.134 0.140 0.011 0.024 624
2007 0.008 0.016 0.000 0.222 0.222 0.017 0.033 605
2008 0.025 0.015 0.047 0.144 0.191 0.016 -0.036 396
2009 -0.018 -0.018 -0.051 -0.210 -0.261 -0.022 -0.059 434
2010 0.023 0.023 0.013 0.318 0.332 0.028 0.039 504
2011 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.277 0.299 0.024 0.021 457
2012 -0.004 -0.008 -0.014 -0.127 -0.141 -0.012 0.015 485
2013 0.009 0.013 -0.004 0.197 0.194 0.015 0.024 484
2003-2008 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.149 0.158 0.013 0.017 2,856
2008-2013 0.007 0.007 -0.006 0.093 0.087 0.007 0.009 2,364
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Figure C.10: Manufacturing. Changes of revenue TFP and its components over
the period 2003-2013. Translog production function, within sample,
revenue-weighted
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